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Abstract 
This research explores perspectives on the accountability of Private Ancillary Funds 
(PAFs), a type of Australian endowed philanthropic foundation. Established by trust 
deed, PAFs provide benefits, usually in the form of grants, to certain types of 
charitable beneficiary organisations.  PAFs are a relatively new giving structure that 
has created strong and sustained growth in the philanthropic sector over the past 13 
years, in regard to the number of foundations, and the dollar value of their combined 
capital and distributions.  Their addition to the Australian charitable sector is 
“arguably the single most important boost for Australian philanthropy in many 
decades” (McLeod, 2013, p. 2).   
 
PAFs benefit from several freedoms and concessions, enjoying financial security, tax 
concessions and exemptions, and a light regulatory touch in regard to accountability.  
These characteristics raise the issue of accountability, both including and beyond the 
limited legal and regulatory requirements.  Given PAFs are privately established and 
governed organisations, but have a public benefit purpose, there are differing and 
sometimes conflicting perspectives in terms of the nature and scope of their 
accountability.  
 
Using Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework of non-profit accountability, this 
study explores PAF accountability in terms of to whom, for what, how and why, 
examining the tensions between PAFs’ private form and public purpose.  Through in-
depth interviews with the managers and trustees of 10 PAFs, forms and relationships 
of PAF accountability are uncovered.   
 
Findings reveal PAFs recognise that they are accountable primarily to their 
beneficiaries; the two regulatory bodies, the ACNC and the ATO; the general public; 
the philanthropic sector as a whole; and the children of the founder. 
 
PAFs perceive that they are accountable for their grant-making decisions; 
investments and financial management; and managing risk; as well as the internal 
management of the fund; assessing performance; and conserving resources.   
 
PAFs identify that they are accountable by way of reporting and performance 
measurement of grantees; selective disclosure and transparency; undertaking site 
visits and engaging with beneficiaries; due diligence undertaken on applicants; and 
openness to inquiry and discussion. 
 
PAFs understand that being accountable enables them to demonstrate results, lead 
and inspire others, represent a family, and enjoy the success of a partnership.  
Accountability also brings shared learnings, strategic focus, reduced risk and greater 
visibility. 
 
While PAFs exercise discretionary choice in almost all forms of accountability, they 
engage in accountability for primarily internal reasons which relate to their mission 
and purpose and their desire to lead others in philanthropy.  PAFs are influenced by 
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their philanthropic peers, in particular other PAFs; however their accountability does 
not necessarily include public disclosure or transparency.  
In a more populated and diverse future field of PAFs, engagement with 
accountability to demonstrate professionalism and excellence is likely to increase.  
As the group of individuals involved in the PAF grows and changes, the perceptions 
of PAF accountability will also likely evolve.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THIS STUDY 
Philanthropic foundations are nonprofit organisations, established through donated 
assets, and exist to provide grants for social benefit purposes.  Private and 
independent, philanthropic foundations in Australia have historically not been 
subject to scrutiny from government, beneficiaries, or the general public (including 
through the tax office) (Leat, 2004).  The Australian philanthropic sector was 
explored by Leat (2004), who concluded that Australian foundations have little or no 
accountability, for reasons including notions of privacy, lack of data and debate, 
unquestioning trust in charities, and broad disinterest from successive governments 
and the general public.  In a comparison with the United States, Leat (2004) found a 
relative lack of concern with accountability and foundation governance in Australia.   
Accountability is a notoriously complex concept.  Blind (2011), Sinclair (1995), and 
Koppell (2005) are among several authors who have described the complexity, 
confusion and resulting difficulties the lack of a clear definition imposes on 
researchers.   Blind (2011) describes accountability as “an amorphous concept that is 
difficult to define” (p. 2); Sinclair (1995) refers to “The Chameleon of 
Accountability”; and Koppell (2005) frames the problem as “multiple 
accountabilities disorder”.  However, this lack of a commonly accepted and 
understood definition allows space for foundations to develop and adopt their own 
interpretation of accountability, beyond limited legal and regulatory requirements.   
Accordingly, it is important to understand accountability from a philanthropic 
foundation perspective; given their activities have broader social implications.   
The underlying assumption regarding the importance of accountability is that it leads 
to learning, change and improvement (Carman, 2010).  Without accountability, 
nonprofit organisations including philanthropic foundations “have no way of 
knowing how well they’re doing at fulfilling their mission” (p. 268).  The aim of this 
study is therefore to explore the nature and forms of accountability in endowed 
Australian philanthropic foundations, in particular Private Ancillary Funds (PAFs), 
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given the claims of limited accountability and the limited research on this growing 
sector.   
PAFs are a unique sub-set of nonprofit organisations, representing endowed private 
philanthropic foundations established for a public benefit purpose.  By nature of their 
wealth, PAFs have qualities such as power, influence, independence and long time 
horizons that make them a distinct and compelling context in which to explore the 
concept of accountability. PAFs are a new and expanding part of Australia’s 
philanthropic sector, encouraging new donors into planned philanthropic giving 
(McLeod, 2013, 2014).  A relatively recent foundation structure, PAFs were 
established under the name Prescribed Private Funds (PPFs) in 2001 to enable 
“families and individuals [to] donate to a trust of their own” (Howard, 2001).  This 
form of private philanthropy has grown rapidly over the past 14 years, and has 
“deepened philanthropic giving in Australia” (Edwards, 2009, p. 3).  
As these foundations grow in both number and wealth, a number of issues and 
questions arise with respect to accountability.  The decisions made by philanthropic 
foundations such as PAFs have far-reaching consequences for the nonprofit sector 
and the broader Australian community.   PAFs have discretion regarding which 
organisations and which issues they allocate funds to (and which they do not); for 
what purposes grants are made, and how the capital of the foundation is invested.  By 
whom these decisions are made, with what justification, and against what criteria or 
values, has significant social and economic implications, yet is largely unexplored.  
Similarly unmapped is what information is reported to whom, and what is in the 
public domain.   Thus the question remains, how do foundations explain, justify and 
take responsibility for their work? 
Nonprofit accountability in the academic literature tends to focus on accounting to 
funders (government, business, and philanthropic donors, including foundations, 
trusts and individuals) for the outputs and impacts of the projects or programs they 
support (e.g. Carman, 2010; Flack & Ryan, 2003).  Likewise philanthropic 
practitioner reporting tends to focus on the forms and practices of accountability of 
grant recipients to foundations.  However, what is often not considered is the 
accountability of the grant-making foundations themselves, particularly in light of 
their public benefit purpose and the tax concessions and deductions to which they are 
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entitled.   Accordingly, this descriptive and exploratory project will focus on the 
perspectives on accountability of PAFs as endowed philanthropic foundations, from 
the perspectives of PAF managers and trustees.    
1.2 MOTIVATIONS 
This research has two main motivations, the first of which arises from the literature 
on accountability theory.  The accountability of nonprofit organisations (including 
philanthropic foundations) in the academic literature focuses on accountability to 
funders (government, business, and donors); see for example Dhanani and Connolly 
(2012), Flack and Ryan (2003), and Furneaux and Ryan (2015).   There is very little 
published, however, on the accountability of funders, e.g. philanthropic foundations’ 
organisational level accountability to others (e.g. Coyte, Rooney & Phua, 
2013).  Accordingly, this research will draw on extant theories and frameworks to 
explore how accountability is understood in endowed philanthropic foundations such 
as PAFs, whose purpose is pro bono, survival is assured in perpetuity, and legal and 
regulatory accountability requirements are minimal.   
Specifically, this research seeks to extend nonprofit accountability in the literature, 
incorporating the relationships and forms of accountability in endowed philanthropic 
foundations, in particular PAFs.   Having endowments, PAFs exist free from the 
imperative to continually secure income that is the survival focus of both for-profit 
and most nonprofit organisations.  This financial independence of PAFs means they 
often exist in perpetuity by virtue of trust law, giving them the ability to adopt much 
longer time horizons than almost all other organisation types (Tyler, 2013).  They 
also benefit from a range of tax concessions and exemptions, which has given rise to 
the argument that they should create value at least equal to the tax revenue foregone 
(Australian Government Treasury, 2008).  Hence, they occupy a unique place in the 
nonprofit sector.   
Additionally, the motivations and nature of philanthropic relationships differ from 
those of contract or client relationships (Benjamin, 2010).  In the context of 
nonprofits, accountability to government as a funder is a clear upward accountability 
relationship (Furneaux & Ryan, 2015). However for endowed philanthropic 
foundations, their relationship with government(s) is more frequently implied as 
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being that of a joint funder.  In Australia, a lack of critical media attention given to 
endowed philanthropic foundations (Leat, 2004; McDonald & Scaife, 2011) as 
compared to business and government, highlights the accountability differences 
between philanthropic foundations and other organisational types.   
The second motivation comes from philanthropic sector practice.  In particular, the 
introduction of PAFs (previously PPFs) as a new and simplified philanthropic trust 
structure in Australia in 2001 for the purpose of encouraging new donors into 
philanthropy provides an interesting and valuable opportunity in which to examine 
accountability.  McGregor-Lowndes (2014a, p. 1) describes PAFs as “a tax effective 
closely held charitable trust”.  Since the first fund was established in June 2001, over 
1,200 PAFs with a combined capital value of approximately $4 billion as at 
December 2014 (McLeod, 2014a, p.3) have been created, significantly growing and 
changing the philanthropic sector.   
The economic importance of PAFs is highlighted in a recent report (McLeod, 2014) 
examining their financial contribution to Australia’s nonprofit sector.  While the 
number of PAFs established and the level of donations to them fell in the wake of the 
global financial crisis in 2008-2009, the number of new PAFs being created each 
year is again rising.  Perhaps a more telling number is the cumulative distributions 
from PAFs since 2001, estimated by McLeod (2014) to have reached $1.7 billion at 
the end of 2014.  The growth in untied distributions from PAFs (McLeod, 2014) will 
be of additional significance to nonprofit organisations when contrasted with the 
increasingly common model of nonprofit funding through contracts for service with 
government(s) (Furneaux & Ryan, 2015; Van Slyke, 2006).  
Given the limited research on PAFs and the relatively minimal legal and regulatory 
accountability requirements, exploring how this comparatively new foundation type 
reports and takes responsibility for decisions is timely, and has important 
implications for the future of Australia’s nonprofit sector through a wider 
understanding of the accountability of these organisations.  An examination of 
accountability to whom, for what, how and why will provide valuable theoretical 
insights in an area of limited research to date.  Further, exploring these questions 
with managers and trustees of PAFs will provide additional insights into PAF 
accountability in practice. As noted by Lloyd: 
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Once an organisation starts to engage with the issue and questions of 
accountability to whom and for what are asked, a process of self-reflection 
can evolve that goes to the heart of why an organisation exists, what it seeks 
to achieve, and whom it ultimately aims to serve (Lloyd, 2008, p. 276). 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
For the purposes of this study, the accountability framework expounded by Ebrahim 
(2010) in the context of nonprofits will be adopted and adapted in the context of 
PAFs.   Seminal to the nonprofit accountability literature, Ebrahim (2010) considers 
three questions: accountability for what?, accountability to whom?, and 
accountability how?  This simple and open conceptual framework fits the exploratory 
nature of the study, and is extended to include an additional question around why 
accountability is exercised in philanthropic foundations.   
The four research questions for this study are: 
1. To whom are Private Ancillary Funds accountable?  
2. For what are Private Ancillary Funds accountable? 
3. How are Private Ancillary Funds accountable?   
4. Why are Private Ancillary Funds accountable?  
Collectively, these four research questions will allow the nature and forms of PAF 
accountability to be explored and uncovered. 
Ebrahim’s emphasis on these ‘scaffolding’ questions of accountability is echoed by 
O’Neill (2002, p. 4), who differentiates between the underlying and espoused aims of 
accountability.  
The new systems of control may have aims and effects that are quite distinct 
from the higher standards of performance, monitoring and accountability that 
are their ostensible, publicly celebrated aims. We can see this by asking to 
whom the new audit culture makes professionals and institutions accountable, 
and for what it makes them accountable (emphasis added). 
This study will examine the ways in which PAFs understand and practice 
accountability.   The core of the study is research question one – to whom are PAFs 
accountable?  The subsequent questions (accountable for what, how, and why) 
extend logically from the answer to the first question.  For example, the what, how 
and why of accountability to a regulatory body will necessarily differ from the what, 
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how and why of accountability to a founder, or to future generations of the founder’s 
family.  Thus exploring the field of actors, groups or agencies to whom PAFs 
perceive they are accountable precedes and forms the basis for an exploration of the 
forms and practices which that accountability takes, and the reasons why PAFs 
perceive themselves accountable. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Giving from endowed philanthropic foundations in Australia is increasing much 
faster than giving from individuals, bequests and corporates (McLeod, 2013).  This 
rapid growth has benefits for Australia’s charitable sector, but also potentially creates 
problems, as the decisions made by philanthropic foundations have far-reaching 
social and economic consequences, such as privileging or supporting certain causes 
over others, and potentially influencing policy through advocacy and funding.  Many 
of these decisions are made with little public accountability (Coyte et al., 2013).  
By examining accountability of PAFs, a type of endowed foundation established to 
provide money, property or benefits to eligible entities (broadly, deductible gift 
recipient organisations1) this research will explore an area largely overlooked in 
Australian philanthropy.  Established as trusts, PAFs have some similarities with 
U.S. private family foundations (McGregor-Lowndes, 2014a).  However, given the 
recency of this form of foundation, the absence of accountability frameworks 
specific to endowed philanthropic foundations, including PAFs, represents a gap in 
the literature. 
As at December 2014, there were 1,240 PAFs in Australia, with an estimated 
combined corpus of approximately $4 billion (McLeod, 2014, p. 3).  With a growing 
sector base and mandatory minimum distribution of 5% of net assets per annum, 
PAFs represent a large, growing and irrevocably committed source of grant funding 
for eligible nonprofit organisations.  McLeod (2014) estimates that within a decade, 
distributions from PAFs will exceed donations to them; and that within two decades; 
                                                 
 
1 A deductible gift recipient (DGR) is a nonprofit organisation endorsed by the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) under one of more than 40 categories.  Once endorsed, DGRs are tax exempt, and are 
entitled to receive gifts that are tax deductible to the donor.  This is most commonly understood in 
practice as organisations which issue receipts stating “Donations of $2.00 or over are tax deductible”. 
Examples of well-known DGRs are The Smith Family, the Royal Flying Doctor Service, and the 
RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals).  
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annual distributions will reach $1 billion from an estimated 3,000 PAFs (McLeod, 
2014, p. 13).  Extrapolating from observed trends in the growth of PAFs both in 
number and value, these estimates appear conservative. Hence it is important to 
understand how this growing sub-sector understands accountability.   
The contributions of this study to the evolving understanding of accountability in a 
nonprofit context are: 
1. To consider and review an existing conceptual framework of nonprofit 
accountability (Ebrahim, 2010) in a new context (philanthropy) where 
underlying assumptions from the current theory may not apply (e.g. reliance 
on ongoing external funding). 
2. To extend and build upon existing conceptual frameworks of accountability 
(in particular Ebrahim’s 2010 framework) by examining PAF accountability 
relationships and processes.  
3. To provide an empirical foundation for future research on accountability in 
endowed philanthropic foundations. 
4. To enhance the understanding of the nature and work of a particular giving 
structure, PAFs, which will likely have a large future impact on the 
Australian nonprofit sector. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter One has outlined the aims of this study and the motivations for gaining a 
deeper understanding of accountability of PAFs.   Chapter Two considers the 
background and context of this study, and the influences and pressures currently 
shaping the Australian philanthropic sector.   Chapter Three provides a review of the 
existing literature on the accountability of philanthropic foundations, starting with 
the broad concept of accountability, then narrowing the focus progressively to 
accountability of nonprofit organisations, philanthropic organisations, and endowed 
philanthropic foundations such as PAFs.   In Chapter Four the research design and 
methodology of this study are detailed and justified.  This chapter also addresses the 
philosophical approach to the research, the rationale for the research design, the role 
of the researcher, data collection and analysis, and ethical considerations. 
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Chapter Five explores the findings in relation to the four research questions: to 
whom, for what, how and why are PAFs accountable?  In addition, emergent themes 
are examined and presented.  Chapter Six discusses how the findings of this study 
improve our understanding of accountability in the particular context of PAFs, 
comparing findings with extant nonprofit accountability literature. Chapter Seven 
concludes this thesis, highlighting key findings, theoretical and practical 
implications, limitations of the study, and recommendations for future research.    
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Chapter 2: Background and Research Context 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the background and research setting for the study, in both a national and 
international context.  Section 2.2 examines the background of PAFs since their introduction 
(as PPFs) in 2001.  Section 2.3 considers the regulation of PAFs, and Section 2.4 looks 
specifically at the role of the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) in 
relation to PAF regulation.  Section 2.5 reviews current issues and activities regarding 
accountability in the Australian philanthropic sector as a whole.  Section 2.6 then examines 
international influences on accountability in Australian philanthropy, considering influences 
from the U.S., the U.K. and New Zealand.  Section 2.7 then summarises this chapter. 
2.2 BACKGROUND OF PAFS 
The PAF structure in Australia was initially created in 2001 under the name Prescribed 
Private Fund.  The new structure arose from then Prime Minister Howard’s response to the 
1999 report from the Business and Community Partnerships Working Group on Taxation 
Reform, to encourage philanthropy by making the establishment of a charitable trust or 
foundation simpler, quicker, and more attractive to wealthy donors, such as individuals, 
families and companies (McGregor-Lowndes, 2000).  PPFs offered multiple tax advantages, 
including tax deductibility of donations to them, and exemption from income tax for the fund.  
PPFs did not have public fundraising requirements, and so could remain private and invisible 
from the public eye, but were required to have a minimum of one external director or trustee 
of the fund.  Established for public benefit purposes, PAFs could make grants only to 
organisations endorsed by the ATO as DGRs, and were required to be audited and provide an 
annual financial return to the ATO (Ward, 2009).   
A PAF is itself a nonprofit entity, and must operate within Australia2.  PAFs are required to 
distribute a minimum percentage (5%) of their net asset value each year, must be 
independently audited, and must report to the Commissioner of the ACNC (McLeod, 2013). 
                                                 
 
2 PAFs can make grants to support people and causes overseas by making grants to the overseas aid fund of 
DGR1 organisations based in Australia that are listed on the AusAid list of Australian accredited non-
government organisations (NGOs)  (Ward, 2009) 
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A sample trust deed for establishing a PAF is provided by the ATO to facilitate establishment 
of these funds, and promote charitable giving through this vehicle.  PAFs must distribute 
funds based on the terms of their trust deed; however trust deeds may be general rather than 
specific or limited in nature. 
Being charitable trusts, PAFs are governed by Australia’s State Trustee Acts, which differ 
slightly from one state to another.  While trust is a word used in law and commerce as well as 
daily life, there is a lack of consensus on what a trust actually is, due to multiple meanings 
and usage.  However, Cordery and Baskerville-Morley (2005, p. 5) note that it implies a 
fiduciary duty or an obligation to act in the interests of a ‘vulnerable other’ when managing 
trust property on their behalf.  This underscores the beneficial ownership of the assets or 
property of the PAF, intended for a wider public purpose.  As noted by Parkinson (2002, p. 
683) “…an express [charitable] trust is an equitable obligation binding a person (“the 
trustee”) to deal with identifiable property to which he or she has legal title for the benefit of 
others to whom he or she is in some way accountable”. 
In 2008, a review by the Australian Government Treasury titled “Improving the Integrity of 
Prescribed Private Funds” was initiated by the Rudd Government with the release of a 
discussion paper.  The stated purposes of the review (Australian Government Treasury, 2008) 
were to amend the PPF guidelines to provide the trustees of PPFs with greater certainty as to 
their philanthropic obligations, to ensure regular valuation of assets at market rates, and to 
increase the size of compulsory distributions. 
These purposes were to be achieved under four identified principles outlining the essential 
characteristics of a PPF (Australian Government Treasury, 2008, p. 3), as set out below: 
1. PPFs are philanthropic 
2. PPFs are trusts that: (1) abide by all relevant laws and obligations, and (2) are open, 
transparent and accountable3 
3. PPFs are private 
4. PPFs are ancillary4 funds. 
                                                 
 
3 It is important to note that following the passage of legislation on 1 October 2009, the PAF Guidelines 
included an amended version of this principle, with the wording “A Private Ancillary Fund…is a trust 
which…2.(2) is open, transparent and accountable to the public (through the Commissioner). Note: This does not 
affect the Commissioner’s obligations to protect the confidentiality of taxpayers’ information under taxation 
secrecy and disclosure laws” (Australian Government Treasury, 2009a, p. 3). 
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One hundred and thirty-eight submissions were received as part of the subsequent public 
consultation process, 24 of which were confidential.  Of the 114 publicly available 
submissions, accountability, privacy and confidentiality were recurring themes. For example, 
a joint submission from The Myer Foundation and the Sidney Myer Fund, two of Australia’s 
largest and oldest endowed philanthropic trusts, states: 
One of the attractive features of PPFs is that they are private. This does not mean that 
they are unaccountable. Caution should be exercised in dealing with the terms 
“transparency” and “accountability”, and care taken not to join them mistakenly. 
“Transparency” is best applied to how a PPF meets the regulatory requirements as set 
by legislation, not whether the details about a PPF’s funds under management, funding 
preferences and contact details are available to the public. It would be too easy to 
claim that foundations are not transparent, implying not accountable, when what is 
being argued is that contact and operating details are not known to the public and 
should be made so (Edwards, 2009, p. 5). 
On 1 October 2009, following a review by the Australian Government Treasury, the name 
Prescribed Private Fund was changed to Private Ancillary Fund, together with various other 
changes regarding the distributions from and governance of the funds.  Other changes 
included: 
 annual minimum distribution requirements (5%) based on net assets rather than 
income  
 requiring trustees to be an incorporated body   
 requiring PAFs to be audited for compliance with guidelines, in addition to the annual 
financial audit, and  
 requiring PAFs to submit a formal investment plan as part of their annual return. 
The purpose of the changes was broadly to increase the reporting, distribution and governance 
requirements for PAFs.  Figure 2.1 below summarises the establishment and growth of PAFs 
on a timeline from March 1999 to December 2014, highlighting key legislative changes such 
as the transition from PPFs to PAFs, and growth milestones including the establishment of the 
1,000th PAF in 2012. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Ancillary in this sense means “providing necessary support to the primary activities or operation of an 
organisation, system, etc.” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015).   
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March 1999 report by the 
Business and Community 
Partnerships Working Group on 
Taxation Reform
June 2001 First PPF created, in 
the state of New South Wales 
November 2008 Australian 
Treasury release of discussion 
paper for consultation “Improving 
the Integrity of PPFs”, 138 
submissions received 
2012 The 1,000th PAF registered 
with the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) 
June 2007 Cultural Organisations 
displace Welfare organisations as 
the largest category of grant 
recipients from PPFs  
December 2012 ACNC 
established as the national 
regulator of charities, including 
PAFs 
May 2014 155 public 
submissions received to the 
Senate Committee to repeal the 
ACNC Act, of which 10 refer 
specifically to Ancillary Funds 
March 2001 creation of the 
Prescribed Private Fund (PPF) 
structure
October 2009 Legislation passed 
to change PPFs to PAFs, with 
associated changes in reporting, 
governance and distribution 
requirements
December 2013 Total number of 
PAFs in excess of 1,115 
June 2007 Total closing value of 
all PPFs at end of financial year 
exceeds $1 billion; annual 
distributions from PPFs exceed 
$100 million 
June 2008 Total closing value of 
all PPFs at end of financial year 
exceeds $2 billion; number of 
PPFs established during the 
financial year peaks at 169  
June 2012 Total annual 
distributions from PAFs exceed 
$200 million 
December 2014 Total number of 
PAFs in excess of 1,240 
2000
2014 
Figure 2.1 Timeline of PAFs in Australia 
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2.3 REGULATION OF PAFS 
At a federal level, regulation of nonprofit organisations in Australia is undertaken jointly by 
the ACNC, the ATO, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).  
Nonprofit organisations are also regulated at state and territory level through the State 
Attorneys General.  These regulatory bodies therefore oversee PAFs as a subset of all 
nonprofit organisations.   
The directors of a trustee company of the PAF (individuals informally referred to as the 
‘trustees’) have duties and responsibilities that can be broadly categorised as administration, 
grant-making and investing (Ward, 2009).  Administration includes keeping records and 
accounts, reporting as required under regulations (e.g. the Annual Information Statement 
(AIS) submitted to the ACNC), and managing a PAF’s existing portfolio of grants5.  Grant-
making includes distributing a minimum of 5% of the net asset value of the fund each year 
based on the value as at the end of the previous financial year; as well as granting only to 
eligible organisations and for the public benefit purposes set out in the trust deed.  Investing 
requirements include the establishment of and adherence to an investment policy and any 
investment limitations in the deed or PAF guidelines6 (Australian Government Treasury, 
2009a), and extend to the prudent person requirements for trustees7.   
The trustee(s) of a PAF are also jointly and severally liable for any transgressions of the PAF 
against the Private AF (or PAF) guidelines (Australian Government Treasury, 2009a).  These 
guidelines are the primary regulatory instrument for PAFs, and are administered by the 
Australian Treasury for the purpose of setting “minimum standards for the governance and 
conduct of a private ancillary fund and its trustee” (Australian Government Treasury, 2009a, 
p. 3).  The Explanatory Statement to the guidelines specifically states in the notes to 
Guideline 18 that “Trustees must remain accountable for certain decisions they make. The 
fund must not indemnify a trustee in relation to those decisions” (Australian Government 
Treasury, 2009b, p. 3).   
                                                 
 
5 At minimum, managing an existing portfolio of grants entails obtaining a receipt from the grantee organisation, 
and monitoring of any terms and conditions relating to the grant. 
6 Investment limitations under the PAF guidelines issued by the ATO include that the PAF cannot run a business, 
cannot purchase or hold collectibles such as works of art, and must conduct transactions at arms’ length and on 
commercial terms. 
7 Prudent person requirements for trustees include diversification of investments, considering potential tax 
consequences of investment decisions, and liquidity or future cash flow requirements.  
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There are penalties that may be imposed on PAFs for misdemeanours (Ward, 2009).  The 
most significant of these penalties is potential loss of the PAF’s charitable status through 
failure to report to the ACNC.  However given that disclosure of the PAF’s AIS to the public 
is discretionary (PAFs are able to request their details are not made publicly available), this 
form of reporting is purely administrative for most PAFs.  Hence it does not necessarily 
impinge on the privacy of the founder or trustees, nor does it necessarily contribute to public 
accountability through transparency. 
Fines (expressed in penalty units) must be paid by the trustee or directors, and specifically 
cannot be paid by the fund itself (Ward, 2009).  The penalties under the PAF guidelines range 
from 5 units (for failing to notify a change of Deed) to 100 units (for not following instruction 
from the Commissioner of the ATO).  Given that a penalty unit is $170 in 2015, the 
maximum penalty for which PAF trustees or directors might be jointly liable is $17,000.   
Other regulatory requirements include the Commissioner of the ATO having the power “to 
suspend, remove or replace trustees of private ancillary funds that breach the guidelines or 
other relevant Australian laws” (Australian Government Treasury, 2009b, p. 2).  Figure 2.2 
below depicts PAFs as situated within the broader nonprofit sector in Australia, highlighting  
PAFs as a distinctly defined trust structure within a larger group of endowed grant-making 
trusts and foundations (including those established before the creation of the PAF (then PPF) 
entity in 2001).  Endowed trusts and philanthropic foundations are themselves a subset of 
grant-making foundations, some of which also fundraise from the general public.  This group 
includes PuAFs such as community foundations or health and medical research foundations.  
These grant-making foundations are part of the larger group of nonprofit organisations in 
Australia, which include groups and organisations such as churches, neighbourhood 
associations, societies and emergency services volunteer-based organisations (Productivity 
Commission, 2010).   
 Chapter 2: Background and Research Context  15 
Figure 2.2 PAFs as a sub-set of nonprofit organisations 
 
 
Table 2.1 below summarises the legal form, funding and regulatory accountability of PAFs 
compared to other nonprofit organisation structures, highlighting differences in funding and 
public reporting requirements. Figure 2.3 below shows the relationships between the various 
organisations, agencies and individuals that are connected with a PAF, such as the beneficiary 
organisations to which PAFs make grants, and the ultimate beneficiaries served by these 
organisations. 
 
Table 2.1 Forms, funding and regulation of PAFs compared with other nonprofit organisation 
structures 
Structure and operation PAFs Other nonprofit organisations 
Legal form Charitable trust established by 
deed 
Incorporated associations, unincorporated 
organisations, companies limited by 
guarantee, cooperatives 
 
Sources of income Donations from small, tightly 
held group of donors; 
investment income from corpus 
Funding from donors, government, service 
contracts, trading or sale of goods and 
services, fundraising from the general 
public, investment income 
 
Reporting requirements AIS submitted to the ACNC 
with optional public disclosure 
AIS submitted to the ACNC with 
mandatory public disclosure; annual report 
including audited financial statements 
 
 
PAFs, e.g. The Nelson 
Meers Foundation, the 
first PAF established
Endowed grant-making trusts and 
foundations (e.g. The Myer 
Foundation), often established 
before the creation of the PAF 
structure
Fundraising and grant-making trusts and 
foundations, e.g. Surf Life Saving 
Foundation, Leukaemia Foundation. These 
may include Public Ancillary Funds 
(PuAFs) and community foundations
All nonprofit organisations, 
including neighbourhood 
associations, churches, societies 
and emergency services 
organisations 












 Required to be an incorporated body, serves as private trustee, e.g.  “The Trustee for the J. 
Smith Family Foundation”   
 Directors of the trustee company act (and are informally known) as ‘trustees’ of the PAF  
 Minimum of three directors, one must be designated as ‘Responsible Person’ 
 May also be a statutory trustee company, e.g. State Trustees, Equity Trustees, Perpetual. 
 Staff and managers are usually employed by the trustee company rather than directly by 
the PAF 
 
Private Ancillary Fund 
 Charitable trust fund established by Deed 
 Receives tax exemptions and concessions 
Founder(s) 
 Makes initial (and often 
ongoing) donation(s) to 
the PAF 
 Receives tax deduction 
for gift(s)/donations 
 Typically also a director 
of the trustee company, 
or ‘trustee’ 
ATO and ACNC 
 Regulatory role for PAF 
establishment and 
ongoing operations 
 ATO approves 
establishment of PAF 
and its tax deductible 
status 
 ACNC requires AIS 
from PAF 
Other donors 
 May not be members of the 
general public, must be part 
of a close family or business 
group 
 Receive tax deduction for 
gifts/donations to the PAF 
Beneficiary organisations 
 Must be endorsed as Deductible Gift Recipients, Type 1 (DGR 1) by the ATO 
 Receive grants from the PAF to carry out mission 
Ultimate beneficiaries 
 The individuals, families, groups and communities that are assisted through the work/services of the beneficiary 
organisations, e.g. patients of the Royal Flying Doctor Service 
    Figure 2.3 Structures and relationships between PAFs and their founders, beneficiaries and regulators 
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2.4 THE AUSTRALIAN CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-PROFITS 
COMMISSION 
The ACNC was established in late 2012 by the Federal Labour Government with the 
objectives of maintaining public trust in charities through greater transparency and 
accountability, supporting the nonprofit sector, and reducing unnecessary regulation 
(ACNC, 2013). While the ACNC oversees and is responsible for all charitable and 
nonprofit organisations, not all charities are subject to the same requirements.  After 
lobbying by the philanthropic sector, the ACNC Regulation 2013 (Commonwealth) 
was amended to include a specific provision enabling PAFs to request the ACNC 
withhold some of their information from the publicly available ACNC Register. This 
is typically information that might identify the individual donor(s) contributing to a 
PAF8.   
Under ACNC regulations, private ancillary funds (funds set up to provide 
money, property or benefits to deductible gift recipients – DGRs) that are 
registered charities can ask the ACNC to withhold specific information from 
the Register... Generally, we will allow private ancillary funds to withhold 
their information if it relates to information likely to identify individual 
donors (ACNC, 2015a).  
Following the election of the Liberal National Coalition Government in September 
2013, the ACNC was slated for dissolution.  However, an inquiry into the repeal of 
the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (Repeal) (No. 1) Bill 2014 
was held by the Senate Economics Legislation Committee. The 155 public 
submissions to the inquiry contain several references to the accountability and 
transparency of PAFs, as well as the accountability and transparency of the charitable 
organisations they support.  For example, the submission from Philanthropy 
Australia, the peak membership body for grant-making trusts and foundations, states: 
…as part of maintaining any such register of charities, appropriate provision 
must be made to ensure that the privacy of individual donors is protected. 
Otherwise, the publication of private information about such donors could 
dissuade giving.  
                                                 
 
8 Based on a randomly selected sample of 131 PAFs across all states and territories listed through the 
Australian Business Register online, an average disclosure rate of 10% was found (for PAFs on the 
ACNC Register), i.e. approximately nine in every 10 PAFs had requested that their AIS be withheld 
from the public. 
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This is particularly important in the case of individuals and families who 
maintain a private charitable trust (such as highly regulated Private Ancillary 
Funds), and wish to be accountable but discreet in how they undertake their 
giving (Walsh, 2014, p. 7). 
As these submissions make clear, the issue for philanthropic foundations (including 
PAFs) is not the reporting to the ACNC, but rather whether those reports are made 
public and identifiable. 
At the time of data collection (November and December 2014), the future of the 
ACNC remained uncertain.  The regulatory accountability imposed upon PAFs is 
greater under the ACNC than previously (under the ATO).  If passed, the Australian 
Liberal National Coalition Government’s decision to repeal the ACNC Bill would 
effectively return oversight of PAFs and other nonprofit organisations to the ATO 
and ASIC.  McGregor-Lowndes (2014b, p. 1), in response to a Department of Social 
Services Options Paper, states that “What is proposed clearly will not ‘fill the place 
of’ the ACNC but will be a pale shadow of it, with a minimalist approach to the role 
and functions of the ACNC”.  Despite this ongoing political uncertainty, public and 
third sector support for the ACNC has remained high, as evidenced by an Open 
Letter addressed to the Prime Minister requesting its continuation, signed by 58 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chairs of prominent third sector organisations 
(Community Council for Australia, 2014). This issue is therefore of significant 
interest and importance within the Australian philanthropic sector.   
However, following a change in Federal Ministers in December 2014, the repeal of 
the ACNC Bill was declared a low priority by the Coalition Government (Wilson, 
2015).  The subsequent May 2015 Federal Budget includes three years of funding for 
the ACNC, from mid-2016 to mid-2019 (Australian Government Treasury, 2015).  
As stated in the Budget Papers “the ACNC will continue to operate in its current 
form whilst the current ACNC Act remains in effect” (p. 208).   
2.5 ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN PHILANTHROPIC 
SECTOR 
The notion of transparency and accountability in philanthropic organisations is 
controversial and an area of debate.  Discussion continues in the third sector around 
appropriate levels of openness and disclosure (Wilson, 2015).   
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In August 2013, the Asia-Pacific Centre for Social Investment and Philanthropy at 
Swinburne University of Technology, Victoria hosted a forum titled “Transparency – 
The World Has Changed: Have We?”  In a panel of speakers discussing transparency 
and accountability of charitable giving in Australia, and in particular the impact on 
public trust, there were multiple differing perspectives, both from those broadly in 
favour of and those with reservations about transparency.  In September 2014, 
Bradford Smith, Chair of the U.S. Foundation Center, gave a lecture in Melbourne, 
Victoria on “Bringing transparency to the world of philanthropy – the Foundation 
Center’s role in empowering through knowledge” (Centre for Social Impact 
Swinburne, 2015).  Both these events highlight the increasing interest in transparency 
as a form of accountability in Australian philanthropy. 
The peak membership based-body for philanthropy and giving structures in 
Australia, Philanthropy Australia, currently proposes a voluntary code of practice 
(Philanthropy Australia, 2015a). Endorsed at its Annual General Meeting in 2002, 
the code includes one principle around transparency and accountability: “…it is 
important that there is openness, transparency, integrity, accountability and self-
regulation in the provision of resources to grantees” (Philanthropy Australia, 2015a).  
Other membership bodies include Australian Community Philanthropy, which 
represents its membership base of community foundations.   Both organisations 
provide publications and resources to assist the sector, including the Private 
Ancillary Funds (PAF) Trustee Handbook (Ward, 2009) and the Public Ancillary 
Funds (PuAF) Trustee Handbook (Ward, 2012), which outline the governance duties 
and responsibilities of the trustees or directors of PAFs and PuAFs9.   
Greater regulation of nonprofit organisations (including philanthropic foundations) in 
an Australian context was introduced through the Commonwealth Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, the reporting provisions of 
which apply to nonprofits.  Specified types of transactions, in particular offshore 
transfers, must be submitted to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis 
Centre (AUSTRAC), the regulator for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism 
financing in Australia (Bricknell et al., 2011).  A more recent report (AUSTRAC, 
                                                 
 
9 Public Ancillary Funds (PuAFs) are endowed grant-making funds that are differentiated from PAFs 
in that they “can and must fundraise from the public” (Ward, 2012). 
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2014) specifically identifies non-government organisations such as charities as at risk 
of being targeted by terrorist groups.  The ACNC has also prepared a checklist and 
guidance for charities to assist in protecting them against the risk of terrorism 
financing (ACNC, 2015b). 
2.6 INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON AUSTRALIAN 
PHILANTHROPY 
Australian philanthropy is part of a global network of individuals, corporations, peak 
bodies, membership groups, and teaching and research organisations, each of which 
increasingly interact, inform and influence each other’s work.  Reports on 
international comparisons of giving are becoming more frequent, and more diverse in 
their material.  For example, the World Giving Index 2014 (Charities Aid 
Foundation, 2014) rates over 130 countries assessing individual donations, 
volunteering, and direct assistance to strangers.  The BNP Paribas Individual 
Philanthropy Index (Moreno, 2015) ranks the giving of 400 ultra-high net worth 
individuals across four geographic regions – the U.S., Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia, by the amount given and also their approach to giving.   
Rules to Give By: A Global Philanthropy Legal Environment Index (hereafter ‘The 
Index’), published for the first time in 2015, compares how the governments of 177 
countries support and regulate philanthropic giving through taxation laws (Quick, 
Kruse & Pickering, 2015).  The Index allows for comparison or benchmarking of 
countries, and includes a measure of reporting requirements.  Australia receives a 
score of 10 out of a possible 11 points for its regulation of philanthropic giving.  By 
way of comparison, the U.K. and the U.S. both score 11 points, and New Zealand 
scores 9.  Quick et al. (2015) find a clear link between higher income (wealth) 
countries, and reporting requirements; however only a few countries differentiate the 
level of reporting requirements based on the size of the nonprofit organisation.  
Reporting by nonprofit organisations to regulatory authorities is cited as helping to 
“build public trust in giving and improve governance standards in the sector” (Quick 
et al. 2015, p. 14).  Other publications considering global philanthropy (e.g. Salamon, 
2014; Wiepking & Handy, 2015) offer comparisons of the actors, regulatory regimes 
and cultural differences that shape philanthropy in different countries, and discuss 
the broader influences that affect giving on a global scale. These international 
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comparisons highlight different approaches to regulatory accountability in 
philanthropy, and the importance of context in understanding variations between 
countries. 
The U.S. and the U.K. have the strongest links to Australian philanthropy (Liffman, 
2008), and the influence of each on accountability in Australian philanthropy is 
examined in greater detail below.  Accountability of philanthropy in New Zealand is 
also considered, given the connections between the two neighbouring countries 
continue to grow, as exemplified by the CEO of Philanthropy New Zealand 
presenting the keynote address at the Philanthropy Australia Annual General 
Meeting in April 2015 (Philanthropy Australia, 2015b). 
2.6.1 Influence of accountability in philanthropy in the U.S. 
As with many new directions in philanthropy, the Australian philanthropic sector has 
followed the U.S. in its growing focus on accountability.  Recent professional reports 
(in most instances, supported by foundations10) exploring the concept of 
accountability for philanthropic foundations cite the drivers of this greater concern 
for transparency and accountability as stemming from: 
 a declining trust in all public institutions, 
 increased regulation. 
 impact of federal budget tightening; and 
 an increase in the underlying problems which philanthropy seeks to address 
(Rourke, 2014, p. 3). 
Another recent professional report by the U.S. Philanthropy Roundtable (Tyler, 
2013) addresses the question of taxation concessions and philanthropy, considered in 
terms of the ‘public’ versus ‘private’ nature of these funds; an issue that arises 
frequently in both the professional and academic literature.   The Philanthropy 
Roundtable has stated guiding principles around philanthropic freedom, and Tyler 
strongly defends the private nature of philanthropy (see also Brody & Tyler, 2010).  
Specifically, Tyler (2013) notes that while philanthropic funds (such as PAFs) are 
                                                 
 
10 See for example Rourke, 2014 ‘Philanthropy and the Limits of Accountability’ published by the 
Kettering Foundation and Philanthropy for Active Civic Engagement. 
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created for a public benefit purpose, from a legal viewpoint these funds are 
established and managed privately.  The Tyler (2013) report titled ‘Transparency in 
Philanthropy: An analysis of Accountability, Fallacy and Volunteerism’ explores 
whether the tax deductions and exemptions granted to philanthropic foundations in 
turn require a greater degree of accountability from them.  Tyler identifies four core 
conditions (2013, p. 20-24) that underlie the ‘compact’ or social contract between 
philanthropy and the public.  They are: 
1. foundations must be organised and operated for charitable purposes 
2. foundations must not use funds for private benefit 
3. foundations must not engage in impermissible lobbying or political activity 
4. foundations must follow reporting rules. 
Tyler is critical of the proposition that the public should derive benefit equivalent to 
the favourable tax treatment given to foundations and their donors, calling it the 
‘quid pro quo’ fallacy.  Tyler (2013, p. 26-35) challenges this ‘quid pro quo’ 
proposition on four grounds, namely unclear economic benefits, non-economic 
contributions from philanthropic individuals and foundations (e.g. donated time and 
expertise), legal restrictions, and bureaucratic burden.   Hence, while foundations 
remain responsible and accountable for their purposes, operations and actions (i.e. 
grants) by meeting the four core conditions above, for Tyler this accountability does 
not extend to the implications/outcomes of those actions. 
The discussion around the responsibilities and answerability of philanthropic 
foundations in the U.S. has a long history.  In the Cox Committee Hearings of late 
1952 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1953) into tax-exempt foundations, Mr Russell 
Leffingwell, Chairman of the board of trustees of the Carnegie Corporation11 of New 
York was interviewed.  His response, when questioned about the public reporting 
requirements of philanthropic foundations, was as follows: 
So far as there is a justification – and I am sure there is – for the existence of 
these institutions, it is that they serve the public good.  If they are not willing 
to tell what they do to serve the public good, then as far as I am concerned, 
                                                 
 
11 The Carnegie Corporation of New York is a grant-making foundation established in 1911 by 
Andrew Carnegie, and is among the oldest and largest American philanthropic foundations.   
 Chapter 2: Background and Research Context  23 
they ought to be closed down… And I say that partly because the welfare of 
these great constructive foundations with which I am familiar, and their 
opportunity for usefulness, are constantly threatened by a confusion in the 
minds of people about what is a foundation.  And when they hear that their 
neighbour has set up a foundation for X dollars, and they cannot find out 
what he does with it, the genus foundation comes under suspicion of Mr John 
Smith, whose neighbour has a kind of foundation.  So I am frankly self-
interested in expressing the opinion that all foundations should be required to 
make public their assets and their enterprises and their general purposes and 
their personnel (p. 379).  
These views were expressed in the context of a concern that nonprofit organisations 
were being used to support communism, or “un-American activities and subversive 
activities” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1953, p. 1).   Similar fears were raised 
after the U.S. terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, when nonprofit organisations, 
particularly unincorporated organisations, were internationally identified as at 
particular risk of exploitation for the financing of terrorism (Bricknell et al., 2011).   
This increased threat was attributed to their social purpose, the cash-intensive nature 
of their activities (including donations), the often minimal regulation of their 
operations, and less rigorous administration and financial management than for-profit 
organisations. 
Mr Leffingwell’s contribution to the debate in the U.S. around the accountability 
and, in particular, the transparency of endowed philanthropic foundations endures six 
decades later in the professional literature and social media, led by the service of the 
New York-based Foundation Center titled “Glasspockets: Bringing transparency to 
the world of philanthropy” 12.   Recent blog topics under discussion in early 2015 
include whether transparency is at all times and in all cases a good idea for 
foundations; pragmatic approaches to transparency; and the inter-relationship 
between transparency and governance.  As at September 2015, 77 U.S. philanthropic 
foundations had submitted profiles to the service, and shared their transparency and 
accountability practices (Glasspockets, 2015a). However, no similar forum dedicated 
to discussing transparency and accountability currently exists in the Australian 
philanthropic sector.   
                                                 
 
12 The title derives from the transcript of Mr Leffingwell’s appearance before the Committee, when he 
stated “We think that the [Carnegie] foundation should have glass pockets” (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1953, p. 380). 
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Regulatory accountability of philanthropic foundations in the U.S. is monitored by 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  The 1969 U.S. Tax Reform Act introduced 
public disclosure requirements for private philanthropic foundations in the U.S. 
based on public interest in their work (Anheier & Leat, 2013).  All U.S. foundations 
must provide an annual report (a Form 990PF), which includes details of their 
activities, key staff and trustees, tax status, income and expenses.  These reports are 
made public, and are searchable online through The Foundation Center.  The 
Foundation Center’s mission is to advance “knowledge about philanthropy in the 
U.S. and around the world” (Foundation Center, 2015) and its many publications, 
tools and resources in the accountability field include the Glass Pockets transparency 
service, searchable international maps of philanthropy, an online foundation 
directory, and Grant Craft guides to transparency and accountability (see, for 
example, Parker, 2014).  Other influences on accountability of philanthropy in the 
U.S. include the work of the Center for Effective Philanthropy, which offers funders 
assessment tools such as surveys giving foundations anonymous feedback from their 
stakeholders, including grantees, applicant organisations13, and staff; and encourages 
them to publish the results.   
The U.S. Council on Foundations, the membership body for philanthropic 
foundations in the U.S., has a Statement of Ethical Principles to which members 
must commit.  One of these principles concerns accountability and transparency, and 
states “In carrying out their philanthropic activities, our members embrace both the 
letter and the spirit of the law.  They welcome public interest, take responsibility for 
their actions and communicate truthfully” (Council on Foundations, 2015, para. 4).   
There is also a set of National Standards for U.S. Community Foundations which 
offers accreditation in community philanthropy practice, administered by a Board 
supporting the Council on Foundations.  There are no equivalent national standards 
in Australia.   
The National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy in the U.S. describes itself as 
the “independent watchdog of foundations”.  Its stated mission is to promote 
philanthropy that is “held accountable to the highest standards of integrity and 
                                                 
 
13 Eligible organisations which apply for grants. 
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openness” (NCRP, 2015, para. 2).  Their Philamplify initiative launched in early 
2014, has the aim of breaking through “the isolation bubble” around grant-makers 
(Philamplify, 2015, para. 7) by reporting on the work of foundations and 
incorporating feedback from “nonprofit leaders and staff, issue experts, community 
members and more” (Philamplify, 2015, para. 1).  As at May 2015, five grant-
making philanthropic foundations had been assessed by Philamplify, and their 
reports made publicly available (Philamplify, 2015).  Again, no comparable 
organisation or service exists in Australia.    
Another new organisation working in the foundation transparency area in the U.S. is 
the Fund for Shared Insight.  Launched in mid-2014, Shared Insight is supported by 
seven funders, and itself makes grants to nonprofit organisations with the aim of 
assisting both foundations and their grantees to be more open with each other, 
particularly through seeking out, accepting and acting upon feedback (Fund for 
Shared Insight, 2015). 
The Open Philanthropy doctrine, championed by Bernholz (2011, 2015) and 
colleagues at Stanford University argues for a need to move beyond mere 
compliance in reporting into more comprehensive voluntary disclosure and 
transparency, particularly in the availability of data for the common good.  Bernholz 
(2015) calls for “theories and working practices for ownership, use, and governance 
of digital assets so that we as individuals can donate them for public benefit” (para. 
9).  This call for formal and voluntary regulation of digital civil society reflects the 
need for public trust and confidence in new forms of philanthropy.  Examples of 
accountability in this context include a proposed “Donors Charter” for technology 
grants, which recommends questions that applicants should be able to answer, but 
puts the onus on donors to ensure that they are not “funding projects they shouldn’t” 
(Donors Charter, 2015, para. 1). 
These multiple initiatives and organisations supporting diverse approaches combine 
to demonstrate the U.S. as a long-term leader and innovator in accountability of 
philanthropic foundations established for public benefit purposes. 
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2.6.2 Accountability in philanthropy in the U.K. 
In the U.K., endowed philanthropic foundations are required to report in some detail 
to the Charity Commission, established in 2006, which served as a model for the 
ACNC (Pro Bono Australia, 2012).  Legal accountability of foundations in the U.K. 
context does not differ from other charities, and includes governance and financial 
information.  Foundations must complete an annual report, including financial 
accounts, names of trustees, and a statement on the public benefit they deliver. The 
financial statements must comply with the current Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP)14.  Public disclosure of reports through the Charity Commission is 
intended to generate greater public trust in the work and operations of all charities.  
However these public benefit statements have been found to give a low level of 
detail (Dufton, 2014).   
Increasing attention on philanthropic foundations in recent years has been attributed 
as a cause of growing interest in accountability, transparency, and self-regulation by 
foundations (Dufton, 2014).  Research capacity into philanthropy in the U.K. has 
been increased by the establishment of the Marshall Institute for Philanthropy and 
Social Entrepreneurship at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
created in 2015 with a significant philanthropic donation (Corry, 2015).  
Transparency is being promoted through advocacy groups such as Publish What you 
Fund and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), both of which 
promote greater transparency around international aid and development; and Three 
Sixty Degree Giving, which helps grant-makers in the U.K. disclose their grant 
information online.  The Directory of Social Change is an independent charity that 
has campaigned over many years for increased foundation transparency (Tomei, 
2013). 
The U.K. Association of Charitable Foundations (ACF) is the national membership 
body for U.K. foundations, but has no code of practice or set of standards for its 
members.  The ACF is however part of the Inspiring Impact initiative (Inspiring 
Impact, 2015), aiming to promote high quality impact measurement by and through 
                                                 
 
14 The SORP is an accounting and reporting standard for charities, initially published by the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales in 2005. 
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funders.  Another actor in the philanthropy and transparency field in the U.K. is New 
Philanthropy Capital (NPC).  This is a charity think-tank and consultancy 
organisation working with charities and funders, and identified building trust through 
transparency as essential in its 2015 Manifesto document (NPC, 2015). 
Accountability of philanthropic foundations in the U.K. is thus less developed than in 
the U.S., however there are increasing numbers of organisations and initiatives 
publicly committed to increasing accountability and transparency in philanthropy. 
2.6.3 Accountability in philanthropy in New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the Charities Commission was established under the Charities Act 
2005 as an autonomous entity, with the aim of implementing and maintaining a 
reporting and monitoring system for charities (including philanthropic foundations).  
The Charities Register subsequently opened in early 2007, and registration involved 
the determination of legal charitable status.  The Charities Commission was however 
closed in 2012 as part of a broad reduction in government agencies, and its functions 
were transferred to the Department of Internal Affairs through its Charities Services.  
Registration of charities continues through a Statutory Board, and requires the 
lodgement of an Annual Return, being the form of regulatory accountability for all 
New Zealand charities (Charities Services, 2015a).   
New Zealand charities have the option of requesting that some of their information 
remain restricted from public access, including the details of donors.  However, 
Charities Services specifically lists reasons that are unlikely to be accepted for 
restricting public access to financial information (Charities Services, 2015b).  
Unacceptable reasons include “Too many people will ask us for funding”, which was 
one of the most common arguments from Australian PAFs in successfully securing 
the option to have their contact details and AIS restricted on the ACNC Register 
(Walsh, 2014).  
In 2011, the then Charities Commission began an Open Data initiative, which has 
been continued by Charities Services.  The Open Data service is intended for use by 
software developers in writing applications using the data, under a Creative 
Commons Attribution by licence.  The service allows programmers to interrogate the 
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data, and provides freely available query examples and code.  An Open Government 
Case Study of the Charities Register data undertaken in 2012 (NZ Government 
Department of Internal Affairs, 2015) reported positive data use under the categories 
of economic and social impacts, transparency and democratic impacts, and efficiency 
impacts. 
In reporting on three different perspectives on accountability in New Zealand 
charities, Sinclair et al. (2010) find that charities regard accountability as a form of 
stewardship, rather than as agency or stakeholder accountability (discussed in 
Section 3.4).  Charities held that making their financial information publicly 
available was a low priority, an unnecessary use of resources, and of no interest to 
their stakeholders. 
The Giving New Zealand report (Slack et al., 2012) discusses the influence and role 
of Maori15 social structures on the nonprofit sector and philanthropy in New Zealand.  
The sense of reciprocity encouraged by Maori social values and structures “…has 
had a large impact on the notion of volunteerism and social obligation” (p. 4).  The 
distinction between the concepts of giving or philanthropy in the European sense, 
and sharing in the Maori sense (Robinson & Williams, 2001) focuses accountability 
on interpersonal relationships and community associations.  The strong involvement 
of Maori culture in civic functions has no equivalent in the indigenous cultures of 
Australia.   
Philanthropy New Zealand is the membership body for trusts and foundations, and 
has a Statement of Principles to which members are asked to make a commitment.  
These principles include transparency, ethics and law, and effective governance 
(Philanthropy New Zealand, 2015). However, there is no record of which members 
listed on the Philanthropy New Zealand website have adopted the Principles.  
Community Foundations of New Zealand (CFNZ) is another membership body, and 
has criteria to which its members must adhere if they wish to display the CFNZ 
membership logo (Acorn Foundation, 2015).   
                                                 
 
15 The Maori people of New Zealand represent approximately 15% of the population, and have a 
distinct culture and language. 
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Accountability in philanthropic foundations in New Zealand is therefore informed by 
cultural and regulatory influences that distinguish the context in which philanthropic 
grant-making foundations support the charitable sector. 
2.6.4 Comparison of accountability in international philanthropy 
The regulatory environment in each of the countries briefly considered – Australia, 
the U.S., the U.K. and New Zealand – influences the nature and forms of 
philanthropic accountability.  Table 2.2 below shows the comparative regulatory and 
peak membership body accountability requirements for philanthropic foundations 
across each of the four countries considered in this chapter, highlighting the limited 
regulatory requirements in Australia relative to these other countries. 
Table 2.2 Comparative regulatory and peak membership body accountability 
requirements for grant-making foundations by country 
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The U.S. philanthropic sector is widely acknowledged as the established leader in the 
philanthropic accountability field, and this is demonstrated through both regulatory 
requirements and the number and variety of different organisations focusing on, 
engaging with and discussing accountability.  While some authors contend that the 
influence of the U.S. on the Australian philanthropic sector is strong (Scaife et al., 
2012), more research is needed to provide empirical evidence of such direct 
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influence.  Nevertheless, voluntary initiatives in Australia (Section 2.5) particularly 
around transparency (Anderson, 2013) reflect the dominant trend in the U.S. towards 
ever-increasing disclosure and openness about the actions, activities and motivations 
of foundations.  
2.7 SUMMARY 
In addressing the background and research context for this study into the 
accountability of PAFs, this chapter has outlined the development of PAFs, and 
identified regulatory and cultural influences on accountability of philanthropic 
foundations as well as the impact of Government initiatives, and membership of 
advocacy organisations.   Australia has lower levels of public accountability than the 
U.S., U.K. and New Zealand, with differences in the regulatory environment of 
countries making direct comparisons of how accountability is publicly exercised in 
each country difficult.  Importantly however, such regulation forms a base from 
which the sector builds, rather than defining the limits of accountability for grant-
making trusts and foundations in each country.  Voluntary accountability through 
transparency, openness and answerability is additional to regulatory accountability 
through compliance and reporting. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the literature on accountability in nonprofit organisations, 
including particular forms and relationships of accountability that exist in and for 
endowed philanthropic foundations.    
Literature relevant to the research is examined and accountability themes identified 
in related contexts, namely nonprofit organisations.  As Gray, Bebbington and 
Collison (2006, p. 321) state: “Although there is, within accounting, a considerable 
literature on accountability as it relates to many (if not most) principal organisational 
forms, there is remarkably little, as far as we have been able to identify, that deals 
directly with NGOs [non-government organisations].”  This lack of research is 
reiterated by Coyte et al. (2013, p. 397) who state in an Australian context that “more 
research on accountability in the [third] sector is needed”. 
This literature review is organised as follows.  Definitions, forms and theories of 
accountability in the literature are explored in Section 3.2, as well as other concepts 
associated with accountability.  An overview of theories of accountability in 
nonprofit organisations is detailed in Section 3.3.  In Section 3.4, the focus is 
narrowed to consider the literature on accountability in philanthropic trusts and 
foundations, including definitions of the terms ‘philanthropy’ and ‘foundation’.  
Section 3.5 considers accountability in endowed philanthropic foundations such as 
PAFs, directly pertaining to the four research questions.  Section 3.6 summarises the 
chapter.   
3.2 DEFINITIONS, FORMS AND THEORIES OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
The accountability literature can be characterised as studying the phenomenon of 
accountability in its absence.  It is almost uniformly critical in approach, such that as 
a body of research it can be better conceptualised as being concerned with “lack of 
accountability” or “the wrong accountability” (Messner, 2009).  This situation has 
resulted in many journal articles critical of accountability; and a similarly large 
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number of articles in a neutral space looking at forms, typologies or classifications of 
accountability.   However, there are fewer journal articles or papers that provide 
exemplar case studies of nonprofit accountability, or that examine the nuances of 
effective accountability in different contexts.  As summarised by Goldmark (1997): 
If I say to you that such-and-such organisation is really “not accountable”, 
usually that turns out to mean that they’re not doing what I think they should 
be doing.  We often use the concept of accountability in a way which 
suggests that it, like the ozone layer, has a large hole in it (p. 3). 
There is no commonly agreed definition of accountability in the literature; however 
most working definitions include some or all of the concepts of responsibility, 
reporting, transparency, being answerable to stakeholders, and accepting 
consequences.  Sinclair (1995) refers to this lack of exactness as the ‘chameleon’ 
quality or elusiveness of accountability.  Likewise, Koppell (2005, p. 94) refers to the 
conceptual fuzziness of accountability, and the problem of ‘multiple accountabilities 
disorder’. 
Examples of the diversity of accountability definitions include: 
 “any mechanism that makes powerful institutions responsive to their 
particular publics” (Mulgan, 2003, p. 8, quoted in Brandsma and Schillemans, 
2012, p. 2) 
 “the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) 
or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible” (Gray, 
Owen, & Adams, 1996, p. 38 quoted in Cooper & Owen, 2007, p. 651) 
 “the processes through which an organization makes a commitment to 
respond to and balance the needs of stakeholders in its decision making 
processes and activities, and delivers against this commitment” (Lloyd et al., 
2007, p. 11 quoted in Ebrahim, 2010, p. 3). 
 “To say that someone should be accountable for particular events or actions is 
to hold certain expectations about what this person or organisation should be 
able and obliged to explain, justify and take responsibility for” (Messner, 
2009, p. 918, citing Cooper & Owen, 2007) 
 “Accountability is, definitionally, about the rights of society (or 
groups/stakeholders within society) and relates to the rights that emerge from 
the relationship between the accountable organisation (the accountor) and the 
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accountee” (Gray et al., 2006, p. 334). 
From even this small sample it is interesting to note that few authors attempt or 
propose a new definition of accountability, but instead tend to reference or build on 
those from previous scholars.   
Such a wealth of definitions is simultaneously a burden and a freedom, requiring a 
narrowing or choice by researchers, and yet providing a wide field from which to 
choose.  In a philanthropic context, where the underlying assumption of ‘pro bono 
publico’16 is enshrined in the charitable status of foundations, the following definition 
from Roberts (2009, p. 969) may be most appropriate. 
What emerges in this space is something of the weight of our practical 
dependence upon each other which accountability as talk, listening, and 
asking questions then allows us to explore and investigate. Accountability is 
thereby reconstituted as a vital social practice – an exercise of care in relation 
to self and others, a caution to compassion in relation to both self and others, 
and an ongoing necessity as a social practice through which to insist upon and 
discover the nature of our responsibility to and for each other.   
Underlying the fluid nature of accountability, there are many related concepts that 
surround and are linked to accountability in the literature. These are summarised in 
Table 3.1 below, listed in alphabetical order, rather than any ranking by significance.  
This is due to a lack of consistency and consensus on the relative importance of 
concepts associated with accountability, where the divergent views of authors are not 
readily reconciled. 
Table 3.1 Concepts or qualities associated with accountability in the literature 
 
Concept Description References in the literature 
Appearance Stage management of external appearances, 
accountability as a false performance or 
reputation/impression management tool, repairing 
or defending self-image 
Dhanani & Connolly (2012), 
O’Neill (2002) quoted in 
Roberts (2009), Roberts 
(2009) 
Compliance Legal, regulatory and fiduciary obligations  Leat (2004), Liket (2014), 
Tomei (2013) 
Consequences Punishments, enforcement or sanctions for 
shortfalls; or incentives 
Brandsma & Schillemans 
(2012) 
                                                 
 
16 ‘For the public good’, or for public benefit. 
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Concept Description References in the literature 
Distance Accountability is a source of confidence for those 
who are distant, rather than those with local and 
immediate understanding, divorced from 
relationships.  Can be many forms of distance, 
e.g. power distances, cynical distancing, spatial, 
emotional and hierarchical  
Gray et al. (2006), Messner 
(2009), Roberts (2009) 
Ethics The social imperative to ‘do right’ or ‘do good’  Liket (2014), Messner (2009), 
Sinclair (1995) 
Expectations Accountability is seen as the explanation of the 
gap between expectations and performance, 
between what you are and what you should be, 
normative forces and conformity 
Brandsma & Schillemans 
(2012), Carman (2009, 2010), 
Dhanani & Connolly (2012), 
Liket (2014), Messner (2009) 
Exposure Associated with risk, failure, blame, scandal and 
invasiveness 
Messner (2009), Roberts 
(2009), Sinclair (1995) 
Honoring Accountability as recognition and respect, 
acknowledgement and giving credit 
Brandsma & Schillemans 
(2012), Dhanani & Connolly 
(2012)  
Inclusivity Accountability to all stakeholders Cooper & Owen (2007), 
Dhanani & Connolly (2012) 
Judgment The force or power of accountability, the 
outcome of being accountable, the assessment of 
the account 
Liket (2014), Messner (2009), 
Roberts (2009) 
Justification The desire to be acquitted or cleared of possible 
wrongdoing 
Ebrahim (2010), Roberts 
(2009) 
Materiality The importance or significance of information  Cooper & Owen (2007) 
Objectivity/ 
Subjectivity 
Becoming the object of scrutiny and assessment, 
and the subject of an account to others 
Roberts (2009) 
Responsibility Felt obligation to stakeholders Ebrahim (2010), Dhanani & 
Connolly (2012), Kamuf 
(2007), Messner (2009)  
Responsiveness Answerability to questioning, addressing 
concerns and needs, willingness to receive 
feedback and be criticised 
Blind (2011), Cooper & Owen 
(2007) 
Stewardship Shared goals and values between organisations 
make accountability an information exchange 
mechanism; often linked with the concept of 
trusteeship or a fiduciary responsibility 
Carman (2010), Connolly & 
Hyndman (2013), McIlnay 
(1995) 
Transparency Making public, laying open of actions and 
procedures; information is brought to light, and is 
available and accessible  
Dhanani & Connolly (2012), 
Ebrahim (2010), Gray et al. 
(2006), Rourke (2014) 
Trust Respect and faith, confidence Blind (2011), Dhanani & 
Connolly (2012), Ebrahim 
(2010), Leat (2004), O’Neill 
(2002), Rourke (2014), Tomei 
(2013)  
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Most prevalent amongst these concepts in the literature is transparency.  
Transparency is sometimes used as a synonym for accountability, however Roberts 
(2009) and others (e.g. Fox, 2007; Rourke, 2014; Tyler, 2013) highlight the 
difficulties and contradictions inherent in this pairing.  “Transparency becomes 
problematic only when we believe in its perfection; when we believe or act as if all 
there is to accountability is transparency; that transparency is adequate and sufficient 
as a form of accountability” (Roberts, 2009, p. 968).  This conceptualisation of 
transparency as a part, but only one part, of a broader concept of accountability is 
echoed by Liket (2014) who describes transparency as only providing one piece of a 
large puzzle.   
Other authors make the distinction that transparency is passive, while accountability 
is active: “First, this approach to accountability places the burden of responsibility on 
the public. The public must take the initiative to seek out the information being 
provided” (Rourke, 2014, p. 7); "to be accountable is to be in motion, not simply 
sitting in an office while being open to criticism. It is a dialogue, explanation and 
justification" (Ackerman, 2005, p. 5); such that “transparency then becomes 
accountability by turning measures into targets” (Roberts, 2009, p. 962).   
There are also negative aspects to transparency highlighted in the literature.  “I think 
that accountability as transparency is often characterised by an anxious paranoia” 
(Roberts, 2009, p. 968).  This concern for the impact of transparency is shared by 
Dhanani and Connolly (2012), who see transparency and openness requiring an 
additional responsibility from stakeholders not to view all bad news as 
“organizational failure” (p. 1160).  Messner (2009) considers whether accountability 
is always desirable or necessary, and explores the constraints and contradictions that 
are implicit in the act of giving an account.  O’Neill (2002) highlights the growth of 
transparency as being accompanied by “Herculean micro-management”.  Similarly 
Rourke (2014) expresses concern about stakeholders’ ability to make sense of the 
large volume of data available – the concept of transparency as ‘data dump’.  
Transparency can therefore be summarised as a necessary, but not sufficient, element 
of accountability. 
Forms of accountability in the literature are likewise varied.  Theories and models of 
nonprofit accountability often focus on mechanisms (Ebrahim, 2010; Flack & Ryan, 
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2003) and systems (Kearns, 1994; Roberts & Scapens, 1985).  Dhanani and Connolly 
(2012) focus on the ‘for what?’ question of accountability, and consider four key 
themes or forms, namely strategic accountability, fiduciary accountability, financial 
accountability and procedural accountability.  Other authors consider historical 
(Hammack, 1995) and philosophical (McKernan, 2012; Roberts, 2009) perspectives 
on accountability.   
Roberts (1991) defines and explores two forms of accountability, hierarchical and 
socialising.  In essence, hierarchical accountability is concerned with independence, 
and socialising accountability with interdependence.  This categorisation is further 
extended in subsequent work by Roberts (2001, 2009).  Ebrahim (2010, p. 4) offers 
the most useful categorisation for the purposes of this study, noting that forms of 
accountability necessarily vary by organisation type.  Organised under the question 
‘Accountability to whom?’ Ebrahim offers upward and downward, or vertical 
accountability as being of particular interest to nonprofit organisations, following the 
flow of money in and out of the organisation.  Horizontal or internal accountability 
refers to an organisation’s accountability to its board or governing body, and to its 
mission.  Another common division in the literature based on the ‘accountability to 
whom?’ question is regulatory/legal accountability versus social accountability 
(Blind, 2011).    
Blind (2011, p. 1) additionally highlights the often binary nature of forms of 
accountability, noting that “the literature on accountability has been dominated by 
dichotomous understandings”.  These dichotomies are not always helpful in 
understanding the complexities and nuances of accountability, in particular 
accountability relationships.  Recognising this, Blind argues in favour of a focus 
instead on the middle; the “linkages and convergences” that make for a continuous 
understanding of accountability.  Rather than a polarised and black or white 
conceptualisation, Blind suggests an accountability spectrum where forms and 
structures are flexible and vary over time and within contexts.  This networked or 
rhizomatic understanding of accountability (as discussed in Egan, 2014) is 
particularly suited to nonprofit organisations. 
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3.3 ACCOUNTABILITY IN NONPROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
Speckbacher (2003), in the context of performance management, cautions against 
adopting theories from for-profit organisations in a nonprofit context without 
appropriate consideration.   
Before transferring concepts and tools derived from a certain model of the 
firm and its environment to nonprofit organizations, one must determine 
whether the assumptions underlying this model are also adequate for 
nonprofit organizations (p. 267). 
With this caution in mind, the theoretical foundation for this thesis is the nonprofit 
accountability framework laid out by Ebrahim (2010), which considers 
accountability to whom, for what, and how.  This conceptual framework was selected 
to inform the research design and analysis as it is suited to the exploratory nature of 
this abductive research in a context where there is currently little published.   
There are three key theories in the literature that are related to accountability: agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory.  In a nonprofit context, agency, 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories have been applied by researchers over many 
decades as lenses to examine and explore the nature and work of this group of 
organisations that exist “for purpose” rather than “for profit” (McLeod, 2014).  It is 
worth noting that these three theories all broadly consider relationships between 
organisations and an external other or others.   Further, all three theories situate an 
organisation in an environment where these relationships are critical for the survival 
and success of the organisation.   
Given the prominence of these theories in the nonprofit literature, each (agency, 
stakeholder, and legitimacy theory) is considered briefly below in a nonprofit 
accountability context.   While their relationship with accountability theory is noted, 
the decision not to adopt any of these three as the theoretical scaffold for this thesis 
was made in acknowledgement that each considers accountability through a 
particular lens that lessens or excludes some aspects or elements of accountability 
through its focus on others.  Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework was therefore 
chosen as it provides an open but comprehensive structure through which key aspects 
and elements of PAF accountability may be explored. 
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3.3.1 Agency theory in the context of nonprofit accountability 
Agency theory was first proposed in the mid-1970’s (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) as a 
way of framing the issues that arise when one person or organisation makes decisions 
on behalf of another, often under the terms of a contract.  It has been applied broadly 
to many fields of research, including economics, political science, law, finance and 
accounting, sociology, and game theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Critical to this theory 
are the concepts of information asymmetry (where one party has more or better 
information than the other party), and the apportionment of risks and costs (which 
one of the parties bears, also known as moral hazard).   
The concept of information asymmetry in funder and nonprofit grantee relationships, 
as posited by agency theory, is discussed by Carman (2009) and Liket (2014).  
Performance measurement requirements imposed by philanthropic funders on their 
grantees are identified as a means of attempting to address this asymmetry and allow 
funders to select the most effective organisations to achieve the intended purposes.  
Liket (2014) highlights that this accountability mechanism (performance 
measurement) works effectively for funders as principals, in that they can cease 
funding one nonprofit organisation in preference for another in the event of under-
performance.   
Agency theory in nonprofit and philanthropic organisations is explored in depth by 
Benjamin (2010), based on case studies of three funding organisations in the U.S. - a 
community development funder, a United Way organisation, and a public 
foundation.  Data was collected from 23 interviews with staff and volunteers, and 
from documentary analysis.   Based on her analysis of these funding organisations, 
Benjamin (2010) questions whether philanthropic funders can accurately be 
characterised as principals in principal-agent theory, where one party delegates 
authority to another through a contractual relationships to achieve a particular 
purpose, and the parties have differing interests and motivations.  She concludes that 
the philanthropic funder’s authority over grantees is a point of tension, and the 
relationship between the two parties is not one of delegation and control on the side 
of the funder, and contract fulfilment by the grantee; but rather a more complex, 
reciprocal, nuanced and negotiated relationship.  Benjamin unequivocally concludes 
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“philanthropic relationships are not equivalent to [principal-agent] accountability 
relationships” (p. 383).    
Agency theory was not used as the primary theoretical framework for this study as it 
focuses on one relationship of accountability, that between a philanthropic funder 
and grantees, and overlooks relationships with other actors.   Agency theory also 
does not encompass other aspects of accountability of PAFs such as its forms and 
motivations.  In addition, the assumption of self-interest inherent in agency theory 
(Van Slyke, 2006) is at odds with the philanthropic context of this study.  Hence, its 
association with accountability is noted, as are its limitations in the context of this 
study. 
3.3.2 Stakeholder theory in the context of nonprofit accountability 
Stakeholder theory is perhaps the most commonly discussed theory in relation to 
nonprofit organisations and their accountability.  Stakeholders are identified as “any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46) or more succinctly, who and what 
‘really counts’.  Cooper and Owen (2007) identify that in a corporate social 
responsibility setting, the role of stakeholder groups is almost always confined to that 
of consultative committees, and has no bearing on strategy or decision making within 
the organisation.  They highlight that engagement with stakeholders is limited to 
rhetoric rather than action, to listening rather than responding or facilitating, and in 
no way gives stakeholder groups any rights or power over the organisation.  In this 
way, stakeholder engagement falls short of some definitions of accountability, which 
include the possibility of consequences (e.g. Brandsma & Schillemans, 2012). 
Focusing on nonprofits, Dhanani and Connolly (2012), Ebrahim (2003), Messner 
(2009) and Connolly and Hyndman (2013) all acknowledge that there may be 
conflicting interests and motivations between different stakeholder groups and the 
nonprofit organisation must prioritise and account to and for these multiple 
constituencies.  In particular, Messner (2009) raises concerns with the demands this 
prioritisation places upon the nonprofit organisation itself. 
Tomei (2013) addresses this issue of multiple accountabilities to multiple 
stakeholders by highlighting the discretionary element involved.  
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…beyond the formal minimum it is up to charities to decide which of their 
stakeholders needs an account. Each account that is given creates 
opportunities but also carries a cost and potential risks (p. 409).   
Tomei nevertheless voices caution regarding the extent to which philanthropic 
foundations, particularly those that wish to create social change, risk their long-term 
engagement with stakeholders by narrowing their concept of accountability. 
Tyler (2013) also seeks to clarify the concept and role of ‘stakeholders’ by dividing 
this constituent group into ‘rights holders’, ‘rights guardians’ and ‘interest holders’.  
His report clearly differentiates between the statuses of the different parties; and 
recommends excluding the concerns of interest holders from the governance and 
fiduciary duties of foundations, situating these instead within management and 
organisational ethics.  However, he in no way suggests that these ‘interest holders’ 
should be overlooked, and cites a list of benefits entailed in engagement with groups 
such as grantees or beneficiaries.  These benefits include: 
…enhanced reputation and credibility, stronger and more informed programs 
and grant-making, potentially more efficient processes…greater opportunities 
for collaboration, scaling and replicating successes, and avoiding mistakes (p. 
42). 
Anheier and Leat (2013) perhaps best summarise the role of stakeholders for 
philanthropic foundations in their statement that “Foundations are organizations 
without shareholders, voters, or customers - and their ‘clients’ are highly unlikely to 
criticise them” (p. 466).  They conclude that philanthropic foundations are shielded 
from the direct signals and feedback given to other forms of organisations, and that 
this impedes their flexibility and creativity. Hence foundations provide a useful 
context in which to study what forms of accountability are perceived to be necessary 
or useful, and why.    
Dhanani and Connolly (2012) use the lens of stakeholder theory to develop an 
accountability framework for nonprofit organisations through public discourse.  They 
analyse the content of annual reports and annual reviews of a sample of 75 large and 
influential U.K. charitable organisations, focusing on their accountability practices.  
Dhanani and Connolly (2012) classify nonprofit accountability, using four 
accountability types (strategic, fiduciary, procedural and financial) and two 
accountability disclosure measures (a weighted index, and a volume measure).   
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They specifically identify ethical stakeholder theory as relevant to nonprofit 
organisations, which “have a responsibility to honour all their stakeholders equitably 
and ethically” (p. 1143).  However, their findings indicate that nonprofit 
accountability in large charitable organisations is motivated by a desire to present 
their organisation’s work positively (impression management) and to justify their 
activities.  Annual reports serve as the formal accountability document, whereas 
annual reviews serve a publicity and marketing role.  These findings support a 
positive rather than an ethical stakeholder theory model (Dhanani & Connolly, 
2012), which holds that nonprofit organisations ensure their own long-term survival 
and success by engaging with their stakeholders and legitimising their activities to 
them.   
While stakeholder theory is relevant to the first research question, namely 
accountability to whom?, it was not adopted as the primary theoretical framework for 
this study as it is insufficient to capture the nuances of the remaining three research 
questions examining the activities, mechanisms and motivations of accountability in 
PAFs.  Hence, though the relevance of stakeholder theory to nonprofit accountability 
is acknowledged, its limitations in the context of PAFs are also noted. 
3.3.3 Legitimacy theory in the context of nonprofit accountability 
Legitimacy theory is closely linked in the nonprofit literature to stakeholder theory, 
and is identified by Gray et al. (2006) as being a key point of difference in 
accountability between for-profit and nonprofit organisations.   They link legitimacy 
with power, and find where power is located within differing organisation types, and 
how legitimacy and power are created in civil society.  Definitions of legitimacy are 
perhaps as diverse as those of accountability; however key elements are authority 
and acceptance of one party by another (Tomei, 2013).  In an Australian nonprofit 
context, Flack and Ryan (2003) note that a central tenet of legitimacy theory is that 
“organisations ensure their survival by being viewed as competent and acceptable” 
(p. 77). 
Legitimacy theory has links with institutional theory, which holds that there are three 
elements that make up institutions: regulative, normative and cognitive (Scott, 1995).   
According to Scott (1995), regulative legitimacy is legal in basis, normative 
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legitimacy is moral, and cognitive legitimacy is cultural and conceptual. For the 
established institution of endowed philanthropic foundations, where regulative 
legitimacy has traditionally been low in Australia, normative and cognitive 
legitimacy are likely to assume greater significance. 
Roberts (1991, p. 355) sees the close relationship between accountability and 
legitimacy as deriving from the public image of accounting as impartial, neutral, 
passive and objective, and therefore able to assess the true value of an organisation.  
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) citing Goddard and Assad (2006) view legitimacy as 
a continuum, rather than a static state for nonprofit organisations.   Movement on this 
legitimacy continuum is determined by using accountability to build trust and 
credibility, particularly with funders.   
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 315) also highlight the underlying threat of 
sanctions and greater control by government should nonprofit organisations’ 
legitimacy become clouded.  They conclude that voluntarily adopting and 
implementing accountability measures may avert the possibility of greater oversight 
and restrictions being imposed.   
Goddard and Assad (2006), as reviewed in Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) use a 
grounded theory analysis of case studies of three non-government organisations 
(NGOs) in Tanzania to examine the purpose of accounting.  They find that 
accountability serves to secure funding by demonstrating the legitimacy of the 
organisation.  Importantly, they conclude that legitimacy is a dynamic construct, 
which changes over time in response to both internal and external factors in the 
nonprofit organisation.  Mechanisms and processes used to build legitimacy included 
naming high profile donors; contracting internationally recognised auditors and 
consultants with a reputation for professionalism; improving governance, 
transparency and accuracy of financial information; and conforming to the differing 
accounting requirements of funders, sometimes at considerable cost.  This processes 
of building and maintaining legitimacy with current and potential donors led to 
greater external accountability, however Goddard and Assad (2006) found that this 
was not reflected in internal accountability in decision making within the 
organisation.   
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While aspects of legitimacy theory have relevance to nonprofit accountability, 
legitimacy theory alone is not sufficient for examining accountability of endowed 
philanthropic foundations.  In part, the absence of ongoing external funding 
requirements for PAFs suggests legitimacy is not necessary for the financial survival 
of the organisation.  Further, legitimacy theory also does not capture the multiple 
elements of accountability, in particular the activities (accountability for what) and 
mechanisms (accountability how) used by PAFs, and hence is limited in addressing 
the second and third research questions of this study.  
3.4 ACCOUNTABILITY IN PHILANTHROPIC TRUSTS AND 
FOUNDATIONS 
3.4.1 Definitions of the terms ‘philanthropy’ and ‘foundation’ 
Consideration of accountability in philanthropic foundations must necessarily begin 
with a specified understanding of the terms “philanthropy” and “foundation”.   
Similarly to accountability, there is no widely accepted definition for either term in 
the professional or academic literature.  
Sulek (2010) provides a thoughtful and wide-ranging review of the historical 
evolution of the meaning of the word ‘philanthropy’, commencing from its Greek 
origins as “love of mankind”, moving forward through the Renaissance to the first 
modern dictionaries, and to recent academic papers.  Four definitions of philanthropy 
highlighted by Sulek are (in chronological order): 
 voluntary action for the public good (Payton, 1988)  
 the voluntary giving and receiving of time and money aimed (however 
imperfectly) toward the needs of charity and the interests of all in a better 
quality of life (Van Til, 1990, p.34) 
 the private giving of time or valuables (money, security, property) for public 
purposes (Salamon, 1992)  
 a social relation governed by a moral obligation that matches a supply of 
private resources to a demand of unfulfilled needs and desires that are 
communicated by entreaty (Schervish, 1998, p. 600). 
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Sulek (2010) notes that these modern definitions of philanthropy are all external, 
implying philanthropy as an activity, rather than as an internal state of being or 
disposition that motivates such acts.  As a conclusion Sulek offers the suggestion that 
different definitions of philanthropy be used dependent on the expression of 
philanthropy being referenced, suggesting literal, archaic, ideal, ontological, 
volitional, actual and social meanings.   
Likewise the word ‘foundation’ is an elusive concept, having no defined meaning in 
an Australian context, including the law.  The term most commonly used in 
legislation is ‘fund’17 although following the U.S., ‘foundation’ is more commonly 
used in practice.  Perhaps the best encapsulation of this concept comes from Cohen 
(2013), who suggests the use of the word ‘foundation’ in a style similar to an 
individual’s surname – as a group identifier without particular meaning.  
As summarised by Tomei (2013, p. 405) “the term [foundation] is used to refer to an 
organisation that (a) exists for public benefit and is registered as a charity, and (b) 
has its own funds, usually in the form of an endowment. The tension between the 
accountability implied by (a) and the independence that comes with (b) lies at the 
heart of the issues under discussion.”  Tyler (2013) also defines a foundation by its 
purpose, stating that “A foundation’s ultimate legal objective (and the responsibility 
of its rights holders and guardians) is to pursue charitable purposes consistent with 
donor intent and the law” (p. 41).  A simpler and more practical definition is 
provided by Dufton (2014) who describes foundations as “institutions set up for 
public benefit which have their own funds. In practice most of these operate as 
grantmakers” (p. 1). 
3.4.2 The role and nature of foundations 
Anheier and Leat (2013) offer a useful synopsis of the opposing views for the 
existence of endowed foundations.  They divide opinion broadly into the positive and 
negative claims for the continuing presence of foundations in the context of a first 
world, democratic society.  Table 3.2 below summarises the two arguments from the 
                                                 
 
17 Fund refers to ‘trust fund’, a fiduciary arrangement governed by state laws and regulations that 
allows for assets to be held on behalf of beneficiaries on specific terms. 
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perspectives of a foundation’s donor/founder, government, and (civil) society as a 
whole, highlighting the tensions in the debate around the role and value of 
foundations. 
Table 3.2 Positive and negative claims about the role and purpose of foundations in a 
democratic society 
 




and leverage private 
money for public 





current and future 
philanthropists with an 
enduring legal instrument 
for expressing and 
pursuing their 
philanthropic interests.  
Particularly for those with 
larger fortunes, setting up a 
foundation is a cheaper, 
less demanding and more 
private way to disburse 
money for a dedicated 
purpose, than through the 





services, and so on) 
that supplement 
government action, 
thereby achieving a 
more optimal use of 
both public and 
private funds. 
Foundations are an 
independent source of 
funding that helps civil 
society counterbalance 
the forces of markets 




sources of innovation, 
redistribution, policy 
change, and challenge, 
an alternative to the 
state, providing for 
those “beyond” market 
and state.  They can 
adopt a longer-term 
perspective than is 
possible for govern-
ments influenced by 






and irrelevant to 
modern society. The 
privileges they 
receive and reinforce 
exceed the wider 
benefits they create.   
 
Foundations provide 
solutions to the problems 
of the rich rather than the 
poor.  Foundations are 
socially legitimate tax 
shelters; a means of 
averting criticism and 
resentment of wealth in a 
democratic society.  They 
appease a founder’s 
(guilty) conscience while 
still providing ongoing 
power and control over the 




processes and divert 
wealth from the 
nation’s tax base; 
they represent a mis-
allocation of (a 
percentage of) public 
funds. 
There is little evidence 
that foundations do 
anything valuable, nor 
do they command 
widespread support.  
They continue to exist 
because of ignorance, 
lack of political will 
and interest, and belief 
in myths about their 
value. 
Adapted from Anheier and Leat (2013, p. 453) 
This synopsis provides a helpful framework against which to consider the role and 
purpose of endowed foundations in a democracy.  This role is highlighted in the 
literature as one of the key points of tension emerging for philanthropic foundations 
in the U.S. in particular, where the growth of ‘big philanthropy’ over the past decade 
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has resulted in focused media and public attention on the enormous influence these 
foundations can have on their chosen area(s) of activity (Hay & Muller, 2013).  Chief 
among these issues is the emerging potential tension between the individual change 
agendas of foundations, and the direction of public policy, where foundations are 
perceived to be unaccountable.  This debate goes to the heart of whether 
philanthropic foundations are public or private institutions (Barkan, 2013; Brody & 
Tyler, 2010; Fernandez & Hager, 2014; McIlnay, 1995).  
3.4.3 Public or private entities? 
The privacy of donors and founders of philanthropic foundations is a sensitive topic 
in Australia (Scaife et al., 2012), and their level and forms of accountability depend 
in some part on their ‘privateness’ or ‘publicness’.  The concept of privacy operates 
on three levels: the privacy of individual or family donors, the privacy of the 
foundations they create, and the nature of foundations as a group, as private rather 
than public entities (Fernandez & Hager, 2014).  These three levels (individual, 
organisational and institutional privacy) are present, although not necessarily 
distinguished, in the literature. 
 Tyler (2013) considers the privacy and philanthropy of individual 20th century 
philanthropists such as Carnegie, Pew, Rockefeller and Rosenwald.  The privacy of 
individual or family donors is also discussed by Liket (2014), who acknowledges the 
argument that philanthropy is deeply personal, and stems from the values and life 
stories of both individuals and families, and sometimes also companies.  This privacy 
of philanthropic motivation is often reflected in a desire for privacy in philanthropic 
actions, supported by a wish not to be frequently approached for funding, and 
sometimes also concerns for personal security.  In particular, the role of faith-based 
giving, underpinned by religious convictions is cited by Tyler (2013) as motivating a 
desire for privacy.  Liket (2014) however draws a direct link between personal 
privacy and a lack of evaluation and transparency for foundations.   
The privacy of foundations as organisations echoes these arguments.  There is a 
distinction made between an individual donor’s giving directly to charitable causes, 
and their choice to establish an endowed foundation; where direct giving might be 
considered private, but the creation of a giving structure is considered to move 
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philanthropy into a more public space (Scaife et al., 2012).   In contrast, community 
foundations are cited by Rourke (2014, p. 8) as offering donors an attractive screen 
between them and the recipients of their donations.   
The question of whether foundations are private or public entities, is addressed by 
Leat (2004), and Anheier and Leat (2013).  Leat (2004) notes that the definition of a 
foundation as existing for the public good, or for charitable purposes, brings public 
accountability to foundations from their establishment.  Anheier and Leat (2013) 
echo this view, but also note that the tax and legal privileges and concessions 
enjoyed by foundations form another strong argument for viewing foundations as 
public entities, with public accountabilities.   
From another perspective, Rourke (2014) states: 
A case can be made that private foundations are both quasi-private and quasi-
public institutions, which makes the conversation even more difficult and 
textured, but it is a conversation that philanthropy must join (p. 2). 
These questions about the public nature of private philanthropy also lead to 
consideration of the role of foundations in a democracy.  The tension in the 
discourses regarding accountability of foundations in a western democratic society 
hinges on the argument that foundations can interfere with the democratic process by 
allowing the private agendas of individuals or small groups to influence public policy 
(Anheier & Leat, 2013).  Barkan (2013) highlights that not only do foundations have 
no broad accountability to the public and the community in which they exist, but 
additionally they have no accountability to the people directly affected (either 
positively or adversely) by their programs.  Hammack (1995) takes this argument 
further, noting that historically certain groups in society (most often women, children 
and ethnic minority groups) that foundations often work to serve, are those with the 
least possibility of engaging in accountability relationships.   
The countervailing view offered by Tyler (2013) is that philanthropic foundations 
play an important role in challenging the democratic majority, allowing for a 
diversity of voices, values and purposes that work to strengthen civil society.  
Further, their risk-taking in the face of public and popular opinion, and conventional 
or majority wisdom, is an important and under-valued quality.  Likewise, 
foundations have the ability to take a long-term and perhaps unpopular view “in 
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ways that are presently controversial, unacknowledged, or remote” (p. 34).  Bare 
(2010) makes a distinction between process accountability and accountability for 
impact, mission, or social change, arguing that the latter is aspirational and requires a 
willingness by foundations to accept large and long-term challenges. 
Of relevance to endowed philanthropic foundations, Kamuf (2007) develops a theory 
of account-er-ability, which she proposes as “a counter-practice to the numeric 
evaluation that assumes a prevailing place in public discourse” (p. 253).  This theme 
of avoiding and/or resisting accountability, or “this whole big brother thing” 
(Carman, 2009, p. 384) can be linked back to the underlying assumption about the 
essential ‘pro bono publico’ nature of nonprofit and philanthropic organisations.  If 
nonprofits and philanthropic foundations are attempting to do good, then attempts to 
hold them accountable, and potentially impose sanctions upon them if they fail to 
give an account, sit uncomfortably and may be overlooked or opposed (Liket, 2014, 
p. 278).  Similarly, Messner (2009) concludes that avoiding accountability may be a 
reasonable response to the ethical burden of accountability demands. 
Roberts (2009, p. 963) lists mechanisms or avoidance strategies by which nonprofits 
might deflect accountability demands.  These include seeking scapegoats, public 
relations or ‘spin’, the manipulation of performance data, flooding vast quantities of 
data into the public sphere, shifting decision-making locations, and rigid and 
defensive adherence to procedures.  Roberts groups these strategies into aggressive 
or defensive accountability mechanisms, designed to resist intelligent accountability.   
3.4.4 Influence of philanthropic foundations’ power and wealth on their 
accountability 
The influence of philanthropic foundations’ power and wealth on their accountability 
forms and relationships is considered by various authors in the literature, although 
not explored in great depth.  While this relationship between accountability and 
power is recognised, and a brief discussion of the concept of power in the context of 
accountability follows, a fuller development of how power is constructed and used in 
PAFs is not the focus of this study.  
Ebrahim (2010) summarises the impact of wealth and power on accountability as 
“influencing who is able to hold whom to account” (p. 7).  Gray et al. (2006) also 
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highlight the need for clarity around who is calling whom to account, and the 
differences this illustrates between the relative power of the parties to the 
accountability relationship.  Edwards (2011) and Barkan (2013) propose that 
democratic processes in the U.S. in particular, are distorted by the power and 
influence of wealthy philanthropic individuals whose allocation of private resources, 
unconstrained by public accountability structures, reflects their personal interests and 
not necessarily the needs of society.   
Barkan (2013) is strongly critical of the motives and work of large foundations, 
which are together termed ‘big philanthropy’. 
…big philanthropy still aims to solve the world’s problems—with foundation 
trustees deciding what is a problem and how to fix it. They may act with good 
intentions, but they define “good.” The arrangement remains thoroughly 
plutocratic: it is the exercise of wealth-derived power in the public sphere 
with minimal democratic controls and civic obligations (p. 636). 
Hall (2013) is likewise critical of large philanthropic foundations, noting that at a 
recent U.S. philanthropy summit, none of the foundation founders present addressed 
the issues of power or democratic process.  As Benn (2001) noted: 
…in the course of my life I have developed five little democratic questions.  
If one meets a powerful person – Adolf Hitler, Joe Stalin or Bill Gates – ask 
them five questions: ‘What power have you got? Where did you get it from? 
In whose interests do you exercise it? To whom are you accountable? And 
how can we get rid of you?’ If you cannot get rid of the people who govern 
you, you do not live in a democratic system (Hansard Commons Debates, 
Column 510). 
These questions were raised in a political context; however their application to 
philanthropy is clear. Benjamin (2010) offers a balanced perspective, noting that 
most philanthropic funders are sensitive to, and attempt to mitigate, the power 
imbalance between themselves and their grantees, and that grantees are also not 
necessarily passive recipients of funding or direction.  Ostrander (2007) considers 
this issue of donor control, and notes that new philanthropic models such as giving 
circles18 and venture philanthropy19 are increasing the influence of funders in the 
                                                 
 
18 Giving circles are donor groups where all members contribute money, and combine funds and 
decision making to give larger grants than they otherwise could or would as individuals. 
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activities and programs of nonprofit organisations.  Barman (2007) also explores the 
extent to which nonprofits offer donors choices, or adopt donors’ expressed choices, 
as a way of fundraising.  Donor control has the effect of potentially changing the 
accountability relationship where there is greater engagement with the donor in the 
program funded, and a more equally shared responsibility for outcomes.   
Cohen (2013) however notes the potential for mis-representation of foundations’ size 
and power in the public eye, where the size of the philanthropic sector and its 
potential grant-making is frequently overestimated.   Cohen’s view is echoed by 
Rourke (2014), who states in regard to private foundations in the U.S.  
The great majority of these foundations do not have the large amounts of 
money public imagination may ascribe to them. Most (63 percent) hold assets 
of less than $1 million and only 2,531 (3 percent) have over $25 million (p. 
4). 
Similarly, this impression of the great wealth and power of foundations is enhanced 
by the Australian media’s interest in the larger and wealthier foundations, as 
evidenced in the article in The Age newspaper titled “Philanthropy comes of age in 
Australia” (Schmidt, 2014) which focuses on recent ‘super-size gifts’.  Yet, Cohen’s 
and Rourke’s cautions are equally well applied in Australia.  McLeod (2013) notes 
that the ‘average’ PAF has a capital value in the range of $2 to $3 million, and this 
has remained steady between 2006 and 2011.  The lack of public reporting 
requirements contributes to this mis-representation of the wealth and potential 
influence of Australian philanthropic foundations. 
This discourse around the role of foundations in a democratic civil society goes to 
the centre of the debate around whether endowed philanthropic foundations are 
fundamentally private or public entities (Fernandez & Hager, 2014). The current 
hegemonic conceptualisation of U.S. foundations as private when viewed in a legal 
or regulatory context is discussed by Fernandez and Hager (2014), who challenge the 
validity of that conceptualisation in political, economic and social contexts.  Potential 
implications of re-framing foundations as public entities include different distribution 
                                                                                                                                          
 
19 Venture philanthropy has a focus on building the capacity of organsiations, rather than supporting 
individual projects.  It involves longer-term relationships between funders and beneficiaries, where the 
funder provides expertise and mentoring as well as funding (Katz, 2005). 
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of resources based on “demonstrable community needs rather than idiosyncratic or 
elites needs” (p. 432), reduced criticism of administrative spending, and greater 
innovation driven by external engagement (Fernandez & Hager, 2014). Each of these 
implications has clear accountability effects for foundations. 
The assumptions that underlie much of the current body of philanthropic literature 
include the premise that the motivation for donors in establishing an endowed 
philanthropic foundation such as a PAF is always a charitable purpose.   However, as 
discussed by Scaife et al. (2012) and Anheier and Leat (2013), a wide range of 
motivations exist for creating a giving structure such as a charitable trust or 
foundation.  Differing motivations may be reflected in differing understandings and 
practices of accountability in foundations, and this will be explored in practice.   
3.5 ACCOUNTABILITY IN ENDOWED PHILANTHROPIC 
FOUNDATIONS SUCH AS PAFS 
There is limited theoretical and empirical knowledge concerning the unique 
relationships and forms of accountability in endowed philanthropic foundations such 
as PAFs.   Much of the current public discourse on accountability in philanthropy 
arises from the grey literature:  social media, blogs, newsletters and professional 
reports originating from the U.S.   
For the purposes of this study, the nonprofit accountability framework expounded by 
Ebrahim (2010) presents a useful structure in exploring accountability in PAFs.  As 
such, it will be adopted and adapted to shape this exploratory research.    
Ebrahim (2010) opens with the question “What does it mean for a nonprofit 
organisation to be accountable?” (p. 1) and answers this question by proposing a 
simple conceptual framework against which the accountability of nonprofits can be 
explored and understood.  From the definitions of accountability discussed (Fox & 
Brown, 1998; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Ebrahim & Weisband, 2007), Ebrahim 
summarises that accountability starts with a minimum of two actors, and centres on 
the relationship(s) between them.  This give and take of accounts leads to the first 
key question: accountability to whom?  From this, Ebrahim derives his second and 
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third key questions of accountability: accountability for what; and accountability 
how? 
This open framework fits the exploratory nature of the study, and leads to the 
additional question around why accountability is exercised in philanthropic 
foundations.  Accordingly, the four research questions of this study are: 
 
1. To whom are PAFs accountable?  
2. For what are PAFs accountable?  
3. How are PAFs accountable?  
4. Why are PAFs accountable?  
This seemingly simple framework aids in exploring forms of accountability in PAFs, 
a relatively unexplored context to date, and is reviewed in the following sections. 
3.5.1 Accountability to whom? 
Ebrahim (2010) categorises the actors to whom nonprofits are accountable by 
direction (upward, downward and horizontal), largely following the flow of money 
through the organisation (p. 6).  Upward accountability describes accountability to 
those from whom funding has been received.  Downward accountability describes 
accountability to those to whom services are provided (i.e. those for and on whom 
money is spent).  Horizontal (internal) accountability designates accountability to the 
organisation’s mission and staff, and is also described as internal accountability.   
Ebrahim (2010) notes that the type or structure of the nonprofit organisation 
(reflecting its mission or purpose) essentially influences to whom it is accountable.  
Networks, service delivery organisations and membership bodies are used as 
examples to illustrate how ‘to whom’ an organisation is accountable varies.  The 
difficulties of conflicting or prioritising accountabilities for nonprofits is a key issue 
discussed by Ebrahim among others, who questions whether it is  
…feasible, or even desirable, for nonprofit organizations to be accountable to 
everyone for everything? The challenge for leadership and management is to 
prioritize among competing accountability demands. This involves deciding 
both to whom and for what they owe accountability (p. 1).   
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Ebrahim reaffirms Koppell (2005) who states that “conflicting expectations borne of 
disparate conceptions of accountability undermine organizational effectiveness” (p. 
94), and finds that this ambiguity is “not a benign problem” (p. 94).  Ebrahim 
concludes that nonprofits must be deliberate and focused in targeting those 
accountabilities that are of most importance to them.  
While Ebrahim (2010) does not include diagonal accountability in the directions of 
accountability considered, Blind (2011) cites Bovens (2007), defining diagonal 
relationships of accountability as those that “do not fit within the traditional top-
down, principal-agent relationships (p. 12).  Examples of diagonal accountability 
include ombudsmen and auditors, as having external, independent accountability 
relationships with nonprofits.   
3.5.2 Accountability for what? 
Citing Behn (2001), Ebrahim divides accountability requirements of nonprofits into 
four groups, namely finances, governance, performance and mission.  These four 
types of accountability are inherently interrelated, rather than able to be individually 
identified. 
Financial accountability is characterised by an emphasis on disclosure, regulatory or 
legal requirements, and carries the possibility of fines or penalties for non-
compliance.  Governance accountability focuses on the role and work of the board of 
trustees or directors in regard to internal controls and regulatory compliance.  
Governance can also encompass accountability to an organisation’s mission or 
purpose. 
Accountability for performance is summarised by Ebrahim (2010) as the delivery of 
results.  This form of accountability relies on performance measurement and 
evaluation, and reports achievements against goals.  This type of accountability is 
often that required by funders, who seek metrics for individual projects or programs, 
rather than at an organisational level.  Accountability to mission is the obverse of 
performance accountability in this regard, with its focus on the organisational unit.  
This type or form of accountability is by nature longer-term, subject to changes 
within the external environment, and the responsibility of the CEO and Board.   
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3.5.3 Accountability how? 
In relation to the question ‘accountability how’, Ebrahim (2003) identifies the 
mechanisms by which accountability is practiced, grouped into tools and processes.   
Ebrahim (2010) defines tools being used at a point in time, whereas processes are 
both broader and less tangible than tools, and are used over time.  The tools group 
includes financial reports and performance evaluations, and are most commonly used 
in legal and regulatory accountability.  The processes group includes participation, 
self-regulation, and adaptive learning; and is often used in accounting to funders 
including government.   
Again, Ebrahim highlights the challenges that arise when nonprofits are accountable 
to different groups or agencies in different ways, stretching the resources of small 
nonprofits in particular, and creating resentment when accountability demands (e.g. 
reporting) are perceived as ill-fitting, unreliable, or unlikely to be read or used. 
3.5.4 Accountability why? 
The motivations and purposes for accountability form the fourth research question 
which is not formally part of Ebrahim’s framework, but stems logically from it.  
These motivations and purposes of accountability can be characterised as internal, 
reflecting the emotions, feelings and beliefs of the individuals that comprise the 
organisation; and external, reflecting the goals and purposes of accountability for the 
organisation in a wider social context (Roberts, 1991). 
Ebrahim (2010) discusses several motivations which see accountability identified as 
an important issue for nonprofits.  These include the need to earn and retain public 
trust, whereby accountability to mission is viewed as a strategic way of achieving 
this goal, avoiding the associated pressure of scandals, excessive regulation, and 
intense questioning.   
The purposes of accountability include the signalling and symbolic power of 
accountability in identifying and upholding the values and legitimacy of the 
nonprofit sector.  Finally, responsiveness to and closer engagement with 
clients/beneficiaries/members may motivate nonprofits to increase their ‘downwards’ 
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accountability, identified by Ebrahim as ‘a key challenge’ (p.6).  Figure 3.1 below 
summarises Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework of nonprofit accountability, 
which will be explored in the context of PAFs. 




In this chapter, the accountability literature was reviewed, with a focus on what has 
been published in a nonprofit context.  The relevance of agency, stakeholder, and 
legitimacy theories was considered, and the choice of Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual 
framework of nonprofit accountability for this study was justified.  The 
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highlighting issues regarding the role and nature of foundations, the tensions between 
their private versus public nature, and the influence of their wealth and power on 
accountability.  Ebrahim’s (2010) framework was then summarised, reviewed and 
extended to develop the four research questions of accountability to whom, for what, 
how and why, in the context of PAFs.  
Thus, this literature review provides a platform for exploring the perspectives of 
PAFs on accountability, whether that perceived accountability differs from what is 
already known, and if so, in what ways, and why.   The following chapter presents 
the research methodology, detailing how these issues were examined in practice. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, 
and Methods 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the study’s research design, methodology, and methods.  
Section 4.2 outlines the research design selected, the methodology chosen and the 
research methods used to address the four research questions.  Section 4.3 examines 
the role of the researcher in the study, and Section 4.4 considers the sample and data 
collection.  In Section 4.5, the methods used to analyse the data are described.   
Section 4.6 details how trustworthiness and reliability of the findings was enhanced.  
In Section 4.7 the ethical issues and considerations are outlined.  Section 4.8 
summarises and concludes this chapter. 
4.2 PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH AND RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
As noted previously in Section 3.3, “accountability” is a complex and multi-faceted 
phenomenon, and the ways in which it is understood and applied by both individuals 
and organisations are extremely diverse.  In attempting to explore the meanings and 
perceptions of accountability in a tightly defined subset of endowed philanthropic 
grant-making foundations, it is helpful to elucidate the philosophical approach that 
underpinned the research design. The choices of research design, methodology and 
methods are explained in relation to the field of inquiry, the framework of 
accountability that informs the research, and the selected data sample. Figure 4.1 
summarises the philosophical approach to the research design using a pyramid 
structure to show the evolving levels and how each is supported by the others. 
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Figure 4.1 Outline of research design, showing ontology, epistemology, methodology 
and methods for this study 
 
Each of these points is summarised below. 
4.2.1 Ontology 
This research adopts a critical realist perspective, which holds that the concept of 
accountability is socially constructed, and exists independently of an individual’s 
subjective experience of the phenomenon (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Krauss, 2005). 
The independent existence of accountability outside the subjective experience of an 
individual is important in this study, where the unit of analysis is the organisation 
(i.e. the PAF) rather than the individual participant interviewed.    
The critical realist perspective also allows for a shared understanding of 
accountability within the philanthropic sector or community from which the data is 
collected.  It encompasses the possibility of reflection by the researcher and 
participants as their understanding of the phenomenon changes and is co-created over 
Ontology
Critical realist 
perspective, where  
accountability is socially 





Burrell and Morgan (1979) -
interpretive paradigm. Abductive 
knowledge (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002) leading to the refinement 
of existing theory.
Methodology
Exploratory qualitative research, good fit for 
theory development (Edmondson and McManus, 
2007). Open-ended research questions to provide 
an understanding of a phenomenon, forming a 
basis for future research and examination
Methods
Semi-structured interviews with PAF managers and trustees, to 
understand the perceptions of accountability in PAFs.
Thematic analysis of interview transcripts
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time (Krauss, 2005).   The focus of the research is therefore on enhancing and 
extending the concepts and theories currently used to understand the phenomenon of 
accountability. 
4.2.2 Epistemology 
For the purposes of this study, an interpretive paradigm (Burrell & Morgan, 1979) 
was used to frame the inquiry.  This interpretive paradigm supports abductive 
knowledge, working from the data collected and informing theory.  The use of this 
paradigm for the study is consistent with the exploration and extension of theories 
and frameworks of accountability20 in an under-explored context, that of private 
endowed philanthropic foundations in Australia.  Abductive reasoning supports the 
open-ended questions within the research design, rather than testing or seeking to 
prove hypotheses derived from well-established theory.  Its focus is on theory 
development and refinement where there are existing concepts, rather than the 
generation of new theory.  As noted by Dubois and Gadde (2002, p. 559) “an 
abductive approach is fruitful if the researcher’s objective is to discover new things – 
other variables and other relationships”.   
Others in the literature describe abductive reasoning as involving moving between 
theory and data in a successive process that looks for underlying patterns or theories 
which are adjusted and strengthened by new data and observations (Alvesson & 
Skoldberg, 2009).  Given the focus of this study on extending and adapting an 
existing conceptual framework of nonprofit accountability (Ebrahim, 2010) through 
considering the new context of PAFs, the use of an abductive paradigm is 
particularly appropriate. 
4.2.3 Methodology 
A qualitative methodology was chosen for this study to enable rich insights to be 
gained into perspectives not only on accountability to whom in PAFs, but also how 
and why.  Knowledge and understanding was gained through direct in-person 
                                                 
 
20 It is acknowledged that there is an ongoing debate around accounting research in an interpretive 
paradigm. Parker (2008) and Ahrens and Chapman (2006) both discuss the role and positioning of 
empirical qualitative research in accountancy.   
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questioning and discussion with individuals who have experience of the phenomenon 
under study, the accountability of PAFs.   Open discussions enabled the researcher to 
engage with the participants and to learn about their experiences and perceptions of 
accountability through the topics they raised, the examples they provided, and the 
histories they recounted (Edmondson & McManus, 2007).  The data therefore was 
shaped in part by what the participants identified as important to them regarding 
accountability.  Open-ended questions also allowed for the researcher to respond to 
unanticipated comments from participants, ensuring that the exploration of 
accountability was not limited in scope by the researcher’s understanding or by 
previous literature.  By speaking with representatives of 10 PAFs, each with a 
different lens through which they viewed and understood accountability, a multi-
faceted view of the phenomenon was achieved. 
4.2.4 Methods 
In-depth, semi-structured interviews were selected as the primary qualitative research 
method as they are “a highly efficient way to gather rich, empirical data” (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007, p.28) with the intent of capturing detailed and nuanced 
perspectives of accountability from managers and trustees of PAFs.  This method 
links logically to both the theoretical and practical motivations and the exploratory 
nature of the research questions.    
Semi-structured interviews were used (Qu & Dumay, 2011) in preference to 
structured or unstructured.  A semi-structured interview method is argued by Qu and 
Dumay (2011) to correspond with a localist perspective (Alvesson, 2003) where the 
interview provides “social construction of situated accounts” (Qu & Dumay, 2011, p. 
240).  Of importance to this study is the emphasis of semi-structured interviews on 
allowing for differences in interviewees’ understanding of the topic.  The questions 
asked in the interviews were carefully constructed to allow for the widest possible 
interpretation of the core topic of accountability (see also Section 4.4.4), while still 
guiding the discussion through the four research questions.   
Also central to the semi-structured interview method is the understanding that the 
perspective of an interviewee produces a ‘situated account’, or one that is specific to 
their contextual understanding; in this case their individual experience of 
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accountability of PAFs (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  Capturing the diversity and 
differences in the contextual understanding of accountability was achieved through 
further questioning of respondents where their answers were unexpected or offered 
new insights.  The semi-structured interview method also allowed for the interviewer 
to return to themes or issues raised in the interview in an iterative way, as one 
response gave emphasis or a change in focus to an earlier response.  Thus, the 
understanding of the interviewee’s perspective on the accountability of PAFs was 
built over the duration of the interview, as rapport was developed between the 
researcher and the participant.    
Observation was also used as a research method during the interview, including 
being alert to non-verbal cues, expressions and the interview environment 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  Further, as soon as possible following the interview, 
reflection was undertaken by the researcher (Irvine & Gaffikin, 2006) through the 
use of a series of structured questions.  This reflective process was used to record 
impressions of the key themes of the interview, the environment in which it took 
place, the dynamics of the interview, any impressions of the participant, learnings for 
future interviews, and anything to be followed up.   
4.3 ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER IN THE STUDY 
As an independent study, the researcher’s own understandings, experiences and 
beliefs inevitably influenced the discussions and data collected during the interviews 
(Creswell, 2013).  These biases can be mitigated through identification of influences 
created by the researcher’s active involvement in the data collection process. 
Deliberate steps may then be taken to minimise and manage personal influences, 
both in the analysis and in the presentation of the findings (Irvine & Gaffikin, 2006). 
In this research, my perceptions of PAFs’ accountability have been influenced by my 
previous career working in grant-making trusts and foundations, in particular in one 
large independent foundation for approximately 10 years, and a subsequent three 
years in the charitable trusts division of a listed trustee company.  My perceptions 
have further been influenced by working as a research assistant in the Australian 
Centre for Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies (ACPNS) within the School of 
Accountancy at QUT for almost three years immediately before commencing my 
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Masters studies.  Current affairs and general media concerning philanthropy, in 
particular the establishment and predicted dissolution of the ACNC have also 
informed and influenced my understanding of accountability in endowed 
philanthropic foundations.   
My previous professional experience has positive benefits, in that it brings a deep 
awareness of the philanthropic sector to my research, and allows me to engage with 
interview participants on the basis of shared knowledge and experiences.  However, 
my background may also have impacted my questioning focus during the interviews, 
and my interpretation and analysis of the resulting data.  By using an interview 
protocol, allowing participants to engage freely and openly without deliberate 
influence or bias (e.g. open-ended, neutral questions), adopting a systematic analysis 
process (Section 4.5) and ensuring that excerpts from the interviews are included in 
the findings, readers are able to make their own assessments regarding interpretation. 
4.4 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
PAFs form a distinct and readily definable sub-group within the philanthropic sector.  
As noted previously (Section 2.2) PAFs are endowed organisations that typically 
exist in perpetuity, are privately funded by a small number of donors, and exist for 
public benefit purposes.  Other foundation types/structures such as Public Ancillary 
Funds (PuAFs) that seek funding from the public and have different regulatory and 
accountability requirements, are outside the scope of this current study.   
4.4.1 Sample 
The sampling frame for the study is PAFs registered in Australia.  A list of PAFs is 
publicly accessible (although not widely known) through the Australian Business 
Register online, with the data available for download.   The list however does not 
include contact information, as PAFs are not required to report to the public or to 
accept grant applications from the public.  While the ATO and the ACNC also make 
some information about PAFs available, it is in amalgamated form and the details of 
individual funds are not revealed. 
Table 4.1 below shows the number of PAFs in Australia as at December 2014, 
shown by state of initial registration with the ATO.  It is important to note that the 
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state of registration is not necessarily the same as the state of location or operations 
of the PAF, which may again differ from the geographic scope of grant-making 
activities.   
Table 4.1 Number of PAFs by Australian State or Territory of initial registration 
 
State or Territory Number of registered 
PAFs 
New South Wales (NSW) 527 
Victoria (VIC) 390 
Queensland (QLD) 122 
Western Australia (WA) 99 
South Australia (SA) 73 
Tasmania (TAS) 15 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 13 
Northern Territory (NT) 1 
Total 1240 
As at December 2014.  Source: Australian Business Register online 
4.4.2 Recruitment 
Given the lack of publicly available contact details for PAFs, initial recruitment was 
undertaken through professional networks in the philanthropic sector.  Interviewees 
were recruited using a snowball sampling method (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981), 
appropriate for this notoriously private and difficult to reach group (Coyte et al., 
2013).  One key person in the philanthropic sector in each of three states (South 
Australia, Victoria and Queensland) was initially contacted.  Two of these were 
previous colleagues of the researcher, and the third was a well-known person in the 
philanthropic sector and an acquaintance of the researcher.   
Each of these key individuals was provided with the participant information sheet, 
and was asked to forward it to managers or trustees of PAFs in their state who may 
be interested in participating in this research.  The researcher was not aware of to 
whom the information was initially forwarded, as this protected the privacy and 
confidentiality of those who may have chosen not to accept the invitation to 
participate.  Involvement was purely voluntary, with participants electing to contact 
the researcher directly to take part in the study.  This recruitment method proved very 
successful, with the intended number of participants in two states being recruited 
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over a 10 day period.  Recruitment in the third state was slower, perhaps as the 
researcher’s connection with the key individual was not as strong.   
The final sample of 10 PAFs included small, family-based organisations with no paid 
staff; and larger organisations with staff or managers.  No PAFs established by 
companies were included in the sample; however this was not by design, and 
possibly reflects the anecdotally lower incidence of corporate PAFs in the sampling 
frame. 
4.4.3 Profile of participating PAFs 
Participants were based in three Australian cities: four in Adelaide (SA), four in 
Melbourne (VIC) and two in Brisbane (QLD).  Three states were deliberately 
included to ensure that the data sample was not reflective of a particular geographic 
and/or cultural community.  The number of states was limited to three by travel 
costs, the time available for data collection, and the scale of this Masters study. 
The earliest establishment date for any of the PAFs included in the sample was 2002, 
the year after the introduction of the PAF structure (then known as Prescribed Private 
Funds).  The most recently established of the 10 PAFs was created in early 2014.  
The year of establishment for each participating PAF is shown in Table 4.2 and 
Figure 4.2 below. 21 
Table 4.2 Year of establishment of each PAF in this study 
 
PAF ID Year of establishment Age of PAF (years)* 
PAF 1 2007 7 
PAF 2 2011 3 
PAF 3 2011 3 
PAF 4 2004 10 
PAF 5 2002 12 
PAF 6 2013 1 
PAF 7 2014 0 
PAF 8 2009 5 
PAF 9 2004 10 
PAF 10 2005 9 
* at the time of data collection in 2014 
                                                 
 
21 Further information regarding the participating PAFs, such as areas of interest, corpus size or 
geographic location has deliberately not been provided as it would risk possible identification. 
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Interviews were chosen as the primary data collection method as they allow for a 
deep knowledge to be gained of the participant’s understanding of accountability, 
and offer “a unique opportunity to explore the points of view of others” (Irvine & 
Gaffikin, 2006, p. 126).  The interview process permits questions to be asked that 
clarify previous responses, and provide more detail (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  Ideally, 
the participants become engaged with the interviewer through the interaction of 
questioning and shared experience as rapport is built, such that their responses will 
consequently be open, honest and reflective (Bruce, 1994).   
The interview format was semi-structured, with a list of 10 open-ended questions that 
formed a flexible structure for the interview (see Appendix A for the interview 
protocol).  The questions were phrased in such a way as to avoid the use of the word 
‘accountability’ where possible, with the intention of preventing the participant’s 
subjective definition of the term from limiting their response.  The words used to 
represent accountability in the interview questions were therefore derived from Table 
3.1 Concepts or qualities associated with accountability in the literature (Section 
3.3).  Questions included phrases such as:  
 owe an explanation;  
 their interest in what you do;  
 what does that mean in practice;  




Number of PAFs in this study established each year
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The semi-structured interviews were conducted in person; with a total of 11 
participants (one of the PAFs had two participants).  This allowed for consistency in 
the way the open-ended questions were asked.   Managers or trustees from 10 
participating PAFs were interviewed; as they were very familiar with the 
organisation’s accountability relationships and associated activities. The researcher’s 
interview preparation included familiarity with each PAF’s website (where one 
existed) and any publicly available reports.  All interviews were conducted during 
late November and early December 2014.  Table 4.3 below summarises details of the 
interviews conducted as part of the data collection process.  
Table 4.3 Interviews conducted and data collected 
 










PAF 1 1 Manager F 1:01 8,924 
PAF 2 1 Trustee M 0:33 5,069 
PAF 3 1 Trustee/Founder M 1:06 8,506 
PAF 4 1 Trustee F 0:49 8,200 
PAF 5 1 Manager F 1:01 10,501 
PAF 6 1 Trustee M 1:03 9,642 
PAF 7 1 Trustee M 0:51 9,159 
PAF 8 1 Manager F 1:01 9,545 
PAF 9 2 Trustee & Manager M&F 1:20 10,432 
PAF 10 1 Manager F 0:45 6,284 
Totals 11 5M, 6T 5M, 6F 9:30 86,262 
 
The average duration of the interviews was just under one hour (57 minutes), with 
the shortest being 33 minutes and the longest being one hour and 20 minutes.  The 
average transcript length in words was 8,626.  In the final participant sample, an 
almost equal mix of genders was represented, with five male and six female 
participants.  Likewise, an almost equal mix of managers and trustees participated, 
with five managers and six trustees.  It is notable that all five managers were women, 
and all but one of the six trustees were male, however the sample size is too small for 
this to be statistically significant.   
The trustees were board members or directors of the incorporated body that serves as 
the trustee for the PAF.  These individuals are commonly referred to informally as 
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“trustees” of the PAF22.  The roles played by the individual interviewees in the PAFs 
varied slightly, and this may have influenced the views they expressed.  Of the six 
trustees who participated in interviews, four were designated as the Responsible 
Person23 on the board, and one was also the founder of the PAF. 
Undertaking all 10 interviews in person allowed for observational data of 
participants’ body language, facial expressions and the interview environment.   At 
the conclusion of each interview, a short list of reflective questions was completed 
by the researcher, noting initial observations and impressions of the interview (see 
Appendix B for an example of the completed reflective questions).  Interviews were 
recorded (with permission) and transcripts were prepared. 
Eight of the interviews were conducted in the offices of the interviewees.  One 
interview was conducted in a café and another in a hotel at the request of the 
respective interviewees.  
4.4.5 Review of publicly available information on participating PAFs 
Prior to interview, a review of publicly available data on each PAF was undertaken 
to familiarise the researcher with the organisation.  Of the 10 PAFs interviewed for 
this study, only one had a website, and another had a dedicated page of a website 
established by a family company.24 None had Facebook pages or Twitter accounts.  
One PAF trustee provided at the conclusion of the interview a printed narrative 
report on a selection of the PAF’s grants, titled “Foundation Review”. This review 
was not publicly available.  One further participant had been interviewed for a 
subscription-only magazine article about philanthropy.   
While these data sources were limited in directly addressing the research questions, 
they provided valuable background information.  In particular, the very slight volume 
                                                 
 
22 As detailed in Section 2.2 and Figure 2.3, the requirement for PAFs to have a company as trustee 
was introduced as part of the changes resulting from the 2009 Australian Government Treasury 
review. 
23 The responsible person on the board of a PAF is a designated director of the PAF’s trustee 
company, who is not a relation or associate of the founder, and has a responsibility to the community 
as a whole (Ward, 2009). 
24 Another of the participating PAFs established a dedicated website in mid-2015, after the data 
collection was concluded. 
 68  Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and Methods 
of secondary data such as reports and websites available to the public from the 10 
participating PAFs is indicative of the broader lack of publicly available information 
on PAFs and their operations.  Table 4.4 below summarises the data collection 
methods, sources and participants, data types and purposes. 
Table 4.4 Summary of research methods 
 
4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim by a professional 
transcription service, with one transcriber working on all 10 interviews for 
consistency.  Use of a professional transcriber ensured that the accuracy of the 
written transcripts was maximised (McLellan et al., 2003).   
Thematic coding of data was undertaken using NVivo.  Use of software assists in 
coding, searching and linking data from different sources, particularly interview 
transcripts and documents (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).  The data was coded to four 
theory-driven codes based on the four research questions developed from Ebrahim’s 
(2010) conceptual framework of accountability in nonprofit organisations (Fereday 
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& Muir-Cochrane, 2008).  Open or thematic coding was also undertaken to closely 
examine the data, categorising phenomena by theme and searching for patterns 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2008; Seale, 1999) as an iterative process.  A number of 
additional codes were derived from this open coding process.   
Once the initial coding in NVivo was complete, the interview transcripts were set 
aside for one week.  A second iteration of coding was then undertaken, using the 
printed hard-copy transcripts.  This second coding, using a manual method, was used 
to reduce the possibility of a section of text being overlooked for coding, or 
interpreted to have one meaning only when others might be relevant.  The initial 
codes were supported, not expanded, as a consequence of this second coding 
iteration.   
The coding process then resumed with NVivo, where second-order themes (or ‘child 
nodes’) were identified and grouped within the initial codes.  These were identified 
particularly within the four theory-driven codes, but also within some of the data-
driven codes.  As a consequence of this second-order coding, some of the first-order 
data-driven codes were re-assigned as second-order codes.   
A coding book was maintained to record the researcher’s creation and use of codes 
during the data analysis process, particularly in relation to second-order themes.  
Table 4.5 below provides an extract of the coding book (see also Appendix C for the 
full list of codes and their definitions). 
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Table 4.5 Extract from coding book used for data analysis of interview transcripts 
 




Description/definition Example text from interview transcripts 
Influence of 
PAFs as a 
group 
Data Text coded about PAFs 
as group and the 
influence or impact 
they have on 
philanthropy and the 
nonprofit sector 
So this PAF has opened up the ability for 
younger families or new people to do that 
and build that longevity of philanthropy that 




Theory For what activities or 
decisions is the PAF 
accountable 
It’s money that would have been paid to the 
tax office.  We basically put up our hand to 
say we can spend it better.  So we have an 
obligation to spend it better and I have no 
issue with someone knowing where we put it 
and the founder doesn’t either 
 
Inter-rater reliability was also used to gain a sense of any subjectivity within the 
researcher’s coding.  A fellow Masters student volunteered to separately code one 
interview transcript in NVivo, using the four theory-derived codes (Ebrahim, 2010), 
and also open coding text to other themes that emerged in the transcript.  This 
independent assessment was largely consistent with the researcher’s coding, 
increasing the confirmability of the findings. 
The coding of the transcripts was broadly guided by, but not directly linked to the 
interview protocol (i.e. the response to a particular question was not automatically 
coded to a specific form or aspect of accountability).  However, the importance of 
Research Question 1 – to whom are PAFs accountable? (Section 1.3) resulted in the 
coding being most detailed on this theme. 
The final stages of the iterative data analysis process comprised reduction and 
triangulation of the data, to summarise and illustrate the findings.  Richardson (2000, 
p. 934) however finds the concept of triangulation rigid and two-dimensional25, and 
instead discusses the concept of crystallisation in social research as involving 
multiple dimensions and differing views.  Building from Richardson’s concept, 
                                                 
 
25 It is noted that other authors such as Modell (2009) in the management accounting field, offer a 
perspective in support of triangulation in both positivist and interpretivist paradigms, based on 
abductive reasoning.   
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analysis of the data in this study included creating a multi-layered understanding of 
‘accountability to whom, for what, how and why’. 
Text searches were also undertaken on participants’ discourse in the 10 interview 
transcripts to identify the most commonly used concepts associated with 
accountability.  Key word searches using NVivo, examined the 10 transcripts, 
revealing both the frequency with which the concepts were used by participants, and 
the context (sentence or phrase) in which they were used, and hence their applied 
meaning.     
4.6 ESTABLISHING TRUSTWORTHINESS AND RELIABILITY 
As highlighted by Firestone (1993), it is difficult to generalise from qualitative 
findings in one context to an alternate setting, and there are arguments both for and 
against generalising from a sample to a population; from one case to another; and 
from data analysis to theory.  Firestone proposes that qualitative research is “best for 
understanding the processes that go on in a situation and the beliefs and perceptions 
of those in it” (p. 22).  This highlights the importance of the multi-faceted view of 
accountability obtained in this study through the 10 interviews (Section 4.2.3). 
Shenton (2004) discusses four dimensions of trustworthiness in qualitative research: 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  Credibility addresses 
the extent to which the research findings present a true picture; and transferability is 
concerned with whether a reader can judge whether the findings are applicable in a 
different context.  Dependability discusses the extent to which future researchers 
could repeat the study and obtain the same or very similar results; and confirmability 
addresses the question of bias and whether the findings are influenced by the 
researcher(s) themselves.   
In regard to this study, Shenton’s question of dependability is of particular interest.  
The findings presented in this study are strongly tied to the time of data collection 
(November and December 2014), particularly in regard to the dimensions of legal 
and regulatory accountability, but also other dimensions of accountability influenced 
by the social context in which PAFs operate.  These are currently in a state of flux 
due to political and policy changes, and they have a substantial impact on both the 
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requirements and perceptions of accountability for PAFs.   The dependability of the 
findings, or the extent to which they could be replicated by future researchers, is 
mitigated by this changeable regulatory context.  
Broader limitations of the study include transferability of the findings to the 
population of Australian PAFs, and to other philanthropic giving structures, such as 
PuAFs, or community foundations.  Credibility is supported by the rigorous process 
of data analysis, but may be impeded by the small sample size, which while 
appropriate for this Master’s thesis, also meant that saturation was not reached within 
the 10 interviews.  
Several limitations are recognised in relation to the data collection for this project, 
which impact on its credibility.  Ideally, focus group discussions with PAF founders 
and trustees would have been held to generate discussion and interaction around the 
concept and purposes of accountability. This method would have allowed for the 
analysis of a shared understanding of the phenomenon.  However, given the privacy 
that characterises PAFs as group, individual interviews were a more realistic and 
achievable research method, allowing for greater honesty in participant responses 
and disclosures. 
In regard to Shenton’s criteria of confirmability, common criticisms of interviews as 
being potentially biased by impression management and retrospective sense-making 
(Qu & Dumay, 2011) are recognised.  These biases were mitigated by interviewing 
both managers and trustees of PAFs to gain different perspectives, and by using a 
semi-structured interview protocol.  Researcher bias is also recognised, and was 
discussed above in Section 4.3.  Issues around the trustworthiness and reliability of 
this research, as well as measures available to mitigate these concerns in either the 
current or future studies, are summarised in Table 4.6, drawing on Shenton (2004).  
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Issues in this research Current and future 
measures to mitigate 
concerns 
Credibility The extent to 
which the 
research findings 
present a true 
picture 
 Small sample size 
 Restricted sample 
(family and individual 
PAFs only, no 
corporate PAFs) 
 Sample only drawn 
from three states/cities 
 Current: Lengthy, in-
depth interviews with 
engaged participants 
 Future: Study could be 
repeated with a larger 
sample, including other 




Transferability Whether a reader 
can judge whether 
the findings are 
applicable in a 
different context 
 Description of sample 
must be sufficient to 




 Future: Increasing data 
will become available 
through the ACNC over 
time, increasing 
potential pool of 
participants  
 
Dependability The extent to 
which future 
researchers could 
repeat the study 
and the findings 
 Perceptions of 
respondents are 
particular to a point in 
time due to rapidly 
changing external 
environment 
 Method may not be 
replicable due to 
privacy and 
confidentiality of 
PAFs in this study 
 
 Current: Detailed 
reporting of research 
design 
Confirmability Whether the 
findings are 
influenced by the 
researcher(s) 
themselves 
 Sole researcher does 
not allow for 
elimination of biases 
 Current: One transcript 
coded independently by 
a fellow student 
researcher to compare 
and confirm coding 
4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research project was submitted for review by the QUT Research Ethics 
Committee as a human low-risk application.  The submission included a list of 
interview questions, recruitment e-mail and phone scripts, a participant information 
sheet, and a consent form for signature by all interviewees.  Approval was given by 
the QUT Ethics Committee, with the approval number 1400000794.   
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Each participant was e-mailed a copy of the participant information sheet and the 
consent form (See Appendix D) at least one week prior to the scheduled interview.   
These included the approval number and contact details so that participants could 
directly contact QUT if any issues with the researcher’s conduct arose.  The consent 
form specifically asked permission to audio record the interview, and to have that 
audio recording transcribed.   Informed consent was given through signed consent 
forms for each of the 10 interviews conducted.  Participants were able to withdraw at 
any time up until four weeks after the completion of the interview.   
The names of individual participants and the PAFs are referred to anonymously 
throughout this thesis, to ensure their confidentiality. 
4.8 SUMMARY 
A thoughtful and well-informed research design is paramount to the success of the 
overall research project.  In this study, the driving factor was the paucity of existing 
research on the accountability of endowed philanthropic foundations.  This 
determined the exploratory nature of the research, and led directly to the choice of in-
depth, semi-structured interviews as the primary qualitative research method.   
Key data analysis processes were the professional transcription of audio recordings 
of the interviews, analysis of the themes in the transcripts using NVivo and manual 
coding processes, an inter-rater reliability check for coding confirmability, and the 
reduction of the coded data to refine and summarise the findings. 
The wide-ranging discussions with participants produced some unexpected themes, 
or ideas that were not suggested by the academic literature, supporting the decision 
to use an abductive design to comprehensively address the research questions.   
These findings are presented in Chapter 5.   
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings of this study, organised by the research questions.  
Section 5.2 addresses the first research question: accountable to whom? providing 
insights into the actors, groups, organisations or individuals to whom PAFs are 
accountable based on the perceptions of PAF managers and trustees.  Section 5.3 
examines the second research question: accountable for what?  This section details 
the activities for which PAFs are accountable, and considers accountability for grant-
making and investments.    
Section 5.4 then presents the findings from the third research question: how are PAFs 
accountable? exploring the tools and processes through which PAFs practice 
accountability.  Section 5.5 describes the responses to the fourth research question: 
why PAFs engage in accountability? exploring two elements of motivation and 
purpose.  Section 5.6 considers what PAFs understand by the term accountability.  
Finally, Section 5.7 summarises the findings from the study. 
5.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 1: ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM? 
Trustees and managers of PAFs identified a wide variety of individuals, groups and 
organisations to whom PAFs were accountable.  The two most common themes were 
that PAF managers and trustees felt accountable to their beneficiary organisations, 
and to the ACNC.   Accountability to their beneficiaries, i.e. to nonprofit 
organisations endorsed as DGRs was coded 23 times in 9 interviews (out of a 
possible 10).  Accountability to the ACNC was coded 21 times in 10 interviews.  
Other stakeholders or actors to whom PAF managers and trustees felt accountability 
included the ATO, the general public, the philanthropic sector, the children of the 
founder, the board of the PAF, a geographic community, other trusts and 
foundations, and the ultimate beneficiaries of the PAF (i.e. the individuals or groups 
that were the clients of the direct beneficiary organisations funded by the PAF).  
Each of these groups is considered in the following sections. 
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Of the 10 actors or agencies to which PAFs perceived the most accountability, only 
two (founder’s children, and board of the PAF) were internal to the organisation, thus 
demonstrating a clear external focus for PAF accountability as a whole. 
Five themes were coded once only, or were only coded in one interview.  These were 
re-examined but remained clearly differentiated from the other, more common 
themes.   These further actors to whom interviewees perceived their PAF was 
accountable are reported separately in Section 5.2.11 below. 
Findings revealed a number of emergent themes, summarised in Table 5.1 below, 
and ranked based on the number of references coded to that theme, rather than the 
number of interviewees that identified each theme.  A breakdown of these findings 
by individual PAF is detailed in Appendix E.   
Table 5.1  To whom do PAF managers and trustees perceive PAFs to be 
accountable? 
 
Individual, group or 
agency 





Beneficiary organisations endorsed as DGRs by the 
ATO.  
23 (9) 
ACNC  Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission 21 (10) 
ATO Australian Taxation Office 17 (7) 
General public The Australian community or population as a whole 16 (7) 
Philanthropic sector as a 
whole 
The individuals, groups and organisations that are 
philanthropic donors 
11 (7) 
Founder’s children The first generation descendants of the founder(s) of the 
PAF 
10 (5) 
Board of PAF The individual directors (known as ‘trustees’) of the 
trustee organisation for the PAF 
8 (6) 
Geographic community A community defined by a geographic area 8 (5) 
Other PAFs PAFs other than those participating in this study 8 (4) 
Ultimate beneficiaries The individuals or groups being the clients of the direct 
beneficiary organisations funded by the PAF 
8 (2) 
  
Chapter 5: Findings  77 
5.2.1 Accountability to beneficiary organisations 
Managers and trustees of PAFs referred to accountability to their beneficiary 
organisations in terms of responsiveness in relation to queries from both existing and 
potential beneficiaries “What we try and do is set ourselves a high standard of 
interacting with grant seekers and grantees” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014).   Engagement 
with beneficiaries was also highlighted as important by some respondents: “…what I 
have seen them [the board of trustees] do… is really engage with the people that 
they’re supporting” (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
One respondent referred to engagement in terms of partnerships with beneficiaries, 
and the exchange of information involved: “partnerships are important and you can’t 
have a partnership unless they know a bit about who you are and what you’re doing” 
(Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  Another reinforced the importance of beneficiaries knowing 
about the PAF: “I think charities should be able to - I mean if we are about to grant 
money to a charity they should be able to go and check that we actually exist” 
(Trustee, PAF 7, 2014).  For others, information about the fund was made available 
on request from beneficiaries “…over seven years word has sort of got out a little bit 
and you do get the odd letter saying, ‘Can we learn more about you?  Can we find 
out more about you?’” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
Accountability to beneficiaries through answerability was also noted: “If we stopped 
working with a major partner I would be particularly answerable to them and say, 
‘Look here is why’, and spend as much time as they needed, say, ‘This is why we 
changed tack’” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  Accountability to beneficiary organisations 
can therefore be summarised as being relationship-focused, through responsiveness, 
engagement, an exchange of information, answerability and partnerships. 
5.2.2 Accountability to the ACNC 
The frequency of the responses regarding accountability to the ACNC can in part be 
attributed to the political uncertainty surrounding the Commission since it 
commenced operations in late 2012.  The responses were almost all positive about 
the ACNC and its role, with only one respondent commenting negatively about the 
Commission as an unnecessary and expensive administrative regime.  Other 
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respondents expressed disappointment in some specific areas of the ACNC’s 
operations, such as the lack of flexibility around the privacy provisions for PAFs; 
and the lack of aggregate operational data for PAFs to provide a benchmark against 
which individual PAFs might measure their own organisations. 
One of the beautiful things about the ACNC as we thought it may roll out was 
the fact that we would then have access to aggregated data, having an 
understanding of exactly who was receiving the money, dollar amounts, 
sectors, and then being able to try and track some kind of impact from that, 
which is a very public benefit to understand the impact of these foundations.  
If that’s ever going to happen who knows (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
The majority of respondents, however, saw the ACNC as playing an important 
regulatory role in the nonprofit sector, commenting on the value and importance of 
its operations. “You had the Federal Labor Government establish the ACNC as the 
sort of compliance watchdog, if that is the word to use, and I was a big supporter of 
that - big supporter” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014); and “I see the ACNC as being really 
done the right way and from my experience they’re a great organisation” (Trustee, 
PAF 7, 2014).  These respondents were confident of the value of nonprofit 
beneficiary accountability provided for PAFs through the ACNC. 
Each of the interviewees was asked whether their PAF had requested their AIS 
submitted to the ACNC to remain private (invisible to the general public through 
searches of the ACNC’s Register).26  Of the 10 PAFs, only two (PAF 2 and PAF 8) 
had chosen to have their information visible to the public.  The publicly available 
documents for these two PAFs include their 2014 AIS, financial statements, a copy 
of the PAF’s trust deed, the names of the responsible persons, and contact details (e-
mail, address, and phone).   The other eight PAFs had no publicly visible information 
through the ACNC register, as these PAFs expressly requested the information 
submitted to the ACNC remain private, and not disclosed to the public. 
5.2.3 Accountability to the ATO 
The accountability of PAFs to the ATO was almost exclusively perceived by 
respondents to be through the agency of DGR endorsement, both of the PAFs 
                                                 
 
26 The ACNC Register is an on-line searchable listing of the 60,000 plus charities that have registered 
with the Commission.  To be registered, charities must meet the Commission’s legal definition of a 
charity, and must keep their information on the register current.     
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themselves (endorsed as DGR Item 2) and the nonprofit beneficiaries to which they 
made grants (endorsed as DGR Item 1).  Both of these endorsements are made by, or 
within the power of, the ATO (Section 30-15 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 
1997).27  As such, the ATO is perceived as having a significant role in regulating the 
operations of PAFs. “To be a legitimate PAF your primary responsibility is to the tax 
office” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
Several respondents expressed their view that the ATO was acting as an agent of the 
general public or taxpayers in carrying out this regulatory role “I mean the ATO - the 
regulatory body - that’s what they’re there to do, so they’re overseeing it, and so I 
don’t think the man in the street needs to” (Trustee, PAF 2, 2014); “…but in the real 
world where you’re accountable to the tax office and the general public, they’re first” 
(Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
Respondents noted the potential conflict between the ATO’s role in endorsing 
charities as DGRs and its role in collecting taxes:  “I know its private money but it’s 
done through donations which is a tax deduction, so it’s leakage from the ATO, 
which the ATO hates…” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  The role of the ATO in 
investigating misdemeanour and fraud, and issuing sanctions was highlighted as an 
important aspect of PAF accountability “…ultimately if the whole PAF sector starts 
to wobble and collapse the ATO are just going to come through like a packet of salts 
and change things dramatically” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
There were also concerns expressed about the ATO’s level of interest in the 
philanthropic and charitable sectors, and its capacity to deal with them. “…we’ve got 
the ATO [as a regulatory body] but the ATO are trying to do a lot of things and this 
is probably not their priority” (Trustee, PAF 7, 2014).  Others were indifferent to the 
ATO’s regulatory role in terms of PAF accountability, indicating that reporting and 
compliance were not significant to them “Well they [the board] don’t seem too 
concerned with say the tax office or any of the government authorities.  The 
regulatory doesn’t come into it” (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
                                                 
 
27 Income tax laws determine which organisations can receive tax deductible gifts through a process of 
endorsement by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO).  Eligible organisations must apply individually 
to be endorsed, and endorsement can be for the organisation as a whole, or for a fund owned by the 
organisation. 
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5.2.4 Accountability to the general public 
Trustees and managers in the study articulated a broad and multi-faceted 
accountability to the general public, or Australian community at large.  For two 
PAFs, this precluded making grants that would only benefit a small section of the 
community, instead focusing on the greatest good for the greatest number. 
So sadly, for example, if somebody came to us and said, ‘One person in this 
state every year is affected by this very bad case of asthma.  We want to do 
some research on it’.  We’d say, ‘Well we appreciate that but we won’t do it’.  
It’s not broad enough (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
So they [the board of the PAF] do say ‘no…we don’t think this is a good 
idea’…if there are things that we really think are maybe a bit narrow or just 
too specific (Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
Other respondents were quite specific about areas in which they judged they had no 
accountability to the public at large, namely the value of the fund, contrasting the 
private versus public nature of PAFs. 
We don’t outline what our corpus capital is because the founder is still very 
private about that.  It is substantial but the founder wants to keep it private 
and we don’t feel the need to push her to advertise it, and we’re not 
convinced it’s in the public good to advertise that (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
The ongoing tension between transparency and privacy was expounded by two 
respondents who raised the issue of the private versus public nature of PAFs in 
regard to their accountability. “So there’s almost a conflict there - well not a conflict 
- but between their wish for privacy as individuals and yet clearly their very strong 
engagement in the [philanthropic] sector and desire to do things better” (Trustee, 
PAF 4, 2014). Many of the trustees and managers, however, highlighted issues 
specifically with the founder’s privacy either at the individual or family level. 
…once the founder passes away it then becomes an interesting conversation 
about private versus public profile because the founder’s private concerns - if 
that’s the word to use - are gone.  So it’s more now of a public entity to a 
certain degree (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
This accountability to the general public was explained by several respondents as 
operating at board level, when decisions regarding grants were made. “So certainly 
being on the board to look after your favourite charity isn’t enough, especially if the 
corpus starts to grow and you build up a public profile, whether you like it or not” 
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(Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  The mandatory responsible person on the board of the PAF 
was also seen as representing the interests of the public in the work of the Fund   “… 
because it is a sort of unregulated, unsupervised space there is real potential for abuse 
and the responsible person is the first line of society’s defence against that” (Trustee, 
PAF 7, 2014).  The role of the ACNC in providing information to the general public 
about PAFs was also noted: 
I was quite surprised because I expected at the very least when you search the 
ACNC register you would get a name and you would get me because I’m 
supposed to be public.  They’re supposed to be able to find me [as 
responsible person for the PAF].  I actually think it’s a flaw in their database 
(Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
Some respondents were very open to the general concepts of transparency and 
answerability to the general public, without needing to specify an audience or a 
questioner.  One trustee, when asked to whom they were answerable or to whom they 
felt responsible regarding the decisions the PAF made, stated “I would tell anyone or 
explain to anyone who asked” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014). PAF accountability to the 
general public was also considered a consequence of the tax deduction received by 
donors to the Fund itself. “…the donors have received a benefit for their donation to 
establish that foundation.  So one of the primary accountabilities would be the 
general public community to ensure that that money is granted appropriately” 
(Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
Further, two respondents were very specific about their PAF’s meaning of public 
accountability. “So if the foundation was to consider anything at all controversial, 
which to be honest it hasn’t, but what would that look like on the front page of the 
newspaper?  Can it be explained?” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014).  This concept of public 
accountability through negative exposure was expressed as a concern by another 
PAF:  “I would never ever want to see our foundation publicly exposed for doing 
something [wrong]” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014).  Hence, the risk of adverse 
publicity reinforced the perceived accountability to the general public. 
5.2.5 Accountability to the philanthropic sector as a whole 
Seven of the 10 PAF managers and trustees interviewed identified accountability to 
the philanthropic sector in Australia as a whole, or as one PAF Manager expressed it 
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“the greater land of philanthropy” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014).  Accountability to the 
sector was expressed as transparency, disclosure and answerability, and the need for 
best practice in a PAF to show leadership and avoid potential scandals.  
“…potentially it’s the sector who could ask the question because…I’m very much 
the type of person who would ask questions like, ‘Why did you fund that?’ 
(Manager, PAF 5, 2014).  Another noted their PAF’s openness to talk with anyone in 
the sector.  “I get people who turn up here that organisations have recommended that 
they come and talk to me, and it can be a trust, it can be a grant seeker, it can be a 
peak body” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
Accountability through transparency and shared learning was raised by one relatively 
new entrant to the philanthropic sector who welcomed opportunities to learn from 
other PAFs. “I think you can all benefit from knowing more about what each other 
does” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  The importance of accountability through shared 
learning specifically from failure was also expressed. 
…there’s other people in the sector doing this or something, and the whole 
project falls over, we don’t see that as a problem.  We just say, ‘Well look, 
we went through the process of scoping this.  People gave it a go.  The end 
result is that it’s not needed or it’s not successful or whatever, that still there’s 
knowledge gained from that’” (Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
Some PAF managers and trustees were embracing the responsibility to show 
leadership in the sector, especially through best practice in their own grant-making. 
“I think there is more of a feeling about wanting to be actively talking about what 
we’re doing and encouraging others to look at what we’re doing, to be seen as 
leaders in the field…” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014).  Similarly, another manager spoke 
more generally about their public profile in the philanthropic sector, and a sense of 
felt responsibility. 
There has been a lot of talk at a board level around a public face for the 
foundation and recognising that as the foundation grows and becomes one of 
the biggest foundations here in [name of state] that we have a role to play in 
being a public face and being part of the sector here and more broadly 
(Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
5.2.6 Accountability to the founder’s children 
While the interviews revealed a broad theme around accountability to family, there 
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was a clear focus on accountability to the founder’s children, or the next generation 
of the PAF founder’s family.  Some interviewees recognised the encumbrance a PAF 
may become to the founder’s children, acknowledging that their interests and life’s 
work may lie outside philanthropy. 
I certainly know of one PAF guy who said to his daughters, “Look I 
understand it’s a future burden.  I understand it’s a lot of work.  So when I’m 
gone if you don’t want to do it, no problem.  Just spend it out.  These are the 
organisations I want you to give it to” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014).  
… most of them only have some kids involved because the other kids just 
aren’t into it, and again these kids might be 40 or 50 or something, but they’re 
not into it, or they live overseas, or a variety of reasons (Manager, PAF 10, 
2014). 
Other managers highlighted situations where the founder’s children of (other) PAFs 
felt anger and frustration about the creation of the PAF and the lack of discussion or 
engagement with them. “…other kids who just feel like they’ve been robbed.  How 
dare you?  That’s my inheritance and you’ve just done that without consulting me.  
It’s not yours to do that with” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014).  However, some respondents 
expressed responsibility to children as motivating both the creation of the PAF, and 
the engagement with their children in philanthropy during their lifetime. “I can only 
think through to my children… if I can deliver something that they’re going to 
engage in then I think I’ve played my role, and hopefully if I’ve done that properly it 
will continue” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
I might say, well I set this foundation up as a legacy for my children so they 
could share the joy of giving and get involved in it and so therefore I’m 
accountable to them to make sure that it works well, is functional and is there 
for them to participate in as well (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
Others talked of trying to deliberately shape the foundation’s work to reflect the 
interests of the founder’s children from its establishment.   
…I went back through a whole lot of memos and correspondence between 
[name of founder] and each of [the founder’s children].  I looked at different 
things that they talked about and what their interests were based on those bits 
of communication (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
There was also an acknowledgement that once the children of the founder take 
charge of the PAF, it will likely change direction and focus. 
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…what I’ve seen in terms of that intergenerational transfer of responsibility 
for the foundation, is that the initial founders when it’s time to hand it over 
they recognise that for their children to take it on they need to have 100% 
ownership of it, and with that comes the understanding that things can, and 
probably will, look very different (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
5.2.7 Accountability to the board of the PAF 
Internal accountability to the board of directors or trustees of the PAF was discussed 
by interviewees who were both board members and managers of PAFs.  Respondents 
perceived accountability to the board mainly through personal relationships rather 
than through internal procedures or reporting. “The other stakeholders are obviously 
your fellow board members - doing the right thing by them” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  
The concept of risk was frequently discussed in relation to PAF boards, with regard 
to their degree of risk acceptance, both in the PAF’s grant-making and its 
investments.  
Are you talking about accountability around compliance, or accountability 
around me making a recommendation to our board about taking some risk in 
supporting a social venture, because there’s real accountability for me around 
that… (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
The high level of personal engagement by board members with the PAF’s grantee 
organisations was also mentioned as a form of accountability. One manager also 
discussed a perceived accountability by current board members to a past board 
member of the PAF, who had been involved with the PAF at the time of its 
inception. 
That’s probably where I see most accountability - that having done all this 
work we decide that we’re going to commit to $60,000 over 2½ years and 
I’m going to work hard to deliver a successful outcome.  That’s the 
accountability that I focus on (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
I know the directors also consider other relationships.  There’s another 
previous director who even though he doesn’t attend meetings and isn’t 
involved in the foundation any more, they will occasionally mention him if he 
had a link to an organisation (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
5.2.8 Accountability to a geographically defined community 
Five of the respondents spoke of a perceived accountability to the community in a 
particular and definable geographic region of Australia “It’s the State of [name] 
when it’s all said and done” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  In most instances this related 
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directly to the founder’s life history and where they felt a sense of belonging or 
loyalty.  A strong attachment to a particular state and city was the motivation for the 
establishment of one particular PAF, in which the focus of all grants was on the 
ultimate benefit to the state.  
The main thing though that ties all of that together is a really strong parochial 
love of [name of state], and [name of city] in particular.  So there’s always a 
very strong you know, does this benefit [the state] and [the city] and does it 
keep people employed?  …how is this going to - bigger picture benefit for 
[the state]?  (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
One manager highlighted the fact that the founder’s business (the wealth from which 
enabled the establishment of the PAF), had its origins in a particular geographic 
district and that there was a strong sense of connection and engagement with that 
community. 
… there is kind of like a direct line between the founder and the community 
engagement because what [the founder] has built up in that whole community 
of [that district], first by putting [their business] into that region, and now 
huge engagement in the people… (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
Other respondents noted that their PAF’s grant-making was restricted by geographic 
criteria, resulting in potential applications being either eligible or excluded based on 
the location of the project for which funding was sought: “I’m sure I could draw a 
line [on a map]” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014).   
5.2.9 Accountability to other PAFs 
Accountability to other PAFs was expressed by interviewees as a responsibility to 
demonstrate leadership, share learnings, and disclose not just grants made but also 
policies and procedures.  Often raised in the context of networking and small groups, 
this accountability to philanthropic peers was significant in these social relationships.   
…there’s a network that’s really beginning to gain some momentum and 
some strength where there’s talk about everyone in that network or that group 
disclosing what they distribute, and disclosing what they support…the whole 
idea is that we talk, we engage, we help each other, we educate (Manager, 
PAF 1, 2014). 
One trustee also noted that it was other PAFs established within an extended family, 
to which the perceived accountability was strongest due to familiarity and closeness. 
“So there’s a sense of responsibility or almost accountability to the other PAFs.  It’s 
 86  Chapter 5: Findings 
interesting” (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014).  The largest PAFs in Australia were identified 
by one respondent as having a greater responsibility for setting an example of best 
practice in the philanthropic sector.  This was seen as a positive development, and 
encouraging for the sector, rather than as a dominant force. 
...people will be looking to them for leadership in terms of corporate 
governance, how they structure their grants, where they put their money, 
accountability, evaluation, etc.  So whether they like it or not, it will be a very 
public exercise in charity giving (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
This theme of accountability to other PAFs is closely linked to accountability to the 
sector as a whole (see Section 5.2.5), but emphasises a sense of felt obligation to 
specific groups of other PAFs (e.g. networked or closely related) rather than the 
philanthropic sector more broadly. The sense of a ‘circle of influence’ was 
expressed. 
…one of the reasons I respect him [the founder] is that he sees that he can 
influence the people around him in positive ways and not just limited to his 
own kids.  He is an influencer - ripples on the water.  So I think he will see 
that … to maximise the bang for buck you can also increase those ripples in 
your own spheres of influence in the community and whatever, then that’s 
part of what you’re trying to do (Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
However, one manager also reported frustration with the privacy and lack of 
information about other PAFs, limiting opportunities for co-funding and sharing of 
experiences and challenges. 
I get upset because I look at the growth rate and I look at the number [of 
PAFs] in [state] and I go, “Where are they?  Why don’t they ring me up?  I 
want to know about them.  I want to know what they’re interested in.  Can we 
co-fund things?”  I think I’ve spent so many years waiting for that to happen 
because most of them aren’t public.  So I could go through the list, and I have 
done in the first two or three years I was here, and try to find any information 
on them - nothing.  So I’ve lost interest now (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
5.2.10 Accountability to the ultimate beneficiaries of the PAF 
This accountability focuses on the ultimate beneficiaries of the grants made by PAFs, 
namely the clients or the service recipients of the DGR 1-endorsed nonprofit 
organisations that receive grants from PAFs.  While spoken about by only two of the 
10 interviewees, this theme was very important to both.  One trustee strongly 
identified children as the ultimate beneficiaries of grants from their PAF, but also 
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spoke of a general community benefit through assisting children “…the kids are 
always the number one beneficiary, but the benefit also creates a cultural change in a 
community” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014).  Sustainability was also important to 
this PAF; the idea that a long-term commitment should be made to children, not just 
by the PAF itself, but by the grantee organisation.  Lack of sustainability was 
referred to as “… like giving the child a lick of ice cream and the music’s gone” 
(Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
The second respondent identified local communities as the ultimate beneficiaries of 
their grants to whom they were accountable, and detailed a careful process of 
engagement and direct dialogue with these communities, not necessarily though the 
intermediary of the grantee organisation.   
The community that’s going to receive the benefits is a huge one [regarding 
our accountability] because we like to support things at a grass roots level.  
We like to make sure that communities want the things, that things aren’t 
foisted upon them.  We do feel responsible to them (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
This process of seeking out the views of communities, and entitling the beneficiaries 
of the grant to a voice in the PAF’s grant-making was distinctive among the 
interviewees. 
…what we do is when we approve it [a grant] we look at how they [the 
applicant organisation] can demonstrate the support from the community.  
We ground truth that.  Often I will ring [community organisations], 
sometimes find out they they’ve never heard of the organisation who’s 
applying (Manager, PAF 8, 2014).   
5.2.11 Accountability to other individuals, groups or organisations 
There were several additional individuals, groups or organisations identified by 
interviewees as being those to which PAFs had a perceived accountability.  In 
descending order, these are shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Additional individuals, groups or agencies to which PAFs perceived 
accountability 
 
Individual, group or 
agency 
Definition Number of 
references 
(sources) 
Founder’s family (broader 
than just children) 
family, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, and 
wider family 
7 (6) 
Australia, the whole nation accountability to the country as a whole, rather than 
a general or specific community 
6 (5) 
Taxpayers accountability to Australian taxpayers specifically, 
rather than the general population/public  
6 (4) 
Mission statement, 
representing the founder’s 
wishes 
a written mission statement from the founder(s) 5 (2) 
Founder’s wishes after their 
death 
the founder’s known wishes (but not written in the 
form of a mission statement) as understood and 
implemented by the board of the PAF after the 
founder’s death 
3 (3) 
Founder the founder of the PAF as a person and their role 
within the PAF 
3 (2) 
Advisory board a board or committee that existed to provide 
specialised advice to the PAF 
2 (2) 
Government  the role of Government in general, not specific 
agencies such as the ATO or the ACNC 
2 (2) 
One’s self at an individual 
level 
individual accountability, accountability to one’s 
self 
2 (2) 
Co-funders of projects other funders of projects funded by the PAF through 
grants 
2 (2) 
The whole world accountability to the whole world, not only Australia 2 (1) 
No-one accountability to no individual, group or agency; not 
the absence of accountability but rather 
accountability with no specific focus 
1 (1) 
Other donors to DGR 
organisations  
accountability to individual donors to organisations 
also supported by the PAF 
1 (1) 
CFO and/or CEO of family 
company or family office 
key managers of a family office or family company 
associated with the PAF 
1 (1) 
Faith, Christian values the religious beliefs and faith-based values of the 
founder(s) of a PAF 
1 (1) 
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Among the most interesting of these themes are those encompassing accountability 
to the founder of the PAF.  This was expressed in three distinct ways: accountability 
to the PAF’s mission statement (as an expression of the founder’s wishes); 
accountability to the founder’s known wishes after their death; and direct 
accountability to a living founder.   The mission statement of the PAF was discussed 
by some respondents as guiding the work of the PAF in a very direct, applied way. 
“Well there are a couple of accountabilities.  One is either legal or moral, obviously 
to the founder, and to ensure that their mission statement is adhered to as much as 
one can” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
Accountability to the founder’s known wishes after their death was discussed by 
three respondents, each with a different focus.  One highlighted the courtesy and 
importance of respecting the founder’s intentions: “Well you tend to give currency to 
the dead person’s wishes and put their money where they wanted it to go” (Trustee, 
PAF 2, 2014).  One manager noted the planning by some founders to continue to 
control the PAF after their death. 
They’re usually pretty strong people and they usually kind of like that idea 
that they’ll control beyond the grave.  The things that are very important to 
them will continue when they’re gone because they’ve made provision and 
they’ve ring fenced it and its solid and no-one can touch it and no-one can 
take it to court and challenge it (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
Another manager discussed whether the PAF would continue to make annual grants 
to a list of beneficiaries that had been continuously supported by the founder as an 
individual for many years prior to the establishment of the PAF: “I don’t know that 
they would continue on indefinitely.  There’s certainly no trust deed, there’s no letter 
of intent from [founder] that says they need to continue forever, but it is just 
honouring that legacy that exists” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
The relatively low importance of direct accountability to a living founder may be 
correlated with the participation of only one founder as an interviewee in the study 
(Section 4.4.4).  In this light, the theme of accountability to oneself as an individual 
may be interpreted as a founder’s accountability to their own values or morals, and 
how they allocate their time and their wealth.   Two respondents spoke of 
accountability directly to the founder of the PAF in instances where the founder no 
longer played an active role within the PAF, or sat on its board.  Foreseeing a 
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possible issue for PAFs as a group as their founders grow older, the question of 
mental capacity of an ageing founder was also highlighted: 
There’s attempted reporting [to the founder].  That’s verbal.  She no longer 
receives papers or anything like that.  She doesn’t have the capacity to digest 
that.  The chairman does go and visit her regularly and tries to talk to her 
about the foundation and depending on the day... (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
The findings presented in this section show the wide variety of stakeholders to which 
PAF managers and trustees perceive they are accountable.  The activities for which 
PAFs are accountable are explored in the following section. 
5.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 2: ACCOUNTABLE FOR WHAT? 
The activities central to how PAFs achieve their mission, and determine the 
effectiveness with which they operate can be broadly divided into grant-making and 
investments. Based on interview data, these activities were most commonly 
identified as ‘for what’ PAFs are accountable.   Additional, higher-level 
accountability highlighted separately by many respondents was accountability for 
governance, specifically managing risk and the internal management of the PAF.  
The range of activities identified are summarised in Table 5.3, and each is grouped 
by Ebrahim’s four categories of finances, governance, performance and mission. 
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Table 5.3 Activities for which PAFs perceive themselves accountable 
 




allocation of distributions 
(performance) 
The process of deciding how much will be granted,  and 
how funds will be divided between eligible applicants in 




The investments and investment policies and procedures 






Identifying and addressing risks or uncertainties that 






Decisions about how the PAF’s resources (primarily 




sustainability of grantees 
(mission) 
Enhancing and supporting the ability of nonprofit 
organisations to achieve their mission, by strengthening 
and developing their resources 
10 (4) 
Maximising benefit to 
ultimate beneficiaries 
(mission) 
Focusing on the impact and benefit of a grant to the 
individuals or community that are the clients of the 
grantee organisation, in line with the mission and values 
of the PAF 
8 (5) 
Internal management of 
PAF (governance) 
 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the management and 




Each theme is considered below under the relevant headings.   
 
5.3.1 Accountability for grant-making or allocation of distributions 
Grant-making or allocation of funds to grantees is the core activity of a PAF, with a 
minimum of 5%28 of the fund’s net assets required to be distributed under the PAF 
guidelines (Ward, 2009). “Every year you’ve got to decide who gets what” (Trustee, 
PAF 2, 2014).  This decision-making process was acknowledged by participants as a 
serious responsibility, and key to the PAF’s performance. 
Someone else’s money to give away - how do I decide?  …A lot of my giving 
in the past has been reactive - someone asks for it, if I’ve got it I give it.  
Whereas this is a much more...considered, yes - I’ve got the deciding vote 
here so that’s quite a different mindset to get your head around (Trustee, PAF 
9, 2014). 
                                                 
 
28 “PAFs must distribute at least 5% of the net asset value of the fund at 30 June during the following 
financial year” (Ward, 2009, p. 9). 
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Grant-making was described by one respondent from a newly-established PAF as 
being a learning process, and not especially important when a PAF has relatively 
modest resources in its early stages. 
…initially it [grant-making] will be a bit ad hoc.  I think they’ll probably 
have a couple of core ideas and charities, and because there’s also not a lot of 
money initially…it probably doesn’t matter too much…It will just be we like 
this one, we’re going to do this… (Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
The notion of grant-making as a learning process that builds over the life of a PAF 
was echoed by another manager when describing the decision-making of their very 
experienced PAF board. “They [the board] make decisions quickly.  If they don’t like 
it they’ll just say that…and they don’t over-think things either.  They’ll just ask for 
more information and then make a call (Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
Other respondents differentiated between accountability for grant-making where a 
longer-term partnership existed, was planned, or in the process of being built 
involving larger grant amounts; and grant-making where one-off smaller grants assist 
an organisation in the short-term.  
…small grants we’ve made of say $5,000 or $6,000 which was just we like 
the idea but we’re not in for the long-term.  We don’t really care.  It’s 
obviously going to be untied funding29.  Just give them a boost and then step 
away (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
Interviewees also spoke of the difficulties sometimes experienced in gathering all 
relevant information from applicants, and holding grantee organisations to account, 
as part of the broader accountability of the PAF for its grant-making.   
…there was probably some naivety on the part of the not for profit where 
they just thought - pot of gold - awesome.  We’re just going to get the full 
amount; we’re not going to have to really justify it because there’s so much 
there.  So they asked us for a full amount and we discovered bit by bit that in 
fact a half of it would be paid by government, so in a way that’s double 
dipping (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
The grant-making process also involved deciding how much to give, and whether to 
give more than the 5% minimum distribution requirement.  None of the managers or 
trustees expressed concern at meeting the requirement; however there was 
                                                 
 
29 Untied funding refers to a grant that is not for a specific project or program, but can be allocated by 
the beneficiary organisation as they see fit. 
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questioning of whether the regulated minimum effectively became a prescribed or 
maximum amount for some PAFs. 
Yes, so they [the board] all carefully say okay, this is the [amount] so 5% of 
that equals that and that’s what we’ll distribute (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
This approach was viewed as potentially limiting the distributions from the PAF, 
with both positive and negative implications.  For beneficiaries as a group, treating 
the minimum distribution requirement as a mandated distribution level limited their 
potential funding.  However there were longer-term benefits for the PAF in 
distributing the minimum amount in terms of future growth of capital and investment 
income.  One PAF was disinterested in the requirement, reporting little impact on its 
grant-making.  
The foundation doesn’t really pay a lot of attention to the minimum 
distribution other than to make sure it meets it, but certainly has no problem 
well exceeding it (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
The emphasis on accountability for grant-making therefore varies in both level and 
dimension, over time and with experience, based on the size of the grant, and the 
relationship with the beneficiary. 
 
5.3.2 Accountability for investments 
While investment policies of most PAFs did not expressly include an ethical 
accountability, many trustees spoke about seeking an alignment between the fund’s 
mission and its finances. “I feel like there’s really an understanding and appreciation 
of, well our investments really should align with our strategy” (Trustee, PAF 4, 
2014).  Only one respondent was disinterested in linking the grant-making purpose 
and the investments of the fund, instead emphasising accountability for maximising 
financial return on investments. “No.  I would think that would be folly because 
that’s not necessarily the best place to put your money” (Trustee, PAF 2, 2014).  
However, for this fund, there were certain investment areas that would be excluded, 
regardless of the potential financial return. “…you can maximise the giving, yes, 
with maybe the limits I mentioned - gambling and prostitution and things like 
that…probably cigarettes nowadays” (Trustee, PAF 2, 2014). 
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Other respondents spoke of a desire to use mission-aligned investments such as 
social impact bonds30, but had found that there were insufficient investment options 
available to them. “There’s definitely interest in that.  There’s just not a lot of 
product” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014); “They haven’t been as out there with social 
impact bonds because they mostly have been in [another state].  There hasn’t been a 
lot here” (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). Leadership and peer influence were cited by one 
PAF as a reason for moving into mission-aligned investments: “It’s a social 
investment but it’s also about making a statement to other philanthropists that these 
things should be contemplated and indeed done wherever possible” (Manager, PAF 
8, 2014).   
Different PAFs had different approaches regarding who was responsible for 
investments.  While some PAFs had their investments externally managed; in other 
funds it was done by either the founder or a director, mostly due to their professional 
experience and background in finance.  In these cases there was often an approval 
process in place for investment decisions. 
I’m Chairman of the Board and also I manage the investments on behalf of 
the foundation but they’re non-discretionary and I have no vote over the 
investments.  So what we do is we give advice to the board and they say 
“yes” or “no”.  It’s non-discretionary so we can’t do any transactions without 
prior approval and I have no say whatsoever (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  
Other PAFs had the investments managed at arm’s length through a family company 
or family office, as part of the wider financial affairs of the founder and founder’s 
family.  “They’re done internally by the [name] family office.  So there’s a family 
office that looks after the matters of the entire family - that’s [the founder’s] branch 
of the family” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014).   
5.3.3 Accountability for managing risk 
Managing risk was seen as a particular governance challenge by most PAFs, in 
regard to both their grant-making activities and their investing activities.  The trade-
off or balance between impact and risk of failure was raised by six of the 10 PAFs 
                                                 
 
30 Social impact bonds are financial instruments whereby private investors fund public projects with a 
social purpose, and receive a return on their investment only if the social outcomes desired are 
achieved. They are also known as social benefit bonds (Learmonth, 2013). 
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interviewed  “I’m not being flippant when I say this, we’re happy to have our fair 
share of failures because if you don’t try, you’re not going to be part of the process 
of progress” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014).  Another trustee highlighted their individual 
responsibility in managing risk. 
If two [grants] went spectacularly wrong maybe I’d just say, ‘Look, I’ve put 
too many hours into this.  I lack the experience or the judgement or whatever 
is required to make smart decisions’, and maybe I might become more 
conservative and simply funnel it into charities that 60% of it gets to where it 
should go, but it’s not impact (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
This same interviewee spoke of having a pre-determined percentage allocation of 
grants in any year to projects that are deemed ‘high risk’ to guide the grant-making, 
with slightly less than half of the available funds to be directed into programs where 
the risk of failure is deliberately higher than the fund would normally accept. 
I decided that up to 40% of our distributions would be in that area…but it is 
high risk because I don’t know the [beneficiary organisation’s] program is 
going to work (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
Other PAFs had processes in place to assess financial risk in grant-making, such that 
they were able to make an informed decision about whether the grant money might 
be lost or not applied correctly. 
We’ve had situations where…well, yes we did acknowledge that the writing 
was on the wall all this time.  Doesn’t mean we don’t fund them, we just want 
to know what the risks are and what we’re dealing with (Manager, PAF 8, 
2014). 
Risk-taking was also linked to untied funds in grants, whereby the recipient 
organisation, or a key individual within that organisation, has complete discretion 
over how the funds are applied. 
So if they find a researcher that they believe is delivering good results or has 
the potential to deliver good results, they’re happy to back them with untied 
funding… just funding that he can use to keep exploring those high risk 
projects (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
5.3.4 Accountability for conserving resources 
Some PAFs expressed a genuine concern with the waste of resources (time and 
money) involved in the grant application process; a waste that they thought could be 
ill-afforded by the nonprofit organisations (and also by the PAF itself). 
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… I do a lot of that vetting before [a grant application] gets to the board, 
because I am not going to put something up that I don’t think is going to get 
across the board because I don’t want to waste the not for profit’s time 
(Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
This sense of responsibility for conserving resources extended to a PAF’s grant-
making, with one manager reporting a firm belief in maximising the amount of funds 
available to nonprofit organisations.   
…there definitely is a desire to absolutely maximise the amount of dollars we 
put into not for profit organisations in the cause areas that we support 
(Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
This concern for wasted or excessive spending extended to a PAF’s own operations, 
including staffing expenses. “Her [the founder’s] frugal nature means that she does 
not agree with spending money on the administration of the foundation” (Manager, 
PAF 10, 2014). 
The final area in which accountability for conserving resources was raised was that 
of duplication.  Some respondents spoke of duplication of services provided by 
nonprofit organisations, and of the waste of grant monies inherent in funding two 
organisations to do essentially the same thing: 
…quite often….I go, ‘You know what, such and such is in a really similar 
space to you, maybe you should talk to them because you sound like you’re 
doing the same thing and you don’t want to put money into two things’” 
(Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
Duplication was also mentioned in terms of PAF staffing, and the possibility of 
pooling or sharing resources between PAFs “…the foundation is paying a staff 
member to do things, well if all those equal staff members got together and used 
resources … it would be more efficient” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014). 
5.3.5 Accountability for enhancing the capacity and sustainability of grantees 
A repeated theme in relation to grant-making activities was accountability for 
building the sustainability and capacity of grantee organisations over time.  For some 
PAFs, this involved working closely with applicants for funding over a long period 
to enable the PAF to make its own assessment of where their grants could best be 
used.  
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…it’s sustainability that’s important to me and so because we’re in a 
fortunate position to have a little bit of money to be able to say, “There’s the 
money but I have identified a weakness in your organisation and if you’re not 
prepared to go out and try and fix that up, I’ll do it” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 
2014). 
This concept of accountability for spending time with organisations and engaging 
with them in the long-term was a recurring theme when discussing the development 
of capacity in grantee organisations.   
…trying to work out what is going to help the organisations and really 
wanting to engage with [them].  We often have people who represent the 
organisation come and present to the board.  We’ve been on lots of field trips 
to those organisations, site visits and wanting to fund things that other people 
don’t fund - admin salaries - all the unsexy stuff that we in the not for profit 
sector know are the real drivers of an organisation (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
The same respondent reported that the interest of the PAF board in the sustainability 
of grantee organisations extended to details such as the CEO’s salary. “…how much 
are the CEOs getting paid - is that a living wage?  Is that enough?” (Trustee, PAF 4, 
2014). 
Building sustainability and capacity of nonprofit organisations by working closely 
with applicants before grant decisions were made was also an important dimension 
of accountability for some PAFs.  This was expressed through funding guidelines, 
project budgets, and referrals to other funders.  These policies and procedures were 
put in place to assist potential applicants to submit well planned, budgeted and 
targeted grant applications to all potential funders, not just the PAF itself.  One 
manager spoke particularly about the amounts requested by applicants being well 
below what they required to undertake the project as designed, and the disappointing 
compromises that resulted. 
A lot of organisations are almost conditioned to ask for what they think they 
can get rather than what they need, and there’s nothing worse than seeing a 
great project that has a project budget of $400,000.  They’ve got $30,000 
confirmed, they’re asking us for $50,000 and who knows where the rest is 
coming from.  How do you say yes to that?  You could give $50,000 then 
they’ve got $80,000, what happens to the project if they only get another 
$20,000?  It’s a $400,000 project - what are they going to turn it into?  It’s 
not what we funded (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
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5.3.6 Accountability for maximising benefit to ultimate beneficiaries 
Managers and trustees from five of the 10 PAFs interviewed discussed the 
responsibility of providing the maximum benefit, in terms of both quantity (number 
of beneficiaries) and quality (excellence of service) to the ultimate beneficiaries of 
the PAF, i.e. the individuals and communities who benefit from the grantee 
organisations’ programs and services.   Often this involved thinking past the 
immediate benefits, with the aim of trying to create lasting change and improvement 
in the longer term, in line with the PAF’s mission. 
…it’s about creating something that’s nationally significant through its 
quality.  So always aiming for excellence, defining what our interpretation of 
excellence is” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
Really what I’m doing with these programs is I’m changing the wellbeing of 
children and so it’s not just about the education development, it is about the 
wellbeing and how they can deal with resilience and all these sorts of things 
(Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
For one trustee, this concept of maximising benefit included trying to bring others in 
to support a project and its beneficiaries (with financial or other forms of support). 
I’m sure that they [the founders] will try and maximise their impact and their 
reach.  So if they’re doing something where they set up a link with an 
Indigenous community they’ll do what they can to spread the word about 
what’s happening, starting with family and kids and whatever and branching 
out (Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
5.3.7 Accountability for internal management of the PAF 
For some respondents, internal control of expenditure was seen as an important 
reflection of their accountability and values in grant-making. 
I take that accountability very seriously as to expenses that are run through 
the foundation.  Other foundations, on the advice of their accountants, aren’t 
so strict on what they expense.  So that’s one part I can control - that we can 
all have an influence over (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
Another respondent highlighted the ethics and accountability of a family member 
being employed by a PAF to manage its operations. 
There’s one [PAF] I know of where the family member is paid by the 
foundation and that family member has a full-time role.  It’s all meant to be 
purely arm’s length, and…you have to be careful about that.  There’s a bit of 
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risk there.  If you’ve got good compliance it shouldn’t be a huge problem 
(Trustee, PAF 9, 2014). 
The role of the responsible person on the board also was seen by some interviewees 
as extending to accountability for internal governance issues such as family conflicts.  
However, one respondent who was a responsible person outlined limits to their 
perceived accountability in such a difficult situation. 
I mean ultimately you can only do what you do.  If things are going down a 
path that - my choice is always to resign as a director and as a responsible 
person and leave them to their own devices - that’s the ultimate decision I 
have (Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
One respondent was critical of the advice (or lack thereof) provided to newly 
established family PAFs by professional advisers, impacting on accountability for 
internal fund management.  Concerns were raised where a founder is assisted to 
establish a PAF motivated by the tax deduction, but then given no subsequent advice 
on the ongoing management and activities of the fund. 
Accountants look at that admin side and say, “For tax purposes please 
establish one”, but no-one then explains well there’s an estate planning issue 
here, are you going to bring your family on board as board members?  Is that 
appropriate?  Is that the right skill mix..?  Where do we as a family wish to 
give our money?  (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
Part of this lack of advice and accountability for internal management was linked to 
the dearth of information publicly available on PAFs as a sub-sector, either through 
the ACNC or benchmarking reports. 
What are they doing from a corporate governance point of view?  What board 
members have they appointed?  When do they meet?  Do they have an 
investment policy in writing?  Is it adhered to?  Is there a mission statement?  
What’s their expense ratio like?  No-one knows (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
These questions are relevant to all grant-making trusts and foundations, not just 
PAFs as a sub-set of that group. While the discretionary disclosure of PAFs’ 
financial statements via the ACNC Register contributes to this lack of information, it 
was also considered to impact on PAFs’ sense of felt responsibility to manage the 
fund efficiently and prudently consistent with their fiduciary duties. 
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5.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 3: ACCOUNTABLE HOW? 
The research question of ‘accountable how?’ considers the ways in which PAFs are 
accountable, or the mechanisms by which accountability is achieved.   Table 5.4 
below shows the themes listed in descending order based on number of references, 
and groups them as either ‘tools’, ‘processes’, or both (see Section 3.6.3).  A further 
distinction is made in terms of mechanisms undertaken by PAFs, and mechanisms 
undertaken by others for PAFs, in order to enhance PAF accountability. 









Assessment of grantees’ 
performance through 
reporting to PAF 
Measurement and/or narrative reporting on 
outcomes of funding 
16 (8) Process 
(for 
PAF) 
Disclosure, transparency Voluntarily making information about the PAF 
available to the general public 
10 (5) Process 
Site visits, engagement, 
attending events 
Visits by PAF trustees or managers to the 
operational site of the funded programs or 
projects; becoming involved 
10 (5) Process 
(for 
PAF) 
Due diligence on 
possible grantees 
Investigation of the financial status, 
management and operations of grant applicants 
before making a grant 
10 (4) Tool  
Openness to inquiry and 
discussion 
Willingness to listen and to ask and answer 
questions 
8 (3) Process 
Grant agreements Written agreements between a PAF and a 
grantee, covering at minimum the amount and 
duration of the grant 
8 (3) Tool 
Granting only to DGR 1 
endorsed organisations 
Checking by PAFs to ensure grants are only 
made to organisations endorsed by the ATO as 
Deductible Gift Recipients (Item 1) 
7 (5) Tool 
Experienced and 
professional staff 
Direct employment of staff by the PAF, work of 
staff of other organisations for the PAF, or 
contracting services externally to bring expertise 
and professionalism to the foundation’s work 
7 (3) Process 
Formal funding and 
grant approval 
processes, such as 
application guidelines 
Existence and use of written criteria detailing 
what a PAF wishes to fund, and any restrictions 
on eligible organisations or programs 
6 (5) Tool 
Relationships and 
engagement 
Connections and ongoing involvement, how 
PAFs and other actors deal with each other 
5 (5) Process 
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Each of the mechanisms listed in Table 5.4 above is discussed in greater detail 
below. 
5.4.1 Accountability through performance evaluation and reporting by 
beneficiaries 
Despite most PAFs requiring reporting by beneficiaries as a reflection of 
accountability for funds granted, PAF managers and trustees had mixed views about 
grantees’ reporting and performance measurement practices, and there was a wide 
range of requirements by PAFs.  Some PAFs’ reporting requirements for grantees 
were very minimal “…it’s pretty much answer these six questions at the end of the 
financial year and just let us know that you’ve spent the money” (Trustee, PAF 4, 
2014); “At the moment there’s no specific evaluation requested” (Manager, PAF 10, 
2014).   
One manager spoke about valuing the working relationship between them and their 
grantees over any written, structured reporting, and also acknowledged that the 
reports submitted by grantees were of little actual use to the PAF.  “We have an 
evaluation form which we ask our partners to complete.  I’ve got to say I’m not 
incredibly rigorous in analysing it because for me it’s much more about actually how 
we’re travelling as a partnership” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
There was also an acknowledgement of the burden in time and resources placed on 
grantees to meet the reporting and evaluation requirements of multiple philanthropic 
funders, and a desire to reduce duplication in this area by standardising the reporting 
format. “…the not for profits, once they do one [report] they sort of know what 
people are asking, and so anything that saves time and money across the board is 
good for everyone” (Manager, PAF 5, 2014).  Some respondents tied their 
requirement for reporting and evaluation to the amount of the grant. 
I don’t think there’s any obligation…for us to go off and conduct an audit.  
But if we gave a significant amount of money well there might be, just 
because we want to ensure it was used as we thought… (Trustee, PAF 2, 
2014). 
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For one PAF, each board member was required to investigate and report back to the 
board as a whole on the outcomes of a number of grants, both to increase their 
engagement with their grantee organisations and to ensure the board had a strong 
sense of responsibility for grant outcomes.   
…the way that the board is structured is that we each have responsibility for 
two or three of the grantees and we need to liaise with them.  Call them.  E-
mail them.  Get the report and then report back to the board (Trustee, PAF 4, 
2014). 
One trustee referred back to the purpose of assessing performance: “you want to start 
to get results.  You want to see results to keep you motivated” (Trustee/Founder, 
PAF 3, 2014).  However, assessing results was also not necessarily a formal process 
and was linked to the PAF’s relationship with the grantee organisation, and whether 
ongoing funding would be considered “…yeah, I’ve kicked the tyres, I know the 
CEO” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014).  Finally, there was a certain level of caution 
and disillusionment expressed by one respondent about the underlying value and 
accuracy of performance measurement “…if someone is looking for key metrics to 
be ticked off each year, dream on.  Not going to happen.  So on the basis of that I 
guess what we look for is ‘indicators of progress’” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
5.4.2 Accountability through disclosure and transparency 
Transparency is often used as a synonym for accountability (Section 3.3) and was 
seen by some managers and trustees as an easily achievable first step in the process 
of moving towards greater accountability.  This conception of transparency as 
‘passive accountability’ was highlighted by one manager who clearly distinguished 
between information about the PAF being available, and it being actively 
disseminated. 
I have no issue with someone knowing where we put it [grant money] and the 
founder doesn’t either, but that’s different - it’s much more proactive to 
actually then go out and tell people.  I don’t mind them knowing if they want 
to go and look (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
Several managers and trustees of PAFs also referred to a reluctance to be perceived 
as boasting about their organisation. 
So the more we can in an attractive, stylish way tell the world what we’re 
doing, the better in terms of spreading the word.  No-one wants to be 
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aggressive and start bragging etc., but if we just say, ‘This is what we are 
doing’ (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
The wishes of the founder were also paramount in this context, as eight out of 10 of 
the PAFs that participated in this study carried the name of the founder(s) in their 
title (e.g. The Jones Family Foundation).   Any promotion of the PAF was therefore 
clearly felt to be promotion of the founder(s); something that respondents were 
reluctant to do. “They [the trustees] didn’t feel comfortable seeing the family name.  
They really wanted to give to things that they felt passionate about but without 
needing to see their names in lights” (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014).  This concern for 
privacy was respected by all respondents. “…there’s the giving and if people want to 
do that discreetly that’s their absolute right, and I respect that” (Trustee/Founder, 
PAF 3, 2014).  However, one manager believed that there was a need for greater 
transparency about PAFs as a group, with scope to use aggregated information, 
rather than pushing for greater disclosure at the level of individual organisations. 
PAF founders need to…be more open about the way that they’re operating 
these vehicles.  Again, you can come up with processes and ways of doing it 
that are non-identifiable and don’t impinge on their privacy (Manager, PAF 
10, 2014). 
5.4.3 Accountability through site visits, engagement and attending events 
Engagement with grant applicants and grant recipients was seen by respondents as a 
very important process of accountability for PAFs, through the understanding gained 
of the nonprofit organisation’s work and operating environment, meeting their 
clients, in-person discussions and open questioning.   
…being present at the functions, making sure that we are acknowledged, that 
the name is there, that we are kind of out there, but more than that, meeting 
the [ultimate beneficiaries of the nonprofit], understanding where they are as 
a young person and …what their path might be (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
Site visits were also held to be an important part of PAFs’ accountability; assessing 
the organisation’s credibility and trustworthiness – or lack thereof. “It was a gut feel, 
you know, you’ve got to go out and do your site visits.  At the time I thought this 
doesn’t feel right”31 (Manager, PAF 5, 2014).  The main obstacle raised was the time 
cost of such engagement, particularly for PAFs without staff members. “It’s only 
                                                 
 
31 Referring to a grant that was misappropriated. 
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happened because I’m retired.  I’ve got a little bit more time on my hands and it’s 
only come about by actually taking the interest to learn about that organisation” 
(Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014).  Even for staff members, scheduling site visits was 
problematic “any questions or whatever, clarification I need, ideally I’d do a site visit 
but not always - I should but I don’t have time” (Manager, PAF 5, 2014).  The 
increased engagement resulting from site visits was cited by one respondent as being 
vital to expanding and strengthening the level and scope of support from the PAF in 
fulfilment of its mission.  
So it’s only by really getting involved in those charities that you find out 
where there’s an opportunity to actually do a lot more than what’s being 
done… and ask questions and give them my thoughts and generate the 
discussion and the idea.  So again it’s the hands on thing (Trustee/Founder, 
PAF 3, 2014). 
5.4.4 Accountability through conducting due diligence on grant applications 
Due diligence as a way of vetting nonprofit organisations and their grant applications 
was mentioned by five of the 10 respondents as being an important accountability 
tool in their grant-making.  The focus of the due diligence procedures was usually 
financial, but for one respondent also encompassed governance systems and risk 
profile. 
It doesn’t matter whether it’s [an application for] $10,000 or $1 million, it has 
a financial health check…I designed [it] with the accountants - and it talks 
about the net assets, their profit and loss, their liquidity and their long term 
viability and their working capital - so how much money they’ve got to keep 
going and for how long (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
One respondent was highly critical of the level of applicant examination by funders 
including PAFs, particularly in relation to operating costs. “…to pore over a 
[nonprofit] organisation’s accounts and make judgement calls on administration costs 
and do all of that kind of stuff …is ridiculous in itself” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014).  
Due diligence, however, was not always seen by PAFs as uni-directional.  One 
trustee recognised the importance of grantees at least being able to check on other 
grants made by the fund. 
I actually made the suggestion when I came on board that it might help to use 
the name [of the PAF] a little bit, like in annual reports or whatever, because 
the people who needed to know, [therefore] know who the foundation is and 
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that just gives a bit of information - a bit of they’ve done the due diligence, 
they’re in, we’re in - and how that is helpful (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
Sharing information between ‘friendly’ funders was also mentioned as a means of 
effective checking on applicant organisations.  “…if I have queries - because their 
due diligence is very good, I can always ring them [another grant-making 
foundation] to ask about stuff” (Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
5.4.5 Accountability through openness to inquiry and discussion regarding 
grant-making 
This form of accountability was differentiated from transparency and disclosure by 
its focus on the grant application process rather than on the PAF as a whole.  Being 
questioned by nonprofit organisations and asked to explain guidelines and processes 
was seen as an important and necessary process of PAF accountability.  Some 
respondents expressed concern that greater openness would result in them being 
overwhelmed by inquiries and applications, but this had not been experienced by any 
of the participating PAFs. 
We were worried about that [receiving large numbers of inquiries] but it has 
not happened.  I’m not saying it won’t ever, but we probably don’t have a 
high profile.  Even the small donations we’ve given, they might put us on 
their newsletter list but no-one has ever rung and said, “Can we have some 
more money?”, or anything like that…we started off a bit worried about it, 
but less so as time has gone on (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014). 
Trustees and managers of PAFs reported applications coming to them from a range 
of sources, mostly through board members and staff, but also referrals from other 
funders, and direct unsolicited inquiries.  
… there’s probably a third of the projects that come from me that go to the 
board, and a third from the trustees, and then a third from other people [who] 
might bring something to the table, bring it to our attention (Manager, PAF 5, 
2014). 
Open discussions were seen as key to tailoring a grant to both the PAF’s mission and 
the grantee’s mission, and resulted in a better outcome for both. One respondent 
specified how they sought alignment between the strategic goals of a major 
beneficiary organisation and their own foundation’s long-term goals through 
discussions.  
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We were there to support the [name of organisation] - they came up with this 
idea which is slightly left field of giving [to a cause area] and so forth – and 
we’re happy to support it (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
They say, ‘Okay here’s where we want to be in five years’ and …’here are 
the 10 strategies that are going to get us there’, whether we formally do this 
or not, maybe you’re just in conversation.  Okay…which one of those 10 do 
we believe will help them… [and] help our foundation’s ambitions?  If there 
is one, let’s zero in on it and say, ‘Well how can we help you, with money but 
also in other ways, to fulfil on that strategy?’ (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  
Accountability through openness to inquiry and discussions was clearly seen by one 
PAF Manager as process that was ongoing for the duration of the project, rather than 
specific to the initial decision to award the grant. “…we do communicate where 
we’re up to, what we’re thinking, how it [a grant] might be moving forward, and also 
the fact that we’re watching and waiting and will be looking…” (Manager, PAF 1, 
2014). 
5.4.6 Accountability through grant agreements 
Grant agreements as an accountability tool were discussed by only three of the 10 
PAFs interviewed, but for them agreements were an important part of accountability 
to grantees.  Such agreements varied in scope and detail, but for the PAFs that used 
them, they represented a formal commitment to which PAFs could be held 
accountable by nonprofit organisations they funded.   One respondent spoke of 
increasing the rigour and requirements of the grant agreement in the second iteration 
of a multi-year commitment to a major partner of the PAF. “I guess I [now] see the 
importance of setting up expectations for everybody from the beginning of 
arrangements, for us and for the partners” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  The same 
respondent spoke of the need to move beyond informal agreements over time as the 
PAF’s size and ambitions also grew. 
These gentlemen agreements are all very well, and I know that’s how plenty 
of people do deals in business, but for me I see okay, where are the formal 
pieces of paper, where’s the writing that says this is what you said you were 
going to do? …I think setting up expectations from the beginning is 
important (Manager, PAF 9, 2014). 
For another PAF, grant agreements were perceived as flexible in that they stated an 
intention rather than making a clear and quantifiable commitment. 
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The way that the grant agreements are put to the grantees is that we really like 
what you’re doing but we don’t want to set it in stone at the grant level.  It’s 
like; please do see us again with a view that we’ll support you next year.  So 
it’s like a semi-promise (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
A third dimension of the importance of accountability through grant agreements 
related to giving grantees increased certainty around future funding, to allow them to 
focus on their mission and programs, rather than on securing financial sustainability.  
This multi-year commitment from the PAF was tied to reporting, and future 
payments were conditional on progress. 
… I’ve been trying to move the directors towards multi-year agreements 
upfront.  They were previously giving a number of organisations an annual 
grant and that was never in doubt, but [I’m] saying let’s let the organisation 
know upfront that they’ve got it for three years so they stop chasing us and 
can focus on the program.  Then as a part of that, [they] need to provide us 
with actual project outcomes …before we make [pay] the next tranche 
(Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
5.4.7 Accountability through adhering to DGR1 restriction on grantees 
The restriction on making grants only to nonprofit organisations endorsed by the 
ATO as a DGR (Item 1) was one of the few instances where interviewees discussed 
the accountability of PAFs through regulation.  This was closely linked to the tax 
deductibility of gifts into the PAF itself. 
…the accountability comes from the fact that to get the DGR 1 status you 
have to jump through so many hoops and it has to be signed off by 
government …the government are basically saying, “Well this is an 
organisation that we’ve endorsed to a level that we’d be satisfied if we were 
potentially funding them with tax dollars…so we’re comfortable with you 
putting your dollars in there which would have been tax dollars”…that to me 
is a significant level of accountability that everyone has to adhere to 
(Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
For some PAFs, checking the DGR 1 status of applicants was a useful accountability 
tool. “I’ll talk to them [potential applicants] and establish whether they fit the 
criteria, whether they’ve got the tax endorsements, all that stuff” (Manager, PAF 5, 
2014). “If the rules are followed then assuming there’s no foul play…You’ve got to 
give to somebody who the Government has said is a worthy recipient by this DGR 
endorsement” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  However, others questioned the 
thoughtfulness of the process by which the endorsements were gained.   
 108  Chapter 5: Findings 
…that’s obviously currently regulated via the ATO and then the ACNC 
making sure that they are eligible entities that are receiving the money …Is 
that an effective way of doing it in terms of ticking a box?  Yes it is, but it’s a 
bit arbitrary (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
For one PAF, the limitation on granting only to DGR 1 organisations sometimes 
posed challenges when a family board member proposed a grant to an organisation 
that did not fit this criterion.  The trustee described a notion of accountability to the 
founding family that was met through finding an eligible substitute organisation that 
worked in a very similar space.   
…the board is reluctant to not grant something that one of the family 
members brings in.  So if one of the family members really wants to support 
something and they’re not a DGR, we will try and work out a way that we 
can…fund something similar… (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
The restriction on DGR 1 organisations registered in Australia when granting to 
international projects was viewed by one respondent as ensuring a vital level of 
accountability, where making individual assessments of an overseas beneficiary’s 
work and status was challenging. 
…the safety net for that is the DGR 1, and that’s why I so firmly believe that 
that is vitally important, and also too with the restrictions around international 
aid.  You can give international aid but you’re not just going to be shipping 
off all your distribution to I don’t know what.  That to me is the safety net… 
having the DGR 1 status, and I know there has been a lot of debate around 
how rigorous it is.  I think it should be rigorous (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
5.4.8 Accountability through having experienced and professional staff 
Some respondents reported that a PAF’s accountability was enhanced by the process 
of employing professional and experienced staff, with responsibility for internal 
management and procedures. The issue of staffing for PAFs is complex, as some 
used staff from a family office or family company to do work relating to the PAF. 
“The families will generally use their other employees - they might be running a 
family office - to do the foundation work for free” (Trustee, PAF 2, 2014).  Other 
PAFs used professional philanthropic services companies to outsource the 
application and grant review processes.  It was also common for finances and 
investments to be outsourced.  The approach selected related to size of the PAF, level 
of founder and family engagement, and whether the PAF was part of a larger 
network of family organisations and companies. 
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…it’s a question of scale I think.  If you’re a large organisation, with a lot of 
money to give away and you’ve got lots of proposals you’d want a 
conventional company board structure and a committee to deal with filtering 
[applications] - or you’d need staff to filter (Trustee, PAF 2, 2014). 
The role of foundation staff or management in enhancing accountability for grant-
making was specifically discussed by some respondents, and involved researching 
applicants, internal reporting to the board, preparing grant agreements, and advising 
some applicants of their ineligibility. 
I don’t like being much of a gatekeeper in terms of really knocking things 
back to go to the board but by the same token not everything can go to the 
board.  So you do have to make some calls… (Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
The size and projected growth of the PAF was also linked by one respondent to the 
need for someone to work within the organisation. “…those little daily or 
weekly/monthly types of activities...of which there are a lot and as it grows …those 
jobs will become more and more important” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  Employing 
staff was seen to offer a degree of mitigation against the risk of mistakes or 
oversights being made in the PAF’s operations through lack of due diligence, 
guidelines and processes. “…with the professionalisation of the foundation the hope 
is that we won’t find ourselves in that situation [failure of a grant] now that there’s 
professional staff” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
5.4.9 Accountability through guidelines and criteria 
Guidelines and criteria were an important tool for PAFs to use in enhancing in 
accountability grant-making processes.  By setting out standards that potential 
applicants must meet, guidelines enabled PAFs to specify the criteria against which 
grant applications would be assessed.  Guidelines were seen as providing some level 
of transparency into the PAF’s goals, mission and strategic direction.  While offering 
no opportunity to challenge decisions made by the PAF, having guidelines was seen 
as an efficiency measure for both potential applicants and the PAF itself. 
Trustees and managers discussed varying levels of applying selection criteria, 
ranging from firm “They’re very strict about making sure that things fit the criteria” 
(Trustee, PAF 4, 2014); to slightly more flexible, “If it’s within the guidelines or 
even close I will always look at it, it’s just a matter of whether it’s a fit or not” 
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(Manager, PAF 8, 2014) and very open “We’d never say no to anything in terms of 
looking at it” (Manager, PAF 5, 2014).   
One PAF had an additional exclusion within their guidelines, which related to 
family, “…a requirement of the foundation’s donations is that it’s not something 
that’s directly related to one of the family members” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).  The 
intention here was to ensure that the PAF was accountable for an outward-looking 
focus away from the lives of individual family members, so that the PAF remained 
“something for the family to come together on that was positive”. 
5.4.10 Accountability through relationships 
Maintaining relationships and connectedness with beneficiaries was seen as a vitally 
important accountability process by most PAFs.  The level of engagement varied, 
largely due to the time available from staff and board members, but was seen as a 
key responsibility and extended well beyond the gift of money. 
I have an organisation that we give considerable funds to and I meet with 
them every two months.  I talk to them about their strategic plan, I give them 
feedback, I talk about how they present themselves, I try and introduce them 
to other funders.  So some we work really, really closely with… We try and 
be very, very generous with our time outside the grant, which can be really 
demanding… (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
The initiative in the relationship could come from either party, and could change 
over time “…they’re [now] very professional and very engaging but I think for a 
period it was coming from us, whereas this year it’s coming back the other way” 
(Trustee, PAF 9, 2014).   
Other managers and trustees acknowledged the work involved in building 
relationships that ultimately served both the PAF and the grantee. “…there definitely 
has been an emphasis on…creating and maintaining and nurturing those relationships 
- whether it’s [with] the CEO, the development director, or whomever” (Trustee, 
PAF 4, 2014).  The additional knowledge gained through working relationships 
underscored their importance to PAF accountability. “The way we do capacity 
building is it’s invited and it’s based on relationships and our understanding of the 
organisation and what they need” (Manager, PAF 8, 2014). 
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Relationships could also be frustrating and disappointing, particularly where 
subsequent to the grant being paid, communication became limited or non-existent. 
There was no progress at all made on what we had agreed.  The 
communication - I won’t even say poor, it was just not there…e-mails and 
phone calls went unanswered - three or four - which is disappointing.  I felt I 
was almost reluctant to feed that back into the board.  So I would say, ‘Look I 
understand, he must be really busy, but I’m going to keep trying’, and then 
eventually I had to say, ‘Look this is shit’ (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
Hence, accountability for PAFs in their activities is achieved through both tools and 
processes which varied over time and by participant(s).  While no activity identified 
by PAF managers and trustees was solely concerned with accountability, 
nevertheless accountability was an important component of the reason for each 
activity.  These motivations and purposes of accountability are explored in the 
following section. 
 
5.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 4: ACCOUNTABLE WHY? 
Research Question 4 examines the reasons why PAFs were aware of, interested in, 
and engaged in accountability.  The findings relating to the question of why PAFs are 
accountable fell into two categories: motivations and purposes.  The themes included 
under motivations included why PAFs want to be accountable, with regard to values 
and emotions.  Themes under the category of purposes related to what being 
accountable achieved for the PAF, in regard to the outcomes or goals of 
accountability.   Table 5.5 below summarises the themes relevant to this research 
question. 
Table 5.5 Reasons for accountability in PAFs 
 
Accountable why? Definition No. of references 
(sources) 
Motivations Reasons focusing on wanting to be accountable, 
feelings, beliefs and values 
 
16 (8) 
Purposes Reasons focusing on the use of accountability for the 




Each of these two categories is discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
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5.5.1 Motivations for PAF accountability 
The values-based reasons for PAF accountability generally reflected the underlying 
motivation for the creation of the PAF as a structure for philanthropic giving, with 
accountability representing an intention to demonstrate results, lead and inspire 
others, characterise a family, and enjoy the success of a partnership. “I’m not in the 
business of growing a project for ego reasons.  I want everybody to understand the 
risk and have some real satisfaction, that there’s a real chance of it being a good 
program” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). “I always think, no, this is a partnership, 
we’re in this together.  We’re putting in the money but you’re putting in this [work] 
so we want to see this successful” (Manager, PAF 5, 2014). 
One respondent noted the importance of accountability for a PAF that carries a 
family name, in terms of family identity and values. 
…it’s the [xxx] family name over many generations that we need to 
preserve… That should be part of anyone’s thinking when they establish a 
PAF to say, ‘Well from a risk management point of view we have to make 
sure that if our name is on it, that in fact it’s preserved and looked after and 
cherished’” (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
A different perspective on a family name was offered by an external board member 
(‘trustee’) of a PAF founded by members of a well-known philanthropic family, in 
relation to the motivations for grant-making.  
I think the family members all had a very strong sense of responsibility, had 
grown up with seeing their names on things and felt uncomfortable with that 
kind of philanthropy and felt that they wanted to support things that were not 
necessarily being supported by the main family foundations, and wanted to 
support in a different way (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
A mixed perspective on responsibility to a family tradition of philanthropy was 
perceived. “…they [PAF trustees] were less comfortable with the philanthropy of 
their parents”; “…[I’m] not my grandfather’s philanthropist” (PAF 4, Trustee, 2014). 
Another trustee spoke of the importance of children growing up understanding their 
responsibility to others less fortunate than themselves; and introducing them to the 
joy of giving. 
…our kids need to have a sense of how privileged they are - their lives - and 
that there are plenty who aren’t as privileged, and that part of our 
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responsibility through being privileged is to try and look after those who 
aren’t (Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
This sense of obligation to others was expressed in many different forms, but was a 
key theme emerging from the interviews.  One family member identified feeling the 
need to make good decisions, having been gifted with the authority to make those 
decisions. “I think you want to do the right thing.  Someone else has given me a 
responsibility and I want to make sure that I make a good choice” (Trustee, PAF 9, 
2014).  Another interviewee extended this notion of an obligation or debt to a 
responsibility to the Australian public. “So for her it’s always been about ‘I want to 
be giving back, this country has been really good to us’” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014). 
Two respondents also spoke of an individual’s degree of affinity or comfort with 
formal processes of accountability. “For me it’s a personality thing too.  I like 
structure and guidelines” (PAF 9, Trustee and Manager, 2014).  Certain interviewees 
liked order, systems, and criteria; being able to explain and justify why they had 
made decisions, and felt very much at home with commitments, justifications and 
reporting.   
In addition to these positive motivations, there were also negative aspects and risks 
of accountable and open philanthropy highlighted. One trustee spoke of the 
disillusionment of the PAF’s board when their responsiveness and engagement were 
taken advantage of by a grantee: 
…they [the grantee] spent the money not how we had agreed… I think there 
is that sense of hurt on the board because they do feel like they put into the 
relationship (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014). 
5.5.2 Purposes of PAF accountability 
The purposes of accountability for PAFs represented the goals and outcomes sought 
by the fund through being accountable.  The main focus of the responses was around 
leadership of others already in the philanthropic sector, engaging others in giving, 
and ongoing achievement of the PAF’s mission.   
…there’s two parts to philanthropy…the second part is the more important 
part and that’s the leadership.  It really just hit home.  I thought Jesus, so 
every time I duck the subject I’m really not showing leadership 
(Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
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Accountability was viewed as a way of demonstrating the impact of PAFs and 
philanthropy, with the purpose of inspiring new entrants into philanthropy by 
showing what can be achieved.  Echoing these purposes was an interest in shared 
learning in the charitable sector as a whole, including nonprofit organisations, peak 
bodies and professional services and advisers.  Greater public visibility of 
information about the operations, grants and mission of (perhaps de-identified) PAFs 
would encourage new donors through increased understanding and examples of high 
impact. 
…if you want to encourage people to give and encourage people to be a part 
of this sector as well, show them.  Not wait for a personal introduction to 
someone that has already started one so you can go into a closed office and 
have a quick chat about it.  Actually show them this is what they’re about, 
and this is how they operate, and check out PAF xxx and look at what they’re 
up to.  That’s what is going to make it mainstream (Manager, PAF 10, 2014). 
…if we don’t tell the world what we’re doing, (a) how can we encourage 
other people to establish their own charity giving, or (b) know about where 
the needs are?  So it’s an interesting little twist and turn.  It’s becoming, dare 
I say, the trend more to start advertising at least a little bit, in terms of what 
we are trying to do (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
Two respondents spoke of a purpose of accountability being the avoidance of 
scandals and fraud within the sector. 
No-one knows [if PAFs are well managed].  That’s a function of a very new 
industry or sector going through a massive explosion.  Do I suspect I will see 
scandals down the track?  Yes.  I have no knowledge, but I just say to myself 
that [if] I’ve seen one [there will be others]… (Trustee, PAF 6, 2014). 
…trying to encourage everything to happen efficiently and transparently and 
with accountability and there’s always going to be rotten apples [PAFs], and 
doing what you can to limit the harm that the rotten apples will cause 
(Trustee, PAF 7, 2014). 
Accountability was also seen as a strategic tool in mission achievement, useful in 
focusing the work of a fund and its beneficiaries on a shared target, with the 
advantages of synergies from the relationship and the underlying congruence of 
values and goals. “This idea of what are our strategic objectives?  What are theirs?  
And let’s find something that can link those together, and let’s focus them and us on 
that” (Trustee, PAF 9, 2014). 
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5.6 UNDERSTANDINGS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
In Section 3.2, the concepts associated with accountability in the nonprofit literature 
were summarised in Table 3.1.  A text search was undertaken of all 10 interview 
transcripts, looking for each of the linked concepts identified from the literature.  The 
interview protocol (see Appendix A) deliberately did not use the word accountability 
(Section 4.4.4) to ensure that PAF managers and trustees brought their own ideas and 
understanding of the concept to the interviews. The findings of this text search are 
presented in Appendix F, with key themes summarised in Table 5.6 below. 




Understanding or meaning of the concept as 
used by interviewees 
Number of uses of 
search terms (number 
of interviews where 
used) 
Accountability Accountable, accountability 61 (9) 
Responsibility Responsible, responsibility, obligation 56 (9) 






Material, significant, significance 19 (7) 
 
The concept of accountability was directly discussed in nine of the 10 interviews, 
and the term was used 61 times.  PAF managers and trustees clarified their particular 
understanding of the meaning of the concept of accountability.  “So there’s a sense of 
responsibility or almost accountability to the other PAFs” (Trustee, PAF 4, 2014).  
“…they have their own accountability that is really a values-based accountability…” 
(Manager, PAF 10, 2014).  “Are you talking about accountability around 
compliance?” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014).   
The concepts associated with accountability most frequently used by participants in 
the interviews were responsibility (46 uses in 8 interviews), compliance (24 uses in 7 
interviews) and materiality or significance (19 uses in 7 interviews).  Transparency, 
which is commonly discussed in the nonprofit accountability literature, was used less 
frequently by participants (6 uses in 3 interviews).   
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Responsibility was used by participants to refer to an obligation “…as a 
philanthropist it was her obligation to share that information with the hope that it 
would encourage other potential philanthropists to do the same” (Trustee, PAF 9, 
2014); and to understanding roles in a PAF “I always think of my role as I’m 
responsible to the trustees and responsible to the organisations…” (Manager, PAF 8, 
2014).  It was also used as part of the term ‘responsible person’ in the context of a 
trustee’s designated position as an external community representative on the board.  
The concept of responsibility additionally captured the idea of an obligation or duty 
“I think the family members all had a very strong sense of responsibility…” (Trustee, 
PAF 4, 2014).  
Concepts used by participants to talk about compliance accountability included the 
terms legal, regulatory and fiduciary.  This grouping captured the meaning of 
accountability to laws, regulations and guidelines.  “…and we were completely non-
compliant - just totally 100% non-compliant…” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014).  
Compliance also related to internal governance of the PAF. “Obviously there has to 
be tight corporate governance from an accounting and legal point of view” (Trustee, 
PAF 6, 2014).  The concept of compliance was linked with administration.  “…all 
the reporting, the compliance, the paperwork - all that stuff that most people do not 
want to touch…” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014). 
Materiality and significance were used by participants to discuss accountability, in 
regard to the importance of an issue or activity to stakeholders, including founders 
and beneficiary organisations.  “…because she has so little involvement with it now, 
I don’t see it having a material impact” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014); “…we have 
definite aspirations for that to be nationally significant so that we provide 
opportunities” (Manager, PAF 1, 2014).  Significance was also used in terms of the 
size of a financial commitment, either by the founder to the PAF in the form of a 
donation, or by the PAF to a beneficiary in the form of a grant. “…it [the 
establishment of the PAF] was triggered by a capital event where [the founder] sold a 
significant holding in something” (Manager, PAF 10, 2014); “…it’s going to be very 
powerful and if we get it right - if this [project] does take place - the benefits to those 
children are going to be significant” (Trustee/Founder, PAF 3, 2014).  
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While a word frequency count offers basic insights into the understanding of 
accountability for PAF managers and trustees, analysis of the context in which each 
concept was used in the interviews suggests that the meanings most applicable or 
most relevant to PAFs are accountability through responsibility, compliance and 
significance. Hence the term accountability was used by the managers and trustees of 
PAFs with multiple meanings or understandings that changed with the context of the 
discussion, and were situated in particular circumstances or conditions.   
5.7 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The findings in this chapter examined to whom PAFs perceive they are accountable, 
through which an understanding of the individuals, groups and organisations was 
developed.  The activities of the PAF for which it is accountable were examined.  
The forms and ways in which accountability is practiced were then considered.  
Lastly, the motivations and purposes that underlie accountability in philanthropic 
funds were elaborated on and explored.   As organisations: 
PAFs recognise that they are accountable primarily to their beneficiaries; the two 
regulatory bodies, the ACNC and the ATO; the general public; the philanthropic 
sector as a whole; and the children of the founder. 
PAFs perceive that they are accountable for their grant-making decisions, 
investments and financial management, and managing risk; as well as accountable 
for the internal management of the fund, assessing performance, and conserving 
resources.   
PAFs identify that they are accountable by way of reporting and performance 
measurement of grantees and projects funded, disclosure and transparency, 
undertaking site visits and engaging with beneficiaries, through due diligence on 
applicants and applications, and through openness to inquiry and discussion. 
PAFs understand that being accountable enables them to demonstrate results, lead 
and inspire others, represent a family, and enjoy the success of a partnership.   
Accountability also brings shared learnings, strategic focus, reduced risk and greater 
visibility.  These findings are discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the findings presented in Chapter 5 are examined and compared with 
the relevant literature.  Section 6.2 provides a discussion of key findings, relevant to 
the understanding of accountability in the context of PAFs, including findings on 
each of the four research questions; accountability to whom, for what, how, and why.  
Section 6.3 details implications from this study for theory, and Section 6.4 highlights 
implications for practice.   Lastly, Section 6.5 summarises the chapter. 
6.2 DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS 
The broad rise of accountability, audit, measurement and evaluation in Western 
societies over the past decades (Power, 1994, 2004, 2009) has included the nonprofit 
sector.   Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) highlight the twin mantras of accountability and 
impact in philanthropy, with accountability first emerging in this context in the early 
1990s.  Leat’s (2004) paper on the accountability and governance of Australian 
foundations noted “the assumption has been that such organisations would ‘behave 
well’ precisely because their motives and goals were altruistic” (p. 95).  Dhanani and 
Connolly (2012) similarly note that “organisational stakeholders and the general 
public simply put faith into these sacrosanct organisations to do good” (p. 1147).  
However, two significant changes in the Australian philanthropic sector in recent 
decades have changed the accountability landscape: the rapid growth of the PAF 
(initially PPF) structure since its introduction in 2001; and the establishment of the 
ACNC in 2012.  Regulatory accountability through the ACNC has increased, and 
there may be significant differences in the perceived accountability of PAFs, and in 
the external perception of their practice of accountability by others.  This reflects the 
underlying tension between the inherently private nature of many PAFs; and their 
public purpose.  Exploring accountability offers PAFs one way to resolve this 
tension.   
As shown in Section 5.6, PAF managers and trustees understand and use the concept 
of accountability in many different ways.  Accountability in terms of responsibility 
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was most commonly used in the interviews, but had multiple meanings including an 
obligation, part of a role within a PAF, and a duty.  An additional linked concept 
used frequently by participants was compliance through the concepts of legal, 
regulatory and fiduciary accountability.  
The following sections explore the findings of this study in regard to the 
accountability of PAFs in the context of extant literature, based on the four research 
questions. 
6.2.1 Research Question 1: Accountable to whom? 
Findings from the 10 interviews regarding the perceived accountability of PAFs to 
individuals, groups and agencies (e.g. the ACNC) are largely consistent with the 
academic and practitioner literature (Section 3.5.1).  However, it is notable that 
certain individuals, groups and organisations suggested by the existing literature on 
nonprofit accountability were not perceived by respondents in this study as being 
central to PAF accountability.  These omissions were: 
 the legal system through courts and through PAF trust deeds established 
under state law (e.g. Blind, 2011);  
 the wider family of the founder, beyond the founder’s children (e.g. Gray et 
al., 2006; Anheier & Leat, 2013);   
 all applicants to the PAF, including those that are unsuccessful (e.g. Coyte et 
al., 2013) 
 the Church (e.g. Hammack, 1995; Tyler, 2013). 
Conversely, additions to those individuals, groups and organisations suggested by the 
literature, to which PAFs perceived accountability were:  
 other grant-making trusts and foundations, in particular PAFs as a group; 
 the Australian philanthropic sector as a whole; and 
 specific, defined geographic areas and communities. 
The ACNC and the ATO were distinct in the responses of the interviewees and are 
therefore considered separately in this discussion. 
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As noted in Section 3.5.1, Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework of nonprofit 
accountability considers accountability to multiple actors grouped directionally: 
“upwards to their funders or patrons, downwards to clients, and internally to 
themselves and their mission” (p. 4).  Examined in the context of PAFs, and based on 
the findings from this study, a fourth directional category emerges of circular 
accountability or within-group accountability to encompass a perceived 
accountability to all/other PAFs as a group. This finding does not fit easily or 
comfortably within Ebrahim’s three existing categories in the context of nonprofits, 
and represents a distinct additional element to PAF accountability.  Using these four 
directional categorisations, the findings of this study in response to research question 
one are summarised in Table 6.1 below.   
Table 6.1 To whom are PAFs accountable? 
 
Direction of accountability Coded responses from interviewees 
Upwards Founder, founder’s children, founder’s family, ACNC, ATO (both in 
its own right, and also through its role representing taxpayers), 
Government in general, advisory boards 
Downwards Beneficiary organisations (DGR 1), ultimate beneficiaries of grants, 
general public, geographically defined communities, Australia as a 
nation, the world 
Horizontal (internal) PAF Board, mission statement, founder’s wishes after death, oneself 
as an individual, family company or family office 
Circular (within-group) Other PAFs, the Australian philanthropic sector as a whole, other 
grant-making trusts and foundations, co-funders of projects 
 
Upwards accountability is applied by Ebrahim (2010) to funders or patrons, and is 
primarily concerned with the use of funds.  Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) highlight 
that accountability mechanisms in nonprofit organisations are often focused on 
upward accountability to funders at the expense of downward accountability to 
clients or service recipients. This competition between accountabilities often creates 
internal conflict within nonprofits in the allocation of their often scarce resources 
(Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006). 
Ebrahim (2010) highlights the issues of power and control that underlie the 
relationship between funders and nonprofits.  
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…asymmetric relationships among stakeholders are likely to result in a 
skewing towards accountability mechanisms that satisfy the interests of the 
most powerful actors.  In other words, accountability is also about power, in 
that asymmetries in resources become important in influencing who is able to 
hold whom to account (Ebrahim, 2010, p. 10). 
Regarding upward accountability to the founder, their children and family, most 
respondents agreed with the common belief that PAFs are established for and by 
families (McLeod, 2013, 2014), and that they serve as a focus for family engagement 
into the future.  The perceived accountability of a PAF to the children of its founder 
is therefore future oriented, with an emphasis on shared values, legacy, and the 
management of family wealth.  Notably, there was no mention by any of the trustees 
or managers of past-oriented accountability, back to the parents or grandparents of 
the founder and/or a family tradition of charitable work and giving (Anheier & Leat, 
2013). 
The expectation from the practitioner literature (e.g. Rourke, 2014) is a focus on the 
importance of the founder’s family values (learned from parents or grandparents), in 
other words accountability backwards in time, shaped by family history, traditions, 
or values.  Instead, the accountability discussed by several PAFs was the imperative 
to engage in philanthropy now, to establish a best practice example, so that the next 
generation has learned about giving, and knows what they want to do with the fund 
when it’s their turn.  This echoes previous research by Scaife et al. (2012) about 
establishing a philanthropic structure. “People feel children have much to learn about 
life through structured philanthropy and much to contribute as well” (p. 11).  Several 
PAFs also noted that the mission of the fund would almost certainly change when the 
children of the founder took over, because they would likely have different interests 
and different approaches to funding.   
One further issue from the findings lies in the close relationship between a PAF, its 
founder and the founder’s family.  The PAF, while formally a distinct organisation 
with at least one external trustee/director, may nevertheless informally be perceived 
as an extension of an individual (or family).  This blurring between an individual and 
the organisation that acts as a vehicle for that individual’s philanthropic activities, 
differentiates PAFs from other grant-making trust and foundation structures such as 
community foundations or giving circles.  It also clouds issues of accountability.   
This effect is enhanced by the relatively short history of PAFs in Australia; in that 
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most founders are still alive and very much engaged in the PAF they have 
established (McLeod, 2013).   As increasing numbers of PAFs continue their work 
over the coming decades and the transition to second generations of their founding 
families slowly occurs, it may be predicted that the funds will become more distinct 
identities, develop more formal policies, procedures and governance, and grow their 
corpus.  These changes over time may well affect the ways in which PAFs engage 
with accountability.   
While respondents often talked about family or children, they rarely and only briefly 
mentioned the spouse or the partner of the founder.  It was unclear whether this 
implied that there is usually one person driving the PAF, with potential spouses or 
partners in the background, even if a participant in the PAF’s work.  The emphasis 
on succession within the PAF by the children, rather than a potential surviving 
spouse, was also noteworthy.  Managers and trustees spoke about the founder 
themselves, and they discussed the role of the founder’s children (where applicable) 
in some depth, but the role of the partner was either not referred to, or done only 
fleetingly.  In only one of the 10 interviews did a respondent say that the PAF was a 
joint active partnership, where the couple at the heart of it, were both equally 
engaged.  More commonly, the founder’s partner was nearly invisible or a silent 
presence within the PAF.   
While respondents acknowledged upward accountability to the ACNC and the ATO, 
they were generally unconcerned with regulatory accountability.  The trust deed that 
creates and governs a PAF is established under state law, but none of the 
interviewees talked about accountability to the law or the trust deed.  In regard to the 
ACNC, PAFs were interested in whether the Commission was going to survive 
politically; and whether PAFs publicly disclosed their reports.  While each fund can 
request that their report not be made public, the submission of the AIS is mandatory, 
and includes a list of all grants made.  This reporting was considered inconsequential 
or irrelevant to the respondents; it was routine matter often undertaken by their 
accountant.  They were primarily interested in the ACNC because of the uncertainty 
around its future, and interested in the reporting because of the element of optional 
disclosure and the potential for aggregated data, but there was no engagement with or 
interest in the actual reporting itself.   
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Downwards accountability is applied by Ebrahim (2010) to individual clients, or 
groups that receive services from a nonprofit organisation.  This may also be 
expanded to include geographic regions or communities.  Ebrahim (2005) links 
downward accountability to mission fulfilment and a longer-term perspective by 
nonprofit organisations.  Kilby (2006) finds that while downward accountability to 
the beneficiaries of a nonprofit’s work is vital to their organisational effectiveness, 
“there are few incentives for them to be accountable in this way” (p. 951).  From the 
perspective of funders including philanthropic foundations, Liket (2014) links the 
absence of downward accountability of nonprofits to their clients and communities, 
to an absence of information for funders on the effectiveness of the nonprofits they 
support.  In this absence, funders struggle to make grant-making decisions based on 
impact.   
In terms of downward accountability in the context of PAFs, the findings show that 
one of a PAF’s main perceived accountabilities is to their beneficiary organisations.  
Ebrahim (2010) proposes that increasing this sense of ‘downward’ accountability 
from funders to nonprofits is “a key accountability challenge” (p. 6).  The nature of 
this perceived accountability from PAFs to their beneficiaries varied, however, and 
there were nuances in the findings indicating that this accountability may be limited 
to certain activities (Section 6.2.2) and forms (Section 6.2.3), and may also be 
limited in scale by the PAFs.  By way of example, a PAF manager or trustee may 
perceive that it is accountable to beneficiaries through openness to questioning about 
grant-making, but may not chose to provide beneficiaries with financial information.    
The option of public disclosure available to PAFs through the ACNC Register 
(ACNC, 2015a) had been chosen by two of the 10 PAFs that participated in this 
study, giving a higher disclosure rate (20%) than found in a small random sample of 
PAFs from all states and territories (10%) (see Section 2.4).  The eight PAFs that had 
requested not to have their AIS and other documents available to the public cited a 
concern for being overwhelmed by inappropriate applications for funding.  This 
concern was being consciously tested by one of the two PAFs that had chosen public 
disclosure.  Making the PAF’s financial information publicly available was a 
deliberate experiment to test their previously-held assumption that disclosure would 
result in both more applications, and applications of lower interest to the PAF.    
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The other issue raised in regard to public disclosure via the ACNC Register was with 
the founder’s or founder’s family’s privacy (Section 5.2.2), which is noted in the 
responses to the Government inquiries concerning PAFs (Section 2.2) as a major 
reason for non-disclosure. 
PAF trustees and managers acknowledged the importance of their relationship with 
beneficiaries, and viewed disclosure, responsiveness, engagement and answerability 
as part of their accountability.  Patel (2010) highlights the power imbalance and the 
negative aspects of this relationship model “…foundations today are increasingly 
treating organizations like ours [nonprofit beneficiaries] not as innovators, but as 
contractors who are hired to deliver their visions”.  However as explored by 
Benjamin (2010) in a philanthropic context, and O’Leary (2014) in a nonprofit 
context, there are significant differences between accountability relationships 
between principals and agents based on contracts and service delivery; and 
philanthropic relationships between funders such as PAFs and nonprofits that are 
based on shared values and missions (Section 3.5.1 & Section 5.4.5).  As noted in 
Section 5.4.5, the process of query and discussion that may take place between a 
philanthropic funder and a grantee can result in a strategic alignment that is of value 
to both parties.  While there will, by definition, be a power or resource imbalance 
between a funder and a grant-seeker, findings revealed there was also the intention to 
work collaboratively towards common goals, in alignment with a shared or 
overlapping mission. 
Internal (horizontal) accountability is applied by Ebrahim (2010) to nonprofits 
themselves and their organisational mission and staff (including management and 
boards).  This form of accountability in the literature often also includes peers (Blind, 
2011; Schillemans, 2008) and is described by Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) as 
informal in nature, involving voluntary action, trust and reciprocity.  Schillemans 
(2008) proposes that horizontal accountability arrangements are beneficial for 
organisational learning; in as much as they provide feedback in the form of reflective 
dialogue, from which organisations may gain knowledge and improve.   
This internal or horizontal accountability was discussed by the managers and trustees 
of PAFs through accountability to the PAF trustees, the PAF’s mission statement, the 
founder’s wishes after their death, to oneself as an individual, and to a family 
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company or family office.  Of the four directions of accountability discussed here, 
this came through least strongly in the findings of this study, indicating a priority 
focus on upward, downward, and circular accountability. 
Circular (within-group) accountability is little discussed in the literature, but is 
directed towards peers or like others, within a definable group.  Sinclair (1995, p. 
223) describes “professional accountability” in which administrators feel a 
responsibility to uphold the standards of a professional or expert group of which they 
are a member.  Turnbull (2007) discusses circular accountability in the context of 
Australian public assets, and finds that it is a “condition for self-governance” (p. 
1082) in situations where there is ‘networked governance’.   Tran (2008) echoes this 
concept of accountability within a network or group, and cites Collier (2002) in 
suggesting that circular accountability “symbolises informal answerability and 
enforcement of societal rules within the individual’s respective group” (p. 67).   
Regarding circular or within-group accountability, the issue of identity was important 
to PAFs’ perceived accountability in relation to the philanthropic sector.  PAFs are a 
tightly defined group of organisations, established using a template trust deed, with 
greater reporting requirements than other grant-making structures (prior to the 
establishment of the ACNC).  This appears to have resulted in a heightened sense of 
affinity or ‘brand’ between PAFs, where the reputation of one PAF influences the 
image of PAFs collectively.   While managers and trustees of PAFs interviewed 
spoke of wanting greater knowledge of and interaction with other PAFs, they 
nevertheless felt connected with and responsible to other PAFs, whether or not 
known to them personally.   The consequences of this perceived ‘circular’ or within-
group accountability to each other was expressed in both positive and negative ways, 
i.e. wanting to set an example of best practice within the ‘circle’ of PAFs; and 
concerns for having the reputation of all PAFs diminished and greater regulation of 
PAFs enforced as a consequence of mis-management or fraudulent practice within 
the circle.   
The literature on proto-institutional theory (e.g. Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002) 
suggests that nascent institutions are formed through processes of isomorphism and 
imitation, where organisations copy and learn from each other.  These normative 
forces act over time to reduce differences between actors, and bring them together in 
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the creation of new, context-specific institutions.  In a study of the emergence of 
venture philanthropy as a form of organised philanthropy over 10 years in a 
European context, Mair and Hehenberger (2014) consider the “collective 
rationalisation processes” (p. 1176) that lead to the creation of new institutional 
models for giving.  They find that convening is an important mechanism in the 
disruption of established institutions and the introduction of new institutional models.  
Given the recency of PAFs as a giving structure, the mutual sharing and development 
of norms may in the long-term result in the Australian philanthropic sector moving 
towards the norms of foundation accountability in other countries such as the U.S. 
with a longer history of philanthropic institutions. 
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that Ebrahim’s (2010) directions of 
accountability remain relevant for PAFs as a form of nonprofit organisation; however 
the actors and agencies relevant to each direction vary.  As shown in Figure 6.1, 
these directions of accountability (upwards, downwards, and horizontal) are relevant 
to nonprofit organisations and PAFs, even though their positions differ.  Thus, 
although the directions of accountability are common among PAFs and other 
nonprofit organisations, the relevant actors change (Ebrahim, 2003).  For example, 
based on their position in a philanthropic funding chain, PAFs are accountable 
upwards to their funders and donors, and downwards to their beneficiary 
organisations (DGR1s).  Similarly, nonprofit beneficiary organisations (DGR1s) are 
accountable upwards to funders including PAFs, and downwards to their ultimate 
beneficiaries.    
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In addition to Ebrahim’s (2010) directional categories, the individuals, groups and 
organisations to which PAFs perceived they were accountable may also be grouped 
according to whether PAFs are voluntarily ‘giving an account’ or ‘being held 
accountable’ (mandatory accountability).  Giving an account was typically a 
voluntary act by PAFs undertaken on their own terms, whereas being held 
accountable refers to accountability undertaken on someone else’s terms, and with 
the possibility of enforced change (Gray et al., 2006; Leat, 1990).  
Those organisations with power over PAFs included the ACNC and the ATO, both 
of which may issue formal sanctions against PAFs and/or ultimately revoke their 
charitable status.  The ACNC was identified in all 10 interviews as a significant actor 
in regulatory accountability, playing an important and beneficial role in the 
philanthropic sector.  The ACNC was clearly viewed as working in the interests of 
PAFs, providing useful information to them on the finances and governance of their 
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beneficiary organisations.  No PAF trustee or manager, however, discussed or 
acknowledged the ACNC as having power over PAFs to enforce reporting, issue 
sanctions or penalties, or revoke their charitable status.   This may be due to no cases 
having yet arisen where such action has been taken by the ACNC in regard to a PAF, 
and the ACNC’s powers here remain latent to date. 
Actors with limited power over PAFs were the board of the PAF, family members, 
and other trusts and foundations (in particular, other PAFs).  This power is exercised 
through influence and direction, leadership, peer-pressure and ‘informal sanctions’ 
(Leat, 1990, p. 144). 
Actors with very little power over PAFs included the general public, beneficiary 
organisations, specific geographic communities, and the ultimate beneficiaries 
(individuals or groups) of the PAFs.  While these groups were significant to PAFs in 
the achievement of their mission, and PAFs perceived a high level of accountability 
to them (Section 5.2.1 & Section 5.2.10), their power to influence the PAF was 
minimal.  This lack of power of beneficiary organisations is noted in the professional 
literature (Rourke, 2014), which refers to beneficiaries’ perception of grant-making 
trusts and foundations lacking engagement with and accountability to them. 
On the other hand, there is a deep discontent among grant recipients, 
including the ones that get the money, with the way in which decisions are 
made and the lack of humility, engagement, discussion with what’s going on 
(p. 14).   
However, despite beneficiaries’ lack of power, findings did reveal a voluntary desire 
by PAFs to engage with them. 
6.2.2 Research Question 2: Accountable for what? 
The findings of this study in response to Research Question 2, accountability for 
what, revealed a range of activities for which the managers and trustees of PAFs 
perceived a responsibility.  Based on Ebrahim’s (2010) framework, these findings 
have been grouped in Table 6.2 in terms of resources, governance, performance and 
mission.   
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Accountable for what activities? 
Resources (including 
finance) 
Giving of time and money, financial management, and conserving 




Governance Managing risk; internal management of foundation; assessing 
performance; establishment phase of PAF 
Performance Grant-making, allocation of distributions; enhancing the capacity and 
sustainability of grantees; administration of PAF 
Mission   Maximising benefit for ultimate beneficiaries and community 
(Adapted from Ebrahim (2010)). 
While Ebrahim’s (2010) framework considers accountability for activities in four 
categories: “finances, governance, performance and mission” (p. 7), the category 
where Ebrahim’s framework fits least comfortably with PAF accountability is in the 
category of finances.  Accordingly, this category has been relabelled ‘resources’, and 
expanded to include time and expertise in addition to money.  This variation captures 
the significant contribution made by PAFs (through managers and trustees, and 
potentially the founder), in regard to their time, expertise, endorsement and 
advocacy.   
The renamed ‘resources’ category also encompasses the concept of conserving (as 
well as giving and spending) of resources by PAFs and nonprofit organisations.  This 
was discussed by PAF managers and trustees in regard to effective use of time, both 
theirs and applicants, through having clear and useful guidelines for funding, and 
also by minimising operating costs for the PAF itself (Section 5.3.7).  There was a 
strong sense of felt responsibility not to waste the PAF’s available funds for grant-
making.  This was expressed in multiple ways: by using staff of a family business or 
trustees to do the work of the PAF, by reducing expenses, and by minimising 
duplication of services through sharing knowledge and resources with other PAFs 
and grant-makers.  These matters can be divided into two broad groups, those 
concerned with cost minimisation, and those concerned with greater efficiency.  The 
findings of this study therefore suggest that accountability is more nuanced in this 
category than Ebrahim’s (2010) framework outlines. 
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Governance of PAFs is the responsibility of the board, who are the directors of the 
trustee company for the PAF.  Their role in the PAF is multi-faceted, with findings 
reported both in regard to accountability to the board (Section 5.2.7), and 
accountability of the board (Section 5.3.7).  Many PAFs do not directly employ staff 
(Section 5.4.8), consistent with findings from the U.S. that family foundations take 
an average of 27 years to hire their first dedicated staff person (Courrier, 2005 citing 
Gersick & Stone, 2004).  In such cases, the board members may carry additional 
responsibilities in activities such as reporting by beneficiary organisations, grant-
making, and financial management of the PAF’s capital base.  Tangentially, Leat 
(2004) and Cohen (2013) both touch on the appointment of directors as one area 
where philanthropic foundations very seldom disclose criteria for selection, or 
provide a justification as a form of accountability.  The appointment of directors or 
trustees was not directly questioned in this study, and was not a distinct emergent 
finding (although the importance of having professional, qualified staff was).   
Accountability for a PAF’s own performance was undertaken through considered 
grant-making and allocation of distributions (Section 5.3.1); enhancing the capacity 
and sustainability of grantees (Section 5.3.5); and the administration and 
management of the PAF (Section 5.3.7).  The long-term performance of the PAF 
itself is distinct from the performance of its beneficiary organisations, the assessment 
of which is an accountability mechanism for PAFs, rather than an accountability 
process.  However, the adoption of grant-making evaluation processes by PAFs 
reinforces their own governance mechanisms.  Ebrahim and Rangan (2014) note that 
funders of nonprofit organisations, when assessing their own grant-making 
performance, are uniquely able to assess long-term, sustained impact.  
This distinction between a philanthropic trust that makes grants, and its grantee 
organisations that provide services, is not always clear in the common understanding 
of philanthropy.  A PAF that supports environmental organisations, for example, 
may describe its work as being in the environmental field.  However its role is, more 
accurately, to make decisions about the allocation of the resources it commands to 
those organisations in its chosen field(s). This distinction between nonprofit 
organisations that ‘do things’ (e.g. deliver services), and nonprofit organisations that 
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‘fund things’ or work through others is important when mapping the findings of this 
study against Ebrahim’s (2010) framework of nonprofit accountability.    
Accountability for mission in a PAF took place through the activities of maximising 
benefit for ultimate beneficiaries and community (Section 5.3.6).  This was achieved 
through focusing on the impact and benefit of a grant to the individuals or 
community that were the clients of the grantee organisation, consistent with the 
mission and values of the PAF, and as a part of the PAF’s grant-making program.  
Only two respondents spoke about international giving from the PAF.  The only data 
available on international giving by PAFs is through the ATO, which shows 
international affairs received fewer than 11 percent of distributions from PAFs in the 
2010/11 financial year (the most recent data available).32  This reveals a strong 
domestic focus by PAFs, with many funds making grants close to home and giving 
back to the Australian community (Section 5.2.4) as the ultimate beneficiary of their 
funding. 
One activity or role that was reported by the trustees and managers of PAFs relevant 
to each of Ebrahim’s categories of ‘accountability for what’ was risk management.  
The common characterisation of philanthropic grants as “risk-capital” for the 
nonprofit sector (Anheier & Leat, 2010; Cohen, 2013) puts an onus on grant-making 
trusts and foundations to embrace risk-taking in their grants and policies, and to be 
comfortable with the potentially higher ‘failure’ rate of programs and projects run by 
the organisations supported.  Extending Ebrahim’s (2010) framework, risk 
management sits across all four categories of nonprofit activities, although is most 
clearly part of governance.   Risk-acceptance, rather than risk-avoidance was 
identified by PAF managers and trustees as an activity for which they were 
accountable, specifically in relation to achieving the maximum impact through the 
PAF’s grant-making (Section 5.3.3).  This idea of intentionally taking calculated, 
considered risks is discussed by Cohen (2013) and Coyte et al. (2013), and was 
reported by interviewees in regard to their investments, grant-making, internal 
                                                 
 
32 The ATO releases taxation statistics each year, including PAF donations and distributions, however 
there is a three year delay between the data and its release.    
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management, mission, and their commitment of time as well as money to their 
beneficiaries (Section 5.4.3 & Section 5.4.10).   
PAFs can therefore be summarised as being accountable for maximising the benefit 
of their grant-making to their beneficiary organisations and the community, while 
also maximising the social and financial return on their investment portfolio.  These 
activities are influenced by the governance of the foundation, the need to conserve 
the PAF’s resources, and the need to manage rather than necessarily minimise risk.  
Based on the findings, in an operating environment where external regulation of 
PAFs is minimal, internal standards and mission integrity provide the measures 
against which a PAF’s activities are reviewed.   
6.2.3 Research Question 3: Accountable how? 
Findings regarding this research question considered the ways in which PAFs are 
accountable, or the mechanisms by which accountability is achieved.  Ebrahim 
(2010) divides these mechanisms into ‘tools’ and ‘processes’. The ‘tools’ group 
comprises “devices or techniques used to achieve accountability” (p. 11); while the 
‘processes’ group emphasises “a course of action rather than a distinct end-product, 
in which the means are important in and of themselves” (p. 12). 
Based on the findings in Section 5.4 a variation to Ebrahim’s framework is 
identified. Categorising these findings on accountability mechanisms into tools and 
processes, it becomes apparent that individual mechanisms may be a process for a 
PAF, but a tool for a particular grantee.  Taking as an example the most common 
accountability mechanism, reporting and performance measurement (Section 5.4.1), 
assessing the impact and effectiveness of a grant-making program by the PAF is an 
ongoing accountability process; however a report from a single nonprofit 
organisation on a single grant is an accountability tool.  Likewise, the accountability 
mechanism of site visits is a process that takes place repeatedly over time for a PAF, 
but a tool when applied to a single nonprofit applicant or grantee organisation.  This 
change in nature of an accountability mechanism depending on the user and the time-
frame supports Blind’s (2011, p. 7) concerns regarding “…the adequacy of 
dichotomous understandings of accountability prevalent in the literature”.  Blind 
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recommends instead “continuous and graded views of accountability” (p. 7) that 
allow for different stages and variations in processes over time. 
Reporting by a beneficiary back to the PAF about a program or project funded is 
often seen as a reflection of the accountability of the PAF itself, as project success is 
considered an indication of the PAF’s insight and experience in grant-making (see 
also Section 5.4.1).  Additionally, accountability through reporting by beneficiaries 
becomes significant in the combined data from multiple beneficiaries, or perhaps 
from multiple PAFs, as this ongoing process offers an insight into the effectiveness 
of a philanthropic foundation’s grant-making program(s) as a whole.  “Because they 
support and oversee hundreds of nonprofits…that typically act independently of one 
another, funders are specially positioned to connect that work in order to assess 
impacts” (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014, p. 133).  
Disclosure and transparency by the PAF were discussed by five of the PAF managers 
and trustees interviewed as an accountability mechanism, contrasted with only two 
PAFs that had chosen to make their information publicly available through the 
ACNC Register.  Transparency was seen by respondents as a passive form of 
accountability, where information was made available but not actively 
communicated or directed at a particular audience (Section 5.4.2).  Transparency and 
disclosure were also channelled or selective, such as information about processes and 
guidelines made available to applicants (Section 5.4.9). There were some negative 
aspects to transparency raised, where disclosure was perceived as bragging or 
boasting about the PAF and its work (Section 5.4.2). This concern with being seen to 
self-promote through philanthropic work is recognised in the literature (McIlnay, 
1995, p. 120) who notes the modesty and diffidence of foundations as causes of the 
“tradition of anonymity in philanthropy”.  
Accountability through the mechanism of assessment of potential beneficiary 
organisations was highlighted by trustees and managers as an important form of ‘due 
diligence’.  Assessment took differing forms, including ‘reference checks’ with other 
funders, examining financial statements and governance structures, and risk 
profiling.  This form of accountability was concerned with ensuring that the PAF did 
not make grants to an organisation that might shortly go out of existence, with the 
focus on a clean bill of health for the organisation, rather than the innovativeness or 
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excellence of the program being funded.  This assessment was therefore preventative 
in nature; a mechanism of accountability for avoidance of a bad grant outcome such 
as an incomplete project. 
This division of accountability mechanisms into those that are preventative in focus, 
and those that are promotional in focus is potentially reflective of Ebrahim’s (2010) 
division into tools and processes, in that tools may be seen as preventing ‘poor’ 
outcomes, and processes may be seen as promoting ‘good’ outcomes.  As noted by 
the interviewees and summarised in Table 6.3 below, tools such as due diligence 
checks, grant agreements, restrictions on grantee organisation types, and guidelines 
or criteria for grant-making were all used for prevention of potential problems 
(Section 5.4.6 & Section 5.4.9).  These tools were reported as being used at the 
planning or selection stage of a grant.  Conversely, processes such as site visits, 
openness to inquiry and discussion, relationships and engagement were all focused 
on creating and building excellence and greater impact (Sections 5.4.3; 5.4.5 & 
5.4.10), and are reported as being used more during the implementation and 
evaluation stages of a grant.  
Table 6.3 Preventative and promotional mechanisms of accountability 
 
Mechanism Focus Time frame Stage of grant-
making process 
Examples from findings 
Tools  Preventative 




Planning or grantee 
selection stage 
Due diligence checks, 
grant agreements, 
restrictions on grantee 
organisation types, 
guidelines and criteria 
for grant-making 
 
Processes  Promotional 







Site visits, openness to 





6.2.4 Research Question 4: Accountable why? 
While not included in Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework, the research question 
‘accountability why’ is considered a natural extension of the previous three research 
questions.  Re-examining Ebrahim’s nonprofit accountability framework in the 
context of this study’s findings on PAFs, new rationales for accountability emerge.   
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Beyond a level of regulatory accountability through the ATO and the ACNC, 
accountability is not imposed upon PAFs externally, but rather represents a 
conscious choice by PAFs, which largely have the freedom to choose the nature and 
extent of their accountability.  While PAFs do perceive that they have 
accountabilities, these are predominantly fluid and qualitative accountabilities, rather 
than structured, quantitative accountabilities (Section 5.4).  There are however 
qualifications to these accountability relationships, limitations in practice regarding 
for what PAFs do and do not accept accountability.   PAFs largely decide to whom 
they are accountable and for which activities they will be accountable, select the 
ways or forms through which they will be accountable, and reflect all these decisions 
through the lens of why they wish to be accountable.  Hence accountability in this 
context rests strongly on a sense of felt responsibility (voluntary action) rather than 
compliance with mandatory requirements.  
The divide in responses into motivations and purposes of accountability (Section 5.5) 
suggests that both emotional and rational forces are relevant to Australian PAFs’ 
accountability.  Motivations were expressive or internal reasons, concerned with the 
values and identity of the PAF.  PAFs were accountable because they can show 
results, lead and inspire others, represent a family, and enjoy the success of a 
partnership – all emotional factors.  Purposes were external reasons concerned with 
effectiveness, and the outcomes and impact of the PAF’s work.   PAF managers and 
trustees also recognised that accountability offered shared learnings, strategic focus, 
and reduced risk – all rational factors.   
The responses from PAF managers and trustees around why they engage with 
accountability challenge the underlying assumption in the literature on nonprofit 
accountability that sustainable funding is a key issue for all nonprofit organisations 
(Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006, p. 311).  The unarticulated supposition in the literature 
is that accountability follows the path of money through an organisation.  Thus, 
primary accountability is back to the customers who contribute to revenue, or to 
funders including the government (Benjamin, 2010).  Many nonprofit theories 
assume an ongoing fight for survival or financial sustainability, a necessity to retain 
or keep finding new sources of funding (Christensen & Ebrahim, 2006; Dhanani & 
Connolly, 2012).  In examining PAFs as a sub-set of nonprofit organisations where 
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this assumption does not apply (Tomei, 2013), this study explores cases where 
securing funding can be excluded as a reason or motivation for accountability, and 
considers what replaces it. Although money is still central in PAFs, in regard to their 
investments and distributions, it is not vital or significant to the organisation in terms 
of its survival (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2014), leaving the residual motivations for 
accountability unexplored.  
In this context, the reasons for PAFs to engage with accountability are less apparent 
than the reasons for not engaging in accountability and transparency.  Findings reveal 
the reasons against engaging in accountability include a desire for privacy (see 
Section 5.2.4), anonymity, modesty, and a conceptualisation of philanthropy as a gift 
(Sulek, 2010).  For many PAFs there are also identity issues associated with the 
family name (often reflected in the PAF name) which may act as a barrier to 
increased transparency and accountability (Section 5.5.1).  As noted by Scaife et al. 
(2012) “…a strong wish not to be identified as a philanthropist or to speak widely 
about one’s own giving reflects Australian notions of egalitarianism” (p. 108). This 
social and cultural context for accountability highlights differences between 
Australia and the U.S. in the public perception of philanthropy (McDonald & Scaife, 
2011; McLeod, 2012), where in the U.S. “giving is public, planned and 
unapologetically connected with personal identity” (Liffman, 2008, p. 4).  Despite 
this, a strong sense of private or internal accountability was noted, linked with 
morals, integrity and the mission of the PAF. 
One unanticipated finding of the study related to accountability and personality.  
Personality theory may in part explain the findings around why PAFs voluntarily 
engage in accountability, and suggests that certain individuals may naturally like and 
feel comfortable with forms and processes of accountability (Section 5.5.1).   PAFs 
are extensions of the founders to the extent that PAFs reflect funders’ values, 
interests, and personalities; and the link between the founder and the PAF is (at least 
initially) very strong.  There are two dominant theories of personality in the 
literature: the Big 5 or five-factor model of dimensions of personality (Digman, 
1990); and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962).  Both of these theories 
offer categorisations of personality as tools for understanding and predicting the 
behaviour of individuals and teams.   
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In the Big 5 categorisation, the personality factor most likely to be associated with 
enhanced accountability is conscientiousness. While definitions vary, the 
conscientiousness factor includes being careful, thorough, responsible, and 
organised; as well as hardworking, achievement-oriented and persevering (Barrick 
and Mount, 1991).  In the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962), the 
personality characteristic most likely to be linked with accountability is judging (J).  
People of this type prefer thinking, planning and logic, and also prefer to “have 
matters settled” (Myers & Myers, 2010, p. 75). 
The findings indicate that engagement in accountability by PAFs is motivated by a 
combination of values and effectiveness, but specifically effectiveness in achieving 
the mission determined by the values.  Accountability to mission and values suggests 
a higher conceptual level than accountability for expenditure and activities (Ebrahim 
& Rangan, 2014), and goes beyond existing frameworks of accountability.   Thus, 
the personality of PAF founders, trustees and managers may also influence the 
accountability of the PAF. 
The argument that accountability through transparency is an obligation deriving from 
the tax deduction for donations into the fund and other tax concessions provided to 
the PAF is commonly proposed in the literature (e.g. Anheier & Leat, 2013; Hall, 
2013; Tyler, 2013).  This theme also emerge in the Scaife et al. (2012) study looking 
at the establishment of giving structures  in an Australian context, as expressed by a 
participant in that study: 
If there isn’t public transparency…of where you give the money, how you 
spend the money, how you’re managing…and expect tax free benefits and 
franking credit refunds – then it’s all going to turn nasty…some...private 
funding, doesn’t observe those rules …they’re putting the future of 
philanthropy in the tax beneficial environment at risk (p. 34). 
These two reasons for engaging in accountability – avoidance of scandals, and 
acknowledgement of an obligation derived from income tax concessions – are linked 
in the findings regarding the private versus public nature of PAFs (Section 5.2.3 and 
5.2.4). 
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6.2.5 Relationships, associations and linkages among the findings 
Table 6.4 below shows a synthesis of the linkages between the four research 
questions: accountability to whom, for what, how, and why?.  It provides a collective 
overview of the associations between the perceived accountability relationships, 
activities, forms, and motivations of PAFs.  While the table presents an interpretation 
of the associations identified from the findings, it does not show a direct correlation 
between the research questions, but rather proposes an interpretive framework as a 
basis for future research. 















Obtaining reports from 
beneficiaries, engagement, 
site visits, discussion, 
questioning, answerability, 
grant agreements 
Shared aim of working 
for ultimate 
beneficiaries, shared or 
overlapping mission(s), 
enjoy success of 
partnership 
 
ACNC Financial status, grants 
made, compliance, 
governance  
Compliance and reporting in 










Adherence to Treasury 
guidelines, restriction on 




of sanctions, avoidance 
of scandals 
 
General public Selective disclosure, 
considered grant-
making or allocation of 
distributions, 
conserving resources 
Openness to inquiry and 
discussion, transparency, 
due diligence on applicants, 
compliance with regulation 
through the ACNC and the 




needs and current 
efforts to address them, 
sense of felt obligation 
to give back 
Philanthropic 








openness to inquiry and 
discussion, experienced and 
professional staff, risk 
management 
 
Show results, lead and 
inspire others, 






them about the joy and 
obligation of giving 
Engagement, relationships 
sharing best practice, 
leadership 
Inspire others, preserve 
and enhance the family 
name, characterise a 
family, giving back to a 
country or community, 










Board of PAF Governance, managing 
risk, internal 
















Site visits, engagement, 
relationships 
Obligation to give 









Openness to inquiry and 
discussion 
Sharing best practice, 
show results, lead and 
inspire others, 




Capacity and financial 
sustainability of 
grantees, maximising 




Due diligence on possible 
grantees, DGR1 restriction, 




obligation to give back, 
increased impact 
 
The groupings shown in Table 6.4 above suggest that the research questions are 
strongly interrelated and therefore need to be studied holistically, rather than as 
separate subjects for research.  The associations are presented in summary form, 
therefore not all associations are detailed (e.g. some aspects of ‘accountability how’ 
relate to more than one stakeholder group, but in different ways).  This highlights the 
complexities inherent in these associations between the research questions. 
6.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY’S FINDINGS 
The two theoretical aims of this study, as outlined in the Introduction in Section 1.4, 
were: 
 to consider and review an existing theory of nonprofit accountability 
(Ebrahim’s 2010 framework) in a new context (philanthropic foundations) 
where underlying assumptions from the current theory may not apply (e.g. 
reliance on ongoing external funding); and 
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 to extend and build upon an existing accountability theory (in particular 
Ebrahim’s 2010 framework) by examining PAF accountability relationships 
and processes.  
6.3.1 Extending Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework of nonprofit 
accountability 
This thesis uses Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework to guide an exploration of 
accountability of Australian PAFs.  The findings from this study were mapped 
against Ebrahim’s framework, revealing the perceptions and understandings of PAF 
accountability, but also showing the similarities between Ebrahim’s framework, 
developed for nonprofit organisations in general; and differences based on findings 
specific to PAFs, as endowed grant-making charitable trusts.   The theoretical 
contribution of this study is the variations that emerge between Ebrahim’s (2010) 
framework and this study’s findings, shedding light on the differences in how 
accountability is understood and practiced in donor versus grantee nonprofits.  
Mapping the findings against Ebrahim’s (2010) nonprofit accountability framework 
reveals a number of areas of poorer fit where the framework may be amended or 
refined in the context of this particular sub-set of nonprofit organisations, for which 
accountability exists on a deeper level than simple compliance.  Four main variations 
to Ebrahim’s conceptual framework are proposed: 
1. the addition of a fourth question – accountability why? that explores the 
motivations and purposes for accountability.  
2. the inclusion of circular or within-group accountability in the categorisations 
of directional accountability to whom. 
3. the re-framing of the ‘finances’ category as ‘resources’ to capture both giving 
and conserving of resources in addition to money, such as time and expertise. 
4. the recognition that accountability mechanisms may vary or shift from being 
tools or processes, bot 
5. h over time and with different users. 
The first expansion proposed to Ebrahim’s framework is the addition of a fourth key 
question: accountability why?  There is a surprising lack of consideration of this 
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question in the accountability literature.  One possible reason is that for many 
nonprofit organisations, asking why they are accountable seems redundant as the 
answer is obvious: they must be accountable to gain approval and funding, from the 
public, philanthropic sources or government (Van Slyke, 2006).  Accountability is 
therefore about survival and financial sustainability.  However, for PAFs (and other 
nonprofit organisations with an endowment) accountability is not about financial 
sustainability as their existence is guaranteed in perpetuity barring unexpected 
financial disaster, or a conscious choice to close the fund.  Questioning why such 
organisations are accountable therefore becomes particularly relevant to this thesis.   
The rationales for accountability as revealed in the findings (Section 5.5) are grouped 
under motivations (values-based) and purposes (impact or outcomes-based).  These 
rationales shape to whom, for what and how organisations such as PAFs are 
accountable, given their accountability is largely discretionary. 
Ebrahim’s (2010) paper concludes with the idea that accountability extends well 
beyond mere compliance and “is more deeply connected to organizational purpose 
and public trust” (p. 27).  This deeper purpose is strongly borne out by the findings 
of this study around rationales for accountability. 
The second expansion is the addition of circular accountability to the three 
directional categories identified by Ebrahim (being upwards, downwards and 
horizontal (internal)), to capture the finding of accountability to peers within a tightly 
defined group where positive and negative consequences reflect back on members of 
that group, individually and collectively.  PAFs have a distinct identity, and part of 
their felt accountability was a sense of responsibility to each other, and to the 
philanthropic sector of which they are a prominent and rapidly growing part.   This 
circular or within-group accountability reflects the importance to PAFs of being 
accountable, demonstrating best-practice, offering leadership to other PAFs, and 
others in the philanthropic sector (sharing and influencing).  Notably, circular 
accountability is a form of accountability that is not directly linked with the flow of 
money.  Rather, PAFs feel they need to be doing a good job to encourage others into 
giving; making considered and impactful grants to either inspire other PAFs to 
follow in their footsteps, replicate a grant elsewhere, or take their own giving to a 
higher level (Section 5.5.1).   There was also a concern for not causing a potential 
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scandal that might damage the reputation of PAFs as a group (Section 5.5.2), and in a 
sense, complete the circle of accountability by bringing such consequences to bear on 
all members.  Linked to proto-institutional theory (Section 6.2.1) regarding the 
development of new organisational forms with established norms and culture, PAFs 
might be considered an example of the process of collaboratively building a new 
philanthropic institution in part through circular accountability. While only briefly 
discussed in the literature (Section 6.2.1), this recursive and networked form of 
accountability is an important finding in this study.   
The third variation proposed to Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework is the 
modification of accountability for ‘finances’ to accountability for ‘resources’, 
acknowledging that PAFs offer more to their beneficiaries than just money. These 
additional elements to funder-nonprofit relationships include the exchange of 
knowledge, learnings from experience, specific expertise, endorsement and 
advocacy, convening, and a broad oversight of the third sector (Section 6.2.2).  
While the significance of relationships between nonprofits and funders is emphasised 
by Ebrahim, these relationships are based on grant funding, and the existing category 
(finances) is therefore insufficient to encompass the importance of PAFs’ multi-
modal support. 
The fourth variation to Ebrahim’s (2010) framework is a more flexible understanding 
of the mechanisms of accountability, which Ebrahim categorises as tools and 
processes.  The findings of this study suggest that individual mechanisms may at 
times be used as a tool by one actor in an accountability relationship, and at times as 
a process by other actor(s).  This shifting of categorisation by actors and by time 
periods offers a more nuanced understanding of how accountability mechanisms are 
used by different nonprofit organisations for different purposes and at different 
moments in the accountability relationship. 
6.3.2 Other theoretical frameworks through which the findings might be 
examined 
While Ebrahim’s (2010) nonprofit accountability framework was used as the basis 
for this study, there are other theories and models presented in the existing literature 
on nonprofit accountability and philanthropy, which may be useful as future lenses 
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contributing to the discourse and understanding around accountability beyond the 
for-profit sector.  
PAFs may be considered as a structure that gives expression to the philanthropic 
goals and values of an individual or small family group.  They are a vehicle for 
giving that remains intensely personal, through the form of the legal trust deed and 
organisation created around that vision and values. Each fund exists as an extension 
of an individual or family, but is made up of multiple individuals on the board, as 
well as staff and advisers.  PAFs are therefore a mix between an individual and a 
small group or team.  Given this complex identity, other theories and frameworks 
beyond those such as Ebrahim’s (2010) on nonprofit organisational accountability 
may also provide useful bases for exploring the accountability of PAFs.   
There are four theories that may usefully inform the findings from this study: 
individual accountability theory; theories of publicness and privateness; theories of 
avoiding or resisting accountability, and proto-institutional theory, each of which are 
considered below. 
Theories of individual accountability may help to explain some of the deeper levels 
of accountability revealed in the findings.   Roberts (2009) proposes a form of 
accountability based on the humble understanding that no individual can ever have 
full knowledge of their own actions.  Concurrent internal and external perspectives, 
or the idea of complete openness at the level of the individual rather than the 
organisation, may shed light on accountability to the values of a founder, as 
expressed through a PAF.  In an earlier paper, Roberts (1991) explores the twin 
concepts of individualising accountability and socialising accountability.  He argues 
that while being held accountable enhances or sharpens a person’s sense of self, it 
can also, in different forms, enhance a person’s sense of interdependence with others.  
These two theoretical forms of accountability at an individual level are evident in the 
findings where respondents spoke of the accountability of individual donors or 
founders of PAFs regarding their internal values; and also of the vital role of 
beneficiary partners in carrying out the work funded by the PAF.   
Messner (2009) builds on the work of Butler (2004) regarding the concept of the 
‘accountable self’, concluding that some forms of accountability are “very difficult 
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or even impossible to justify” (p. 918) and advocating for acknowledgement and 
acceptance that there are limits to accountability.  These limits are particularly 
concerned with an individual’s identity and mutual responsibility to others – issues 
that are strongly relevant to PAFs.  Messner questions whether all external 
accountability demands and expectations are justifiable, and concludes that any 
practical decision about accountability “must remain a question of judgement and 
responsibility” (p. 937).  This theoretical conclusion is borne out by the findings of 
this study, where the discretionary nature of most forms of accountability for PAFs 
places decisions about engagement with accountability firmly with the fund rather 
than with external actors.  
There is a conversation in the literature around theories of public-ness and private-
ness of grant-making foundations and the implications for accountability.  For 
example, Fernandez and Hager (2014) examine four contexts of the dimensions of 
publicness/privateness: legal and regulatory, political, economic, and social.  As 
noted in Section 3.5, the public or private nature of grant-making foundations has 
direct implications for their perceived and actual accountabilities.  Fernandez and 
Hager (2014) suggest that in the U.S., philanthropic foundations are treated as private 
organisations, which influences their operations and their accountability to 
stakeholders, and has the effect of distancing them from the public purpose they 
ultimately serve.  Anheier and Leat (2013) frame the debate around the legal 
dimension. 
One strong argument for viewing foundations as public rather than private 
bodies is that public accountability is built into the concept of charity via the 
notion of public benefit that is central to its legal definition. The tax relief33 
and other legal privileges34 enjoyed by foundations are another powerful 
argument for viewing foundations as having a duty of public accountability 
(p. 466). 
These concepts of public versus private accountability were reinforced in the 
findings through expressions of selected or directed transparency, rather than public 
disclosure (Section 5.2.4); as well as a sense of duty to act appropriately for 
                                                 
 
33 Tax relief for Australian foundations includes the deductibility of donations into the fund, GST 
concessions, income tax exemption for the fund, and the rebate of franking credits. 
34 In Australia such privileges include the exemptions available from public reporting requirements, 
optional disclosure of grant-making policies and criteria, trustees/directors and how they are selected, 
and expenses. 
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community benefit purposes, consistent with PAFs’ grant-making purposes (Section 
5.2.10).  The PAFs in this study accepted the need to be accountable, particularly to 
government through the ACNC, but the majority chose not to do so publicly. 
As noted earlier in this chapter (Section 6.2.1), proto-institutional theory considers 
the emergence of new institutions through a process of both collaboration and 
competition between organisations that ultimately creates new practices and forms. 
In the context of organised or structured philanthropy, Mair and Hehenberger (2013) 
“focus on social dynamics resulting from the situated interaction following the 
introduction of a diverging model of philanthropy” (p. 1194).  Likewise, Gomez and 
Atun (2013) consider the emergence of donor agencies (proto-institutions) in global 
health, and find that they differ from established agencies “especially in relation to 
transparency, inclusiveness, accountability and responsiveness to civil society” (p. 
1).  Many of the contexts in which nonprofit accountability is examined, such as the 
U.S., are well established with many organisational forms and norms entrenched. 
Proto-institutional theory might therefore be applied to the emergence of PAFs as a 
relatively new giving structure that has disrupted Australian philanthropy over the 
past 14 years, and is over time creating new perceptions and practices of 
accountability in the sector.  
Finally, theories of avoiding or resisting accountability are relevant given PAFs’ 
high levels of discretion around their accountability.  As noted in Section 3.4.3, ac-
counter-ability is a theory of active resistance to accountability (Joannides, 2012; 
Kamuf, 2007), in which one particular form of accountability, namely numeric or 
financial accountability is criticised.  Accounterability is described by Kamuf as “a 
counter-practice to the numeric evaluation that assumes a prevailing place in public 
discourse” (p. 253) and echoes both Roberts’ (2001) and Messner’s (2009) views in 
suggesting that there are both theoretical and practical limits to the scope and nature 
of accountability, particularly in nonprofit organisations.  Messner acknowledges the 
two, sometimes conflicting sides of accountability obligations “…although avoiding 
accountability may not be unethical from the perspective of the accountable self, it 
can still be unsatisfactory for those who expect to obtain an explanation” (Messner, 
2009, p. 934).  
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Kamuf’s (2007) suggestion that nonprofit organisations are more at ease with non-
numeric accountability is supported by the findings of this study, where PAFs show a 
preference for qualitative forms of accountability such as site visits, discussions, and 
transparency (Section 5.4.3 & Section 5.4.5); in addition to the more traditional and 
quantitative forms such as performance measurement through reporting, albeit 
selective reporting to specific stakeholder groups. 
Anheier and Leat (2013) describe avoidance of accountability in philanthropic 
foundations as a passive or complacent behaviour, taking “the path of least resistance 
in terms of accountability and performance assessment” (p. 469).  These theories of 
avoidance or resistance to accountability are linked to some of the findings of this 
study, e.g. a desire for privacy, founder anonymity, and limitations to public 
transparency. 
Liket (2014) discusses this internal avoidance of accountability, and the 
corresponding low-level external demands for accountability, in terms of the 
potential disengagement of donors if accountability demands on their philanthropy 
are too harsh. 
…an often-raised argument against critically evaluating impact is that 
philanthropy is something deeply personal, and providing a rational or 
scientific perspective might kill the passion that motivated people to engage 
in philanthropy in the first place (Liket, 2014, p. 278) 
Liket (2014) concludes however that this division into emotional and rational 
motivations for evaluation of effectiveness is in fact unfounded, and that “a growing 
body of philanthropists and philanthropic organisations illustrate that thinking 
strategically about your impact actually ignites passion to ‘do good’” (p. 278). 
Avoidance of accountability can also have simple, practical motivations.  The time 
cost to PAFs particularly of accountability through relationships with beneficiaries, 
was seen as very high and something that, while important, had to be managed and 
controlled (Section 5.4.3 & Section 5.4.10).  Particularly for those PAFs without 
employees, decisions around time allocation were pragmatic and changed over time.  
Such practical implications of accountability are explored in the following section. 
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6.4 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY’S FINDINGS 
The systematic examination of accountability of PAFs has a number of benefits for 
Australian charitable organisations through enhancing the understanding of this 
relatively new giving structure, which is expected to have a large impact on the 
nonprofit sector in the future.  As expressed by Wilson (2015, p. 29), “For charities 
looking to tap into this revenue stream [grants from PAFs], it is important they 
understand the structures, how they are used and the motivations for establishing 
them”. 
Four findings from this study with important practical implications relate to: 
 Circular or within-group accountability 
 Downwards accountability to beneficiaries 
 A focus on children of the founder 
 Lack of networking and online presence 
These findings and the associated contributions to practice are considered below. 
6.4.1 Circular or within-group accountability 
The strong sense of circular or within-group accountability (Section 6.2.1 and 6.3.1) 
might lead to the creation of a set of voluntary best-practice guidelines for PAF 
members of a peak body such as Philanthropy Australia35, or indeed to the creation 
of a peak representational body for PAFs themselves, similar to Australian 
Community Philanthropy36 for community foundations or Australian Council for 
International Development (ACFID) for overseas aid organisations.  In the literature, 
this within-group, peer or professional accountability is often discussed in regard to 
collectively developed self-regulation or voluntary mechanisms of accountability 
(see, for example, Murtaza, 2012).  There is, however, a tension between this circular 
accountability and the intensely private nature of many PAFs, which may reconcile 
                                                 
 
35 Philanthropy Australia is the peak membership body for grant-making trusts and foundations in 
Australia.  
36 Australian Community Philanthropy is a membership body specifically for community foundations 
in Australia.  
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over time as PAFs grow, mature and potentially become more distanced from the 
original founder(s).   
The ultimate practical expression of this circular or within-group accountability in a 
philanthropic context is perhaps the Giving Pledge. This is a group drawn from the 
world’s wealthiest individuals, couples and families, led by Melinda and Bill Gates 
and Warren Buffett, who have made a public commitment in writing to give away 
the majority of their wealth. With 137 signatories (as at September 2015), the Giving 
Pledge37 has been described as an extremely exclusive club (Frank, 2011).  For 
donors on a smaller scale, the international organisation Giving What We Can 
requires its members to pledge at least 10% of their income to evidence-based giving 
towards the eradication of extreme poverty (Giving What We Can, 2015).  This 
joining of a giving group or community relates to protecting or increasing an 
individual’s or organisation’s legitimacy and enhancing accountability.  
Circular accountability of PAFs has the potential to grow at national, state and local 
levels both through on-line and in-person groups.  The practical implications for 
DGR1 nonprofit organisations of the findings around circular accountability are that 
PAFs will most likely increasingly communicate with each other and share 
successes, grant-making and internal management strategies.  Further, as PAFs 
become more widely known and inter-connected, grantees will benefit from better 
understanding the PAF sub-sector and potentially also gain from greater access to 
funding opportunities (Cham, 2014). 
6.4.2 Downwards accountability to beneficiaries 
Accountability to beneficiaries was of primary importance to PAFs.  The most 
common answer to research question one was that PAFs perceive that they are 
accountable to their beneficiaries; particularly the nonprofit organisations, but also 
their clients (the ultimate beneficiaries). PAFs want to pursue public benefit 
initiatives and do so through the intermediary of other nonprofit organisations to 
which they give grants. However, accountability was under-developed in regard to 
forms and mechanisms adopted.   There was a difference between what PAFs 
                                                 
 
37 The Giving Pledge is a campaign, rather than an organisation, that was made public in June 2010.  
Pledgers may donate either during their lifetimes, or through their estates (GlassPockets, 2015b).  
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perceive as their accountability to whom, for what, how and why; and what they 
practice.   
What PAFs perceive they do in terms of accountability, or the ways they report being 
accountable, may not be regarded as accountability by their beneficiaries.  PAF 
managers and trustees discussed being accountable to beneficiaries by talking with 
them; making contact with the ultimate beneficiaries to ensure grants are supporting 
programs they would benefit from, rather than those preferred by the nonprofit 
organisations; by having guidelines, criteria and processes that are available on 
request so as not to waste the nonprofit’s time; and by building long-term 
relationships (Section 5.4).  However practitioner literature (e.g. Rourke, 2014) 
suggests that philanthropic foundations are not accountable to beneficiaries, have 
limited engagement, and restrict the information available about their work.  Hence 
there may be a difference between the self-perception of PAFs reported in this study, 
and what their beneficiaries might say (although interviews with beneficiary 
organisations were beyond the scope of this research).   
Comparing findings on the questions of accountable to whom, for what and how, 
there is a disparity revealed.  When asked whether they have a website, or disclose 
their AIS on the ACNC website, managers and trustees of eight of the 10 PAFs 
responded that they did not do those things because they were concerned about the 
privacy of the founder (Section 5.2.2).   However findings reveal a distinction 
between the desire to be more transparent to and engage more with existing and 
future beneficiaries, and the conflicting desire to remain hidden from the view of the 
general public.  
These findings indicate a willingness by PAFs to improve their accountability to 
beneficiaries.  There would be significant benefits to nonprofits through better 
targeting of applications, knowledge of more PAFs, their values and interests, and 
stronger, longer-term partnerships through shared strategic goals.  These might 
emerge from greater engagement with accountability with this particular group of 
actors; however lack of transparency, even to other nonprofits, has been noted as a 
point of contention and frustration in the sector (Cham, 2014). 
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6.4.3 A focus on the founder’s children 
Findings revealed the importance of the founder’s children in regard to 
accountability (Section 5.2.6).  PAF trustees and managers acknowledged the 
importance of shared values around giving being passed on to the next generation, 
but also not wanting to create a burden for those children inheriting the 
responsibilities associated with a PAF.  They summarised the views of the founder as 
a failure of engagement with the PAF by the founders’ children would represent a 
failure by the founder themselves in passing on their values. 
One demonstration of this long-term focus of PAFs seemed to be focused on 
accountability looking forward (i.e. founder’s children), rather than accountability 
looking backwards (founder’s parents or grandparents).  Only one interviewee made 
mention of previous generations, in an unenthusiastic way (Section 5.5.1).  The 
practical implications of this finding for DGR 1 nonprofit organisations are that 
grantees need to be planning to work with a second generation, knowing that a PAF’s 
mission may change, or become broader, influenced by the interests of the next 
generation(s).  An individual relationship with the founder of a PAF may not 
necessarily translate into a long-term relationship with the PAF itself. 
6.4.4 PAF networking and online presence 
As noted in Section 4.4.5, only one of the participating PAFs in this study had a 
dedicated website at the time of data collection, and none had a social media 
presence.  This indicates significant capacity for growth and development of an 
online profile for the purposes of engagement or accountability.  There appears to be 
a barrier for PAFs to overcome to be public or have a public/community presence 
and communicate what they fund.  Narrative reporting was mentioned by three PAFs 
as being of interest for increased transparency and disclosure, and might form the 
future basis for a simple website.  
Many of the founders of the PAFs in this study were wealthy but very private people, 
and to create a fund and also tell the world about it would be uncomfortable.  One 
respondent was clear that they would not have participated in an interview about 
their PAF even two years ago.  Many PAFs will share information on request, but it 
is challenging for them actively go out and promote what they do, in part due to a 
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concern about being bombarded with inappropriate, unconsidered applications, and 
in part due to a reticence to be seen as self-important (Section 5.4.2).    
Another common theme was that there are few private networks or forums where 
PAFs can share information between themselves.  Many interviewees felt there could 
be shared learning opportunities among PAFs but there was not a space or a network 
(either online or in person), where they could safely and openly share challenges and 
successes.  Two respondents referred to informal or in-person networks, and others 
referred to seeking them out, but the lack of forums was highlighted as an issue for 
shared accountability, representing both a practical implication and an opportunity. 
6.5 SUMMARY  
This chapter has discussed the key findings under each of the four research questions 
in this study. PAFs have adopted and adapted differing approaches to accountability, 
based mainly on to whom they are accountable, and their reasons for engaging in 
accountability.  The more pragmatic questions of how and for what PAFs are 
accountable follow on from these first two issues. 
This multi-faceted approach to accountability provides PAFs with the flexibility to 
engage in accountability relationships and activities that match their needs and 
capacity.  The findings of the study show that beneficiaries are central to PAF 
accountability, but also suggest that the forms and practices of accountability to both 
DGR organisations and their clients as the ultimate beneficiaries of PAF grants are 
under-developed.  This study also illustrates that PAFs feel a strong sense of group 
identity, and this is demonstrated through their discussion of a circular or within-
group accountability to other PAFs.  In addition, the findings emphasise the 
responsibility of the ACNC as the regulator of all nonprofit organisations, and the 
positive but limited role played by the ACNC in PAF accountability. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter, the study as a whole is reviewed in Section 7.2.  Section 7.3 presents 
the key findings.  In Section 7.4 the limitations of the study are detailed, and then 
Section 7.5 identifies areas for future research.  Section 7.6 concludes this thesis with 
some closing remarks and reflections.    
7.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
PAFs are a new, rapidly growing part of the philanthropic sector, and this structure is 
very successfully drawing new participants into planned philanthropic giving 
(McLeod, 2013, 2014).  Many of these individuals have built their own wealth 
through entrepreneurship or extremely successful professional careers.  The financial 
entry level for establishing a PAF is lower38 than for more traditional philanthropic 
foundations, making PAFs more accessible to a greater proportion of the population, 
and representing a democratisation of philanthropy (Edwards, 2009).  Their addition 
to the Australian charitable sector has been described as “arguably the single most 
important boost for Australian philanthropy in many decades” (McLeod, 2013, p. 2).  
PAFs are therefore quickly and significantly changing both the demographics and the 
approach of Australian philanthropy, and it is important to explore and understand 
their accountability.   
Further, given the complex and multi-faceted nature of PAF accountability, insights 
drawn from the perceptions of trustees and managers of PAFs on their understanding 
and practice of accountability provide the opportunity to extend and refine existing 
theories of nonprofit accountability in a PAF context. 
A summary of the history of PAFs and their regulatory environment outlined the 
current regulatory and professional environment in which PAFs operate, and the 
external influences on their accountability.  Further examination of influences on 
                                                 
 
38 Variously cited as between $500,000 (Australian Philanthropic Services, 2014) and $1 million 
(ANZ Trustees, n.d.) 
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accountability in three overseas countries – the U.S., the U.K. and New Zealand – 
highlighted the comparatively light regulatory accountability of PAFs, and the 
importance of the distinct cultural context of PAFs in Australian philanthropy. 
The literature review examined the concept, definitions, forms and theories of 
accountability, as well as related concepts such as transparency that are closely 
associated with accountability in the literature.  Roberts’ (2009) definition of 
accountability was identified as being most applicable to this study, due to its 
emphasis on relationships and mutual dependence.  Theories of accountability in 
nonprofit organisations were reviewed, examining the relevance of agency theory, 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory to PAF accountability.  Ebrahim’s (2010) 
framework of nonprofit accountability was considered to offer the broadest and least 
restrictive theoretical basis for exploring accountability in a context where little is 
known about the perceptions, understandings, activities and motivations of the 
parties involved.  Accountability in the context of endowed philanthropic 
organisations was then considered, with reference to the professional and academic 
literature, before briefly reviewing the four research questions in light of what is 
known about PAF accountability to whom, for what, how, and why. 
The research design and methods used in this study were discussed, with semi-
structured interviews chosen as the primary data collection method.  This method 
reflects the qualitative, exploratory nature of the research and is consistent with the 
aim of extending and refining Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework of 
accountability.   A snowball sampling method resulted in the recruitment of trustees 
and managers of 10 PAFs from three different states for interviews in November and 
December 2014.  The interview transcripts were then analysed and coded to themes, 
both theory driven and arising from the data.   
Findings included concepts of relationships and mutual dependence that emerged 
around to whom and how PAFs are accountable, consistent with Roberts’ (2009) 
view of accountability.  These are evident in the first sentence of Roberts’ 
description of ‘intelligent’ accountability. 
What emerges in this space is something of the weight of our practical 
dependence upon each other which accountability as talk, listening, and 
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asking questions then allows us to explore and investigate (Roberts, 2009, p. 
969). 
Findings revealed PAFs perceive that they are accountable to their beneficiaries, the 
general public and the ultimate beneficiaries of their grants – echoing Robert’s 
concept of “practical dependence on each other”.  PAFs also perceive that they are 
accountable through in-person meetings, engagement with beneficiaries, and 
openness to inquiry and discussion – reflecting Roberts’ relational emphasis on 
“accountability as talk, listening, and asking questions”. 
Based on the findings of this study, the accountability of PAFs is more diverse, and 
more complex than the literature suggests.  Each of the 10 interviews revealed new 
insights regarding to whom PAFs might be accountable, whether through an 
expansion of a particular group of actors, or an entirely new group, as compared with 
the academic and practitioner literature. These new insights underscore a paucity of 
research in regard to PAF accountability, a motivation for this study. 
In philanthropy, there is limited attention paid to compliance-level accountability 
(Leat, 2004) as part of a fund’s broader accountability.  This taken-for-granted aspect 
of compliance or regulatory accountability, combined with PAFs’ financial security, 
enables them to focus on a much wider landscape, over an extended time frame 
(Anheier & Leat, 2013), without the short-term focus of other nonprofits where 
strategic planning or future outlook is often dominated by financial concerns.   
PAFs have money and resources, and they have significant discretion in how they 
allocate them.  Endowments mean that PAFs are more flexible in terms of their 
accountability, as they are not required to report to external funders, which differs 
from other nonprofit organisations.  However, given PAFs are not the only wealthy 
and endowed nonprofit organisations, learnings from this study are also applicable to 
other nonprofits with large endowments (e.g. charities that have received a 
significant bequest, or built up financial reserves over time).  The key findings of this 
study are therefore not necessarily specific to PAFs and may well have wider 
implications.  
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7.3 KEY FINDINGS 
The existing literature on philanthropic accountability contends that accountability is 
determined by the extent to which a foundation is considered to be a public or private 
entity (e.g. Fernandez & Hager, 2014), and the subsequent responsibility (or absence 
thereof) for public transparency and reporting (e.g. Rourke, 2014; Tomei, 2013).  
From this perspective, the discretionary public accountability practiced by Australian 
PAFs supports the argument that PAFs are private entities, and their motivations and 
purposes for engaging in accountability determine the extent to which they engage 
with accountability.   
Four key findings that emerged from this study are: 
 PAFs exercise discretionary choice in almost all forms of accountability.  The 
level of accountability that they benefit from or find useful is the level at 
which they operate. 
 PAFs engage in accountability for primarily internal reasons which relate to 
their mission and purpose; their effectiveness in achieving that mission 
through the work of their beneficiaries; and their desire to lead others in 
philanthropy. External isomorphic pressures are also influencing 
accountability. 
 in determining and selecting their own accountability, they are influenced by 
their philanthropic peers, in particular other PAFs. 
 accountability for PAFs does not necessarily include public disclosure or 
transparency. 
This section summarises each of these key findings and offers perspectives on their 
implications for theory and practice. 
7.3.1 Discretionary accountability of PAFs 
PAFs practice both mandatory and discretionary accountability (Section 6.2.1). 
However, the extent of the discretion exercised by PAFs in this regard is significant, 
reinforcing the debate around the public versus private nature of PAFs.  The 
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following two hypothetical examples illustrate the differing approaches that may be 
chosen by PAFs.  
 At the private end of the accountability spectrum, one PAF might request that its 
AIS report to the ACNC be withheld from the ACNC Register, have no website or 
online presence, encourage its trustees not to discuss its existence, name the PAF 
anonymously rather than incorporating a family surname, not accept unsolicited 
applications for funding, and use a post office box as its registered address.    
At the public end of the accountability spectrum, another PAF might choose for its 
AIS report to be publicly available through the ACNC Register, have an extensive 
and frequently updated website, promote its work through social and general media 
and in person, encourage trustees (and staff) to discuss its work and mission in public 
forums, name the PAF after its founders, provide full contact details to the public, 
accept unsolicited applications for funding,  develop long-term relationships with 
grantee organisations, and welcome questioning of its activities including its 
investments. 
The major differences between these two approaches to accountability, both of which 
comply with regulatory requirements, highlight the degree to which accountability is 
discretionary for PAFs.  The PAFs included in this study clustered around the middle 
of this spectrum.  For example, only two disclosed their AIS report through the 
ACNC Register and only one had a dedicated website at the time of data collection; 
however seven of the 10 PAFs carry a family surname and one carries the founder’s 
first name.   
The implications of this wide-ranging discretion in engagement with accountability 
are perhaps yet to unfold.  Concern regarding the potential for fraud and scandals in 
the sector to damage the reputation of PAFs as a group (Section 5.5.2) may yet prove 
prophetic.  As the ACNC builds public trust in the charitable sector, the role of the 
Commission in enhancing public confidence in nonprofit organisations, including 
philanthropic foundations, will become increasingly apparent (ACNC, 2013). Hence, 
discretionary accountability rests perhaps on the continued integrity of the sector; 
without which such discretion may be replaced with greater levels of regulation. 
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7.3.2 Reasons for PAFs engaging in accountability 
The internal motivations and purposes for PAFs engaging in accountability, as 
revealed in this study (Section 5.5.1), are leading to a general acceptance, evident in 
nine of the 10 interviews, that greater accountability is both beneficial and 
unavoidable.  These reasons relate to PAFs’ effectiveness in achieving their mission 
through the work of their beneficiaries; and their desire to lead others in 
philanthropy. 
PAFs are additionally subject to pressures to comply with a wider societal trend 
towards accountability, audit and measurement of value (Leat, 2004; Liket, 2014).  
Against this backdrop, the U.S. philanthropic sector has witnessed a steady increase 
in the number of foundations participating in transparency and accountability 
activities, and the number of ‘watch-dog’ organisations that are monitoring their 
work (Phillips, 2013).  As awareness of these trends filters through the Australian 
philanthropic sector, there is a slowly building momentum for PAFs and other 
foundation types to ‘take part’ or engage in similar accountability practices.  
The implications for the nonprofit sector more broadly of this increasing acceptance 
of greater accountability by PAFs will likely be a gradual rise in the volume and 
quality of information disclosed by them, and a trend towards more partnerships 
between PAFs and their grantee organisations, as such information leads to clearer 
and closer alignment of values and missions over time. 
Reporting on mission and impact by all charities including PAFs is proposed in the 
U.K. as a way of refocusing the activities of the charity away from its own interests 
and in favour of its beneficiaries (New Philanthropy Capital, 2015).  Such reporting 
in Australia, even if voluntary, would provide a “powerful nudge” (p. 6) towards 
accountability.  In the absence of regulatory requirements, there is significant 
potential for the membership-based bodies such as Philanthropy Australia and others 
to provide leadership in this area.  
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7.3.3 Influence of other PAFs on accountability 
The mutual influence of PAFs on PAF accountability is a key finding from the study, 
and is significant as this circular accountability will likely increase in relevance over 
time as the number and the size of PAFs grows.  The group identity of PAFs was 
developed through the two government inquiries affecting PAFs (in 2009 and 2012), 
through the public submissions to these inquiries, from the clearly defined structure 
and template trust deed that PAFs share, and from the slowly growing public profile 
of PAF founders ‘giving back’ to society (Schmidt, 2014).   
The implications of this circular accountability will likely be explored further if 
PAFs are connected with or involved in frauds and scandals that would affect all 
PAFs by association.  The goodwill and public trust in philanthropic foundations 
(Carman, 2010; Dhanani & Connolly, 2012; O’Neill, 2002) will likely be tested if 
PAFs are revealed to be inappropriately benefiting their founders, or in breach of the 
PAF Guidelines.   
The higher profile slowly being adopted by some individual PAFs for the purposes of 
leadership and inspiring others into establishing giving structures will also increase 
the public profile of PAFs as a group.  The rise of giving circles and similar vehicles 
in Australia as a form of group giving complementary to more traditional trust 
structures is developing the acceptance and understanding of philanthropy as a 
shared activity with decisions made in semi-public groups rather than private forums 
such as boards of trustees (Ray, 2013).  Hence, developments in the philanthropic 
sector as well as the PAF sub-sector will likely influence the future of PAF 
accountability, a dynamic and evolving area. 
7.3.4 For PAFs, accountability does not necessarily involve transparency 
Eight of the 10 PAF managers and trustees interviewed for this study did not see 
public accountability via transparency as a necessary component of their overall 
accountability.  Several reasons for this lack of disclosure to the general public were 
discussed, in particular privacy and the wish not to be overwhelmed with funding 
applications (Section 5.4.5).  PAF managers and trustees perceived that they were 
able to achieve an acceptable level of accountability through targeted engagement 
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with key stakeholders, such as beneficiary organisations, family members, regulatory 
bodies, and other philanthropic entities.  While accountability to the general public as 
a stakeholder group was important to PAFs, this was discussed as being achieved 
through grant application processes, criteria for grants (e.g. requirement for a broad 
community benefit), the presence of an external responsible person on the board of 
trustees of the PAF, and through compliance with the regulatory requirements of the 
ACNC and the ATO, as representatives of the Australian public.   
The link between accountability and transparency is strong in the U.S. philanthropic 
sector (Rourke, 2014), and also in the academic literature (e.g. Dhanani & Connelly, 
2012; Liket, 2014; Tyler, 2013).  However, the findings from this study suggest that 
the connection between accountability and transparency in the form of public 
disclosure is less strong in an Australian context.  The smaller size of the 
philanthropic sector in Australia (Coyte et al., 2013), the strong egalitarian ethos that 
persists in Australian society (McDonald & Scaife, 2011), the desire for privacy 
and/or anonymity, and the voluntary nature of regulatory disclosure combine to 
create a different context for Australian philanthropic accountability in the current 
environment.  Liffman (2008) expresses these differences as 
…giving in Australia reflects our history of apparent unease about 
extravagant wealth, our sense of privacy about personal convictions, and our 
expectations of a significant role for government in the provision of basic 
services (p. 4). 
This finding highlights the importance of clearly specifying the social and cultural 
context of philanthropy, as context affects the generalisability of research findings in 
regard to accountability in both theory and practice. 
7.4 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
One of the key constraints to conducting studies on PAFs is the restricted, 
intermittent and sometimes outdated data available about their location, size, 
founders, and areas of interest (Cham, 2014; Coyte et al., 2013); coupled with their 
preference for privacy.   While participants willingly and openly engaged in this 
study, data was limited to a sample of 10 PAFs’ managers and trustees.  The voices 
of the nonprofit beneficiaries of PAF grants were unfortunately outside the scope of 
this study.   
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Another limitation of the study was that the interviewees were all white Australians.   
It is possible that PAFs as a structure are not currently attracting people from diverse 
ethnic or cultural groups; however this cannot be inferred from the small sample size 
in this study.  Cultural diversity in PAFs may be an issue in future, as there are 
significant funds flowing into this sector (generating tax deductions), and the grant-
making from those funds will to some extent reflect the founders’ culture and their 
values.  Sharp (2012) proposes actively encouraging individuals and families from a 
broad range of cultural and ethnic backgrounds in a U.S. context to establish 
philanthropic foundations, with the aim of increasing diversity in grant-making. 
The Australian context of the study was unique, and differences with overseas are an 
area for future research.  The findings are specific to Australia, as no other country 
has discretion in reporting to the same extent.  In the U.S. there are greater reporting 
requirements, information is in the public domain, and foundations have no 
discretion around disclosure.  Members of the public may look up a U.S. 
foundation’s latest Internal Revenue Service (IRS) return and see how much interest 
was earned, how many donations were received, internal operating expenses, and the 
number, amount, and beneficiaries of grants.  In Australia, the newly introduced 
ACNC reporting is far less comprehensive.  For this reason, comparisons with family 
foundations in the U.S. are difficult because there are very different mandated levels 
of compliance and reporting accountability.  Notwithstanding these limitations, 
valuable insights into accountability of this notoriously private and increasingly 
important philanthropic group have been obtained, providing the basis for future 
research in a number of areas. 
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study provides an empirical basis for future research on accountability in 
philanthropic foundations.  The literature review highlighted two main areas of 
tension, centred around: 
 the potential for undue influence of endowed philanthropic foundations in a 
democracy, and  
 whether foundations are by nature public or private organisations. 
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The issue of undue influence was not raised directly by respondents in this study, 
indicating a possible disconnection between much of the academic literature on 
accountability in philanthropic structures or organisations (mostly published in the 
U.S. and the U.K.) (Section 3.4), and those practicing grant-making in Australia.   
Three levels of privacy of PAFs are identified in the literature (Section 3.4.3), being 
the privacy of individual or family donors, the privacy of the foundations they create 
as organisations, and the nature of foundations as a group, as private versus public 
entities.  The public versus private nature of foundations was raised in the findings, 
but at an individual and organisational level only, rather than at a sector or national 
level (Section 5.2.4). Hence the issue of the privateness and/or publicness of 
endowed philanthropic foundations is a worthwhile subject for further research.   
Interviewing the beneficiaries of PAFs would be a valuable complementary future 
study in order to gain insights into their accountability relationships with PAFs.  It 
would be preferable to interview nonprofit organisations that were the beneficiaries 
of multiple PAFs to ensure that the study’s findings were not based on one specific 
relationship, but rather on multiple relationships – in a sense, the reverse of grant-
making, which is a one-to-many relationship. 
A natural extension of this thesis would be to explore accountability in other 
philanthropic giving structures/models, such as accountability in giving circles and 
accountability in community foundations (often structured as PuAFs).  Like PAFs, 
community foundations and giving circles are growing in popularity and number 
(Australian Community Philanthropy, 2015; Ray, 2013).  Thus it would be 
interesting to research the accountability of community foundations, as they have 
many more stakeholders in terms of their donor pool, and theoretically their 
connections with their local beneficiaries and communities would be stronger.  
Giving circles are donor groups where all members contribute the same amount and 
combine funds to make a small number of bigger grants than they otherwise could or 
would as individuals.  Accountability in this form of philanthropy would be of 
particular interest as the circle members usually vote as to which organisation 
receives the grant.  Hence accountability for grant-making is typically supported by a 
democratic process (Eikenberry, 2005), but other dimensions of perceived 
accountability in the context of giving circles are less clear. 
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Another area of interest for future research would be ageing, dementia and 
philanthropy.  Two respondents spoke of a founder who could no longer be involved 
with the PAF due to dementia or lack of cognitive awareness or alertness due to age.  
The increase in dementia rates as people live longer has implications for 
philanthropy. There may be succession planning challenges, particularly in the 
absence of younger family members who might naturally be appointed to the board.  
These issues relate to the changing identity and accountability of a PAF over time. 
Personality theory may play an important role in understanding accountability at an 
individual level in a PAF context. Based on the findings that suggest a potential link 
between levels of PAF accountability and personality (Sections 5.5.1 and 6.2.4), it 
would be interesting to further explore personality theory and its possible 
relationship with individual and team accountability.  One PAF manager also 
identified that individuals of strong personality types were more likely to establish 
PAFs (Section 5.2.11).  A possible correlation may lie with theories of 
entrepreneurship, in the context of individuals who have created and crystallised 
wealth through entrepreneurship and then go on to establish philanthropic giving 
structures (Acs & Phillips, 2002; Gilding, 2005; Williamson & Scaife, 2013). 
Another area for future research would be a longitudinal study of PAF 
accountability, rather than one based on a particular point in time.  While a PAF may 
initially be considered as an extension of its founder(s), over the life of the 
organisation it will be governed by a changing board of trustees, potentially 
including the founder’s children, and may also be managed by a succession of 
professional staff.  As the group of individuals involved in the PAF grows and 
changes, the perceptions of PAF accountability will also likely evolve. 
Also of note was that faith or religious beliefs were not mentioned in relation to 
accountability.  One trustee talked about accountability to the founder and the 
founder’s faith, but not religious beliefs embedded in the organisation itself through 
its mission, grant-making areas of interest, or beneficiaries.  Given the strong 
evidence in the literature around faith as a motivation for giving (see, for example, 
Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011), this finding (or the absence of it) is worthy of future 
exploration, in particular the influence of culture and country-based context. 
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Further research into these different contexts (accountability in community 
foundations, in giving circles, and over time); phenomena (ageing and reduced 
mental capacity of trustees and founders of PAFs, faith and religious belief, and 
privacy); and theories (personality theory, entrepreneurship traits, and PAF founders) 
will provide further insights for both theory and practice in Australian structured 
philanthropy.   
7.6 SUMMARY  
This study contributes to both the theoretical and practical understanding of 
accountability in endowed philanthropic foundations, by adopting and exploring 
Ebrahim’s (2010) conceptual framework of nonprofit accountability in the specific 
context of Australian PAFs.  The findings from the study suggest that Ebrahim’s 
framework may be modified and extended in several ways to better capture the 
perceived accountability of PAFs.  Key findings were that PAFs exercise 
discretionary choice in almost all forms of accountability; and they engage in 
accountability for primarily internal reasons which relate to their mission and 
purpose and their desire to lead others in philanthropy.  PAFs are influenced by their 
philanthropic peers, in particular other PAFs; and their accountability does not 
necessarily include public disclosure or transparency. 
The findings from this study suggest that the Australian philanthropic sector may 
possibly see an increase in circular or within-group accountability in the future.  
PAFs reported a sense of accountability to each other, in particular not wanting to 
damage the PAF ‘brand’.   This was perhaps because PAFs are a very clearly defined 
and identified giving structure, so no individual PAF wished to be in the public eye 
for the wrong reason.  This may not necessarily mean fraud or scandal, but making a 
grant that for some (unforeseeable) reason has adverse implications.   
PAFs also aspired to be seen as leaders within their group, and therefore wanted to 
be demonstrating best practice, with the aim that newer PAFs might follow and learn 
from them.   Wanting to be exemplars, accountability for PAFs was a way that they 
could show leadership on their terms.  The creation of a PAF suggests founders are 
strongly engaged in philanthropy, and accountability helps to achieve the intended 
purposes more effectively.  There is also a reputational element to best practice that 
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was not overtly discussed by interviewees beyond an expressed desire to demonstrate 
leadership in their sub-sector. 
At present the population of PAFs is quite hidden but as the numbers increase they 
will inevitably have a higher profile.  Media about philanthropy typically focuses on 
the number and size of PAFs, and the ‘biggest’: the biggest grant, the biggest 
foundation, the biggest donation (McDonald & Scaife, 2011).  In a more populated 
and diverse future field of PAFs, engagement with accountability to demonstrate 
professionalism and excellence may increase, leading to an informal hierarchy of 
PAFs based on a tacit within-group understanding of the strengths, expertise and 
interests of each.  As these changes unfold over the next few years, accountability 
may become a tool for PAFs in positioning and differentiating themselves from their 
peers.   
While currently only accounting for an estimated 5% of total giving in Australia 
(McLeod, 2013), PAFs’ growth rate is significantly faster than other forms of giving 
(McLeod, 2013).  Thus, they are likely to have a strong influence on Australia’s 
philanthropic future. In April 2015, the Prime Minister’s Community Business 
Partnership announced a second Giving Australia (2015) study, a decade after the 
original research was undertaken.  This second iteration of Giving Australia will map 
a larger, more diverse and more professional philanthropic sector, which is 
increasingly engaging with accountability in many forms.  This study has highlighted 
the strong focus of PAFs on accountability through relationships.   
Successful engagement with accountability for a PAF results in greater impact and 
satisfaction for those involved in the fund.   The importance of accountability 
therefore lies in its ability to spur change and improvement in PAFs. “At the heart of 
accountability is a social acknowledgement and an insistence that one’s actions make 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1. Tell me the story of the establishment of the foundation.  Why was it established?  
What was happening at that time? 
2. What is the purpose of the foundation?  Is this the same as its mission? 
3. Can you tell me about your role in the foundation? 
4. Your organisation is called a Private Ancillary Fund.  What does “private” in this 
context mean to you?  What (if any) information about your PAF is publicly 
available? 
5. When you are making decisions around grant-making or investment, whose 
interests do you consider?   To whom do you feel you might owe an explanation 
for a decision? (accountability to whom?) 
6. Are all of those interests equal?  Are some more important than others?  In what 
ways are they differentiated? 
7. For each of the responses identified at Q.5 above, then ask the following three 
questions: 
 “and that’s because…?” (accountability why?) 
 “what does that involve?” “What does that mean in practice?” 
(accountability how?)  
 “what do you see as their interest in what you do?” (accountability for 
what?)  
8. What follows?”  What would happen if you didn’t take their interests into 
account? (sanctions)  
9. What do you see as your unique contribution to society/community?  
(accountable for existence) How do you demonstrate this contribution? 
10. We’ve covered a lot of questions in a short period of time.  Do you want to go 
back and add any further comments to your previous responses? 
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APPENDIX B: POST-INTERVIEW REFLECTION QUESTIONS 
 













  Recorder worked? (spare batteries for recorder) 
  Printed copy of consent form signed? 
  Information about the PAF, if publicly available? 
  Any recommendations from them for further interviewees, if needed? 
  Thank you card or e-mail sent 
Reflective questions  
Any key themes from the interview? 
 
 




Describe the environment of the interview, e.g. location, noise level, time of day 
 
 
Any notes about the participant? Did they seem comfortable/uncomfortable?  What 
was their perspective?  Background? 
 
 
Any learnings for future interviews? 
 
 





APPENDIX C: CODING BOOK USED IN DATA ANALYSIS 










Theory To whom (person, 
group, agency or 
statement) is the 
PAF accountable or 
responsible in some 
way 
Well there are a couple of accountabilities.  
One is either legal or moral, obviously to the 
founder, and to ensure that their mission 
statement is adhered to as much as one can.  
There is accountability to the community at 
large.  Accountability to the grantees in 
particular.  We have an overriding 




Theory For what activities, 
actions or decisions 
is the PAF 
accountable 
It’s money that would have been paid to the 
tax office.  We basically put up our hand to 
say we can spend it better.  So we have an 
obligation to spend it better and I have no 
issue with someone knowing where we put it 




Theory Through what 
methods, processes, 
or procedures is the 
PAF accountable 
I suppose one of the restrictions is that they 
can only give to a DGR 1.  So I think the 
accountability comes from the fact that to get 
the DGR 1 status you have to jump through so 
many hoops and it has to be signed off by 
government.  So I think the government are 
basically saying, “Well this is an organisation 
that we’ve endorsed to a level that we’d be 
satisfied if we were potentially funding them 
with tax dollars”, and a lot of them obviously 
are funded with tax dollars, “so we’re 
comfortable with you putting your dollars in 
there which would have been tax dollars”.  So 
I think in a way that to me is a significant level 





Theory For what reasons is 
the PAF 
accountable, what 
are the motivations 
or inducements for 
accountability 
 
I will be so clean because I would never ever 
want to see our foundation publicly exposed 
for doing something.  It doesn’t matter how 
small it is, it just would not go down well.   
 
Board/trustees Data Text coded to 
topics concerning 
boards as groups, 
individual board 
members or trustees 
of PAF, including 
the designated 
Responsible Person 
Not formally in that I know the chairman 
would like to see a different make-up on the 
board but [the founder] is quite untrusting of 
people in general.  So he doesn’t feel 
comfortable with changing the make-up of the 
board at this point in time.  I imagine once 
she has passed away it will have a broader 
skill set and a larger number.  Maybe not a 
massive number but I imagine a couple of 
extra appointments with far different skill sets 




Data Text coded to PAF 
co-funding an 
So how I see it working is we’re the only 
funder.  The program started as of today.  
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Half way through the year, next year, I’d like 
to think that the evaluation has commenced 
and then I will go to some other co-funders 
and say, “Look if you are thinking of 
distributing $100,000 to this program why 
don’t you just distribute $20,000, start getting 
the results a year later and on those results 
we can all start to ramp up what we put in 
there with a level of confidence.”  But this is 
all new to me.  It’s an evolving thing.  You 
learn.  I’m not in the business of growing a 
project for ego reasons.  I want everybody to 
understand the risk and have some real 
satisfaction, that there’s a real chance of it 
being a good program. 
 





wider family groups 
 
They wanted to involve the children, the 
grandchildren, in the process and so they 
were very clear about opening up and inviting 
the children to submit ideas for projects that 
they wanted to support. 
 
Founders Data Text coded about 
the founder of the 





Actually I think that is a really, really 
important point with regard to PAFs, is that 
PAFs are new and PAFs are usually set up by 
people who are self-made and so there is very 
much that sense of they’re entrepreneurial, I 
made it, and I’ll do what the hell I want to do 
with it.  I don’t have any obligation to leave 
anything to my kids.  They can make their 




PAFs as a 
group 
Data Text coded about 
PAFs as group or 
structure type, and 
the influence or 
impact they have on 
philanthropy and 
the nonprofit sector 
 
So this PAF has opened up the ability for 
younger families or new people to do that and 
build that longevity of philanthropy that only 




Data Text coded about 
the investments and 
investment policies 
and procedures of 
the PAF 
We just made our very first impact investment, 
and very interested, and it’s again something 
that I’m personally interested in so I 
sometimes bring that up in board meetings.  
They haven’t been as out there with social 
impact bonds because they mostly have been 
in New South Wales.  There hasn’t been a lot 
here.  But they are very interested in impact 
investing and interested in anything from 
people who are moving the corpus into - who 
are making commitments to move corpus into 
social impact investing.  So I feel like there’s 
really an understanding and appreciation of 
well our investments really should align with 
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Example from text from interview 
transcripts 
our strategy if we’re supporting environment.  
 
Peer influence Data Text coded about 
the influence of 
peers on the PAF, 
and the influence of 
the PAF on peers 
(perhaps child code 
of leadership here?) 
I guess I’m hoping to draw people into the 
world of philanthropy in the same way I was 
drawn into it and philanthropy takes all 
forms.  Not just about setting up a PAF.  
Workplace giving is an area I have a 
particular interest in.  I think there’s a lot 
more that could be done in that area.  So if I 
can stand up there and say, “I have a 
foundation”, that in itself sends a message 
and then you talk about your personal 
experiences and what you see out there and 
what people can do, I think a lot of people 




Data Text coded about 
issues of power 
and/or control that 
arise (internally or 
externally) 
They’re usually pretty strong people and they 
usually kind of like that idea that they’ll 
control beyond the grave.  The things that are 
very important to them will continue when 
they’re gone because they’ve made provision 
and they’ve ring fenced it and it’s solid and 
no-one can touch it and no-one can take it to 
court and challenge it.  
 
Privacy of PAF Data Text coded about 
the privacy of the 
PAF, including 
policies and 
attitudes to privacy, 
changes in privacy 
levels, reasons for 
privacy, and 
difference between 
private and public 
My concept of private is it’s limited within - 
perhaps it’s in the same way as the private 
versus public company sector.  Generally a 
private company is a closely held company 
with only a handful of owners and people that 
are running it and often within a family group 
or small amount of family.  A public company 
is massive and lots of people can come and go 
and huge amounts of stakeholders.  So I think 
that’s my concept.  I understand that there is 
a different tax and legal distinction between 
the public foundations and the private ones. 
 
Purpose and 
mission of PAF 
Data Text coded about 
the reasons for the 
PAFs existence, 




The big picture purpose of the foundation - 
after some discussion - it wasn’t like we went 
in with a particular purpose.  We kind of went 
in with the concept, but some people might go 
in because they’ve seen a particular issue 
that’s touched them and they say, “Okay, this 
is what I want to devote my time and money”.  
We didn’t have that.  The foundation came 
first then it was thinking about well what is 
the foundation going to support?  There were 
conversations about that, and in the end I 
would summarise it by saying that we decided 
to try to tackle the world’s biggest problem, 
as we see it.  We’re obviously tiny and 
whatever problem we try and tackle we’re not 
going to solve it but if we can contribute to 
solving the world’s biggest problem, then 
that’s our aim.  
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Example from text from interview 
transcripts 
Quotable quotes Data Where something 





sentiment, or is 
memorable 
 
I think the whole idea [of a PAF] is it’s a 
closely held foundation for a closely held 
group to do their private philanthropic things. 
 
Source of funds Data Text coded about 
the origin of the 
funds now in the 
PAF 
No, I don’t believe it had anything to do with 
her husband.  I believe her father and uncle 
perhaps had some family businesses which 
she inherited.  She also worked her whole life 
and then had her own investment portfolio 
that she herself had managed and had made 
some good investments.  So it was a 
combination.  But there definitely was a little 




Data Text coded about 
tax deductions for 
gifts into the PAF, 
the ATO, and the 
concept of foregone 
tax revenue 
We put in another half million dollars the 
following year and then I retired, so the tax 
effectiveness was taken care of.  Might I say 
that people talk about tax effective donations 
and I think there’s another way of looking at 
it, particularly if you’re getting a tax break of 
46 cents in the dollar.  It’s effectively I’m 
donating a dollar and the government is 
donating a dollar.  It’s a matching program.  
It changes the way people view it because 
people talk about it’s tax driven.  It is, but the 
more productive way of looking at it is saying, 
“The government is running a matching 





Data Text coded about 
time, time frames, 
changes in the PAF 
over time, and the 
future of the PAF 
So to me it’s the longevity of this whole thing 
and the growth of it - the potential to get a 
cluster in a region that develops a strong 
[xxx] program.  So I guess that gets back to 
my life as a stockbroker and running a 
business and thinking strategically about that 
business - long term - what’s sustainable.  I’m 
trying to get some satisfaction out of starting 
something, seeing it grow 
 
To whom not 
accountable 
Data Text coded about to 
whom the PAF 
does not consider 
itself accountable 
Well they don’t seem too concerned with say 
the tax office or any of the government 
authorities.  The regulatory doesn’t come into 


































board  members  of  Private  Ancillary  Funds  (PAFs)  to  explore  the  forms  and  relationships  of 
accountability of  their  organisations.    This  relatively  new  giving  structure  has  created  strong  and 
sustained  growth  in  the philanthropic  sector over  the past  13  years,  in  regard  to  the number of 






Your participation will  involve an  interview by  telephone or  in person at an agreed  location which 









Your  participation  in  this  project  is  entirely  voluntary.  If  you  do  agree  to  participate  you  can 






It  is  expected  that  this  project  will  not  benefit  you  directly.  However,  it  may  benefit  Australian 
philanthropic  foundations and  the communities  they serve.   The published  thesis will be available 
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All  comments and  responses will be  treated  confidentially unless  required by  law.   The names of 
individual  persons  or  organisations  (i.e.  PAFs)  are  not  required  in  any  of  the  responses.    No 
individuals or organisations will be named  in  the  research  thesis, but will  instead be  identified by 
number (e.g. PAF1, PAF2). 
 
The  interviews will  involve audio  recording, with  your written permission.    If audio  recorded,  the 
recording will not be used for any other purpose than the research, and only the researcher will have 
access  to  the  recording.    Transcription  will  be  done  by  a  professional  transcription  service,  and 
transcriber(s) will be asked to sign a confidentiality agreement. 
 
Please note  that non‐identifiable data collected  for  this project may also be used  for comparative 
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APPENDIX E: TO WHOM DO PAF MANAGERS AND TRUSTEES PERCEIVE THE PAF TO BE ACCOUNTABLE? 
The strongest response category for each individual PAF is bolded and underlined, representing visually the accountability which the 
interviewees discussed most. 
 Beneficiary 
Orgs    
(DGR 1) 












Other PAFs Ultimate 
bene-
ficiaries 
PAF1 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 2 2 0 
PAF2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PAF3 2 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 4 
PAF4 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
PAF5 4 2 1 3 4 0 1 1 2 0 
PAF6 2 2 3 5 1 0 2 1 3 0 
PAF7 2 6 5 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 
PAF8 5 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 0 4 
PAF9 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
PAF10 3 3 1 2 1 3 1 2 0 0 
Total references (no. 
of sources, out of a 
possible 10) 
23 (9) 21 (10) 17 (7) 16 (7) 11 (7) 10 (5) 8 (6) 8 (5) 8 (4) 8 (2) 
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Search terms (including stemmed 
words) 
Number of uses 






Accountability accountable OR accountability 61 9 
Responsibility responsible  OR responsibility OR 
obligation 
56 9 
Compliance compliance OR compliant OR legal 
OR regulation OR regulatory OR 
fiduciary 
24 7 
Trust trust OR trustworthy 21 7 
Materiality/ 
Significance 





objective OR objectivity OR 
subjective OR subjectivity 
11 4 
Expectations expectation OR conform OR 
conformity 
10 8 
Ethics ethics OR ethical 9 6 
Honoring honour OR honouring 7 2 
Distance distance OR confidence 6 5 
Transparency transparency OR transparent 6 3 
Consequences consequence OR punishment OR 
enforcement OR sanction 
5 2 
Judgment judge OR judgement OR judging 5 3 
Responsiveness responsive OR responsiveness OR 
answerability OR answerable 
4 2 
Exposure exposure OR scandal OR blame 3 2 
Justification justify OR justification 1 1 
Appearance appearance OR impression OR 
reputation 
0 0 
Inclusivity inclusive  OR inclusivity 0 0 
Stewardship steward OR stewardship 0 0 
 
